Invazija SAD na Grenadu

Invazija SAD na Grenadu


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25. oktobra 1983., šest dana nakon što je stalanistička sekta Bernarda Coarda pogubio premijera Maurice Bishop, oružane snage Sjedinjenih Država iskrcale su trupe na plaže u Grenadi. Da bi razumjele zašto i gdje je invazija Grenade izvršila 7000 američkih vojnika, uz oko 300 vojnih osoba s okolnih otoka, čitatelj bi trebao znati malo o povijesti koja je dovela do sukoba.Grenada, prve godineGrenada je malo ostrvo od 135 kvadratnih milja, sa oko 95.000 stanovnika. To je valovito, planinsko ostrvo dobro poznato po mirisnim začinskim drvećem i drugim biljkama za proizvodnju, uključujući muškatni oraščić, karanfilić, đumbir, cimet i kakao. Prvi kontakt stranih naroda uspostavio je Kristofor Kolumbo 1498. godine. Vincent, koji je nisu htjeli izgubiti svoje trgovačke puteve prema kopnu. Britanci su povratili kontrolu nad ostrvom 1783. godine, a od Grenade postali krunska kolonija 1877.Do danasKonačno, 1974. godine Grenadi je priznata nezavisnost od Britanije. Nova vlada, koju je predvodio Sir Eric Gairy, polako se kretala prema totalitarnoj državi, što je izazvalo pobunu. Kada je Gairy bio u New Yorku, govoreći u Ujedinjenim narodima u ožujku 1979., Moris Bishop, omiljeni i obrazovani ljevičar, predvodio je beskrvni udar kako bi uzurpirao kontrolu nad grenadskom vladom. Biskup je zagovarao vladu zasnovanu na Novom pokretu nakita (New Joint Endeaver for Welfare, Education and Liberation), udruženju aktivista na selu. Biskupova marksistička opredjeljenja dovela su do veza s Kubom, Rusijom i drugim lijevim zemljama. Biskup je pozvao kubanske inženjere na svoje ostrvo da sagrade međunarodni aerodrom za poboljšanje turizma. Predsjednik Ronald Reagan je na to gledao kao na prijetnju Sjedinjenim Državama jer se uzletište moglo koristiti za izgradnju skladišta oružja i poticanje vojne izgradnje na Karibima. U međuvremenu, tvrdokorni marksist Bernard Coard, biskupov zamjenik premijera ministar i nekadašnji prijatelj, smatrao je da Bishop ne djeluje dovoljno lijevo. 19. oktobra 1983. Coard je, uz podršku vlastite vojske, preuzeo vlast krvavim pučem, a zatim je pogubio Bishop i članove svog užeg kruga.Operacija Urgent FuryNajnoviji pokušaj instaliranja marksističko-lenjinističke vlade unutar sfere utjecaja SAD-a toliko je uznemirio članove Organizacije istočnokaripskih država da su apelirali na SAD, Barbados i Jamajku da interveniraju. U pitanju nije bila samo borba ideologija, već i prijetnja za oko 1.000 studenata medicine koji su živjeli na ostrvu, od kojih su mnogi bili Amerikanci. Dok se položaj odvijao na Karibima, 23. oktobra eksplodirala je kamionska bomba svijetu u Bejrutu, Liban, ubivši 241 američkog marinca. Osim velikog gubitka života, incident je bio velika sramota za Sjedinjene Države. Puč u Grenadi dao je Reaganu priliku da se osveti malo antiameričkim režimima na Karibima i u ostatku svijeta. Predsjednik je 25. oktobra poslao invazijske snage, nazvane "Operacija Hitna bijes", kako bi oslobodile otok i spasile studente. Grenadanske trupe brojile su oko 1.200, s oko 800 Kubanaca (uglavnom građevinskih radnika s pištoljem) i 60 savjetnika iz Sovjetskog Saveza Union, Sjeverna Koreja, Istočna Njemačka, Bugarska i Libija. Taj mali kontingent uskoro se suočio s međunarodnim snagama predvođenim SAD-om od oko 7.300 ljudi. Operacija se smatra uspješnom, s minimalnim brojem američkih vojnika. Preostali Kubanci i drugi preživjeli su uhapšeni; domaći Grenadanci su oslobođeni, a vlast je preuzela proamerička vlada.ZaključakNeposredno prije invazije, protesti su odjeknuli sa zidova Ovalnog ureda. Premijerka Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Margaret Thatcher inzistirala je, "na najjači mogući način", da je "Grenada dio Britanskog komonvelta i da se Sjedinjene Države nemaju posla miješati u njene poslove." Reagan se kasnije prisjetio: "Bila je vrlo odlučna i nastavio inzistirati da otkažemo iskrcavanje na Grenadu. Nisam joj mogao reći da je to već počelo. "Nakon invazije, Thatcher je rekla Reaganu,

"Ova akcija će se smatrati intervencijom zapadne zemlje u unutrašnje stvari male nezavisne nacije, koliko god njen režim bio neprivlačan. Molim vas da ovo razmotrite u kontekstu naših širih odnosa Istok-Zapad i činjenice da ćemo imati u narednih nekoliko dana da našem Parlamentu i ljudima predstavim položaj krstarećih projektila u ovoj zemlji. Ne mogu sakriti da sam duboko uznemiren vašom najnovijom komunikacijom. "

Nepokolebljivi Reagan kasnije bi se našalio da je Grenada morala biti napadnuta jer je to najveći svjetski proizvođač muškatnog oraščića. "Ne možete napraviti jaja od jaja bez muškatnog oraščića", primijetio je.


Američka invazija na Grenadu, 1983. - Howard Zinn

Izvještaj povjesničara Howarda Zinna o američkoj invaziji na malo karipsko ostrvo Grenada, navodno radi 'zaštite' američkih građana, ali zapravo radi ponovne potvrde američke vojne i finansijske dominacije u regiji.

U jesen 1982. predsjednik Reagan poslao je američke marince u opasnu situaciju u Libanonu, gdje je bjesnio građanski rat, ponovo ignorirajući zahtjeve Zakona o ratnim ovlastima, kao što je to učinila vlada s Kambodžom u aferi Mayaguez. Sljedeće godine, više od dvije stotine tih marinaca ubijeno je kada su teroristi eksplodirali bombu u njihovoj vojarni.

Ubrzo nakon toga, u oktobru 1983. (s nekim analitičarima koji su zaključili da je to kloniranje kako bi se skrenula pažnja s libanonske katastrofe), Reagan je poslao američke snage da napadnu maleno karipsko ostrvo Grenada. Ponovo je Kongres bio obaviješten, ali nije konsultovan. Razlozi koji su američkom narodu dati za ovu invaziju (zvanično nazvana Operacija Hitna bijes) bili su u tome što je nedavni puč koji se dogodio u Grenadi doveo američke građane (studente medicinske škole na ostrvu) u opasnost i što su Sjedinjene Američke Države primile hitan zahtjev Organizacije država istočnih Kariba za intervenciju.

Neobično naglašen članak dopisnika Bernarda Gwertzmana u New York Timesu 29. oktobra 1983. rušio je te razloge:

Formalni zahtjev da SAD i druge prijateljske zemlje pruže vojnu pomoć uputila je Organizacija istočnih karipskih država prošle nedjelje na zahtjev Sjedinjenih Država, koje su željele pokazati dokaz da je od njih zatraženo da djeluju u skladu s ugovorom o toj grupi & rsquos . Formulacija formalnog zahtjeva, međutim, sastavljena je u Washingtonu, a posebni američki emisari su je prenijeli karipskim liderima.

I Kuba i Grenada, kad su vidjele da američki brodovi kreću prema Grenadi, poslale su hitne poruke u kojima su obećavale da su američki studenti na sigurnom i pozivale da se invazija ne dogodi & hellip Nema naznaka da je uprava učinila odlučan napor da mirno evakuira Amerikance priznao da nema sklonosti pokušaju pregovora s grnadskim vlastima & hellip & ldquoTamo smo stigli na vrijeme, & rdquo rekao je predsjednik. Glavna tačka u sporu je da li su u stvari Amerikanci na ostrvu bili u takvoj opasnosti da opravdavaju invaziju. Nijedan zvaničnik nije iznio čvrste dokaze da su Amerikanci bili maltretirani ili da ne bi mogli otići ako bi htjeli.

Pravi razlog invazije, rekao je jedan visoki američki dužnosnik Gwertzmanu, bio je da bi Sjedinjene Države trebale pokazati (odlučne da prevladaju osjećaj poraza u Vijetnamu) da su zaista moćna nacija: & ldquoKoji su dobri manevri i pokazivanje sile, ako nikad ga ne koristite? & rdquo

Veza između američke vojne intervencije i promocije kapitalističkog poduhvata uvijek je bila posebno loša na Karibima. Što se tiče Grenade, članak u Wall Street Journalu osam godina nakon vojne invazije (29. oktobra 1991.) govori o & ldquoan invaziji banaka & rdquo i napominje da je St. George & rsquos, glavni grad Grenade, sa 7.500 ljudi, imao 118 ofšor banaka, jedan na svakih 64 stanovnika. & ldquoSt. George & rsquos postao je Casablanca na Karibima, brzo rastuće utočište za pranje novca, utaju poreza i razne finansijske prijevare & hellip & quot

Nakon proučavanja različitih američkih vojnih intervencija, politikolog Stephen Shalom (carski Alibis) zaključio je da su ljudi u napadnutim zemljama umrli & ldquonot kako bi spasili američke državljane, koji bi bili daleko sigurniji bez američke intervencije, ali kako bi Washington mogao jasno reći da vladao Karibima i da je bio spreman upasti u paroksizam nasilja kako bi izvršio svoju volju. & rdquo On je nastavio:

Bilo je nekih slučajeva u kojima su američki građani bili uistinu u opasnosti: na primjer, četiri crkvenjakinje koje su ubili eskadrile smrti sponzorirane od vlade u El Salvadoru 1980. Ali tamo nije bilo američke intervencije, nema iskrcavanja marinaca, niti zaštitnih bombardovanja. . Umjesto toga, Washington je podržao režim odreda smrti vojnom i ekonomskom pomoći, vojnom obukom, razmjenom obavještajnih podataka i diplomatskom podrškom. Priča u Panami, Nikaragvi, Gvatemali i jugoistočnoj Aziji bila je tragično slična.


Ovaj članak je preuzet iz Howard Zinn & rsquos izvrsne Narodne istorije Sjedinjenih Država. Od srca vam preporučujemo da odmah kupite A People's History of United States. OCR odredila Linda Towlson i lagano uredila libcom - Pravopis SAD -a u UK, dodani su dodatni detalji, pojašnjenja i veze .


Grenada, Intervencija SAD -a u

Grenada, Intervencija SAD -a u (1983.). Grenada je prvi put privukla vojni interes Sjedinjenih Država 1979. Marksistički i#lenistički prevrat te godine, predvođen Mauriceom Bishopom i pokretom New Jewel, srušio je vladu, a komunisti su započeli i izgradnju piste od 9.800 ‐ stopala . Drugi i nasilniji prevrat 1983. ostavio je Bishopa i više od 100 drugih Grenadaca mrtvim, a na čelu su bili zamjenik premijera Bernard Coard i general Hudson Austin. Kao odgovor na ovo nasilje i nered, generalni guverner Grenade, Sir Paul Scoon, potajno je zatražio od Organizacije istočnokaripskih država (OECS) pomoć u uspostavljanju reda. OECS je pak zatražio pomoć od Sjedinjenih Država.

Za snažno anti ‐komunističkog predsjednika SAD -a, Ronalda Reagana, mogućnost postojanja sovjetske klijentske 𠄍ržave na takvoj strateškoj lokaciji bila je neprihvatljiva. Pista je smatrana prijetnjom vitalnim karipskim brtvama i Panamskim kanalom, a mogla se koristiti i za izvođenje kubanskih i sovjetskih vojnih letova za Afriku i Nikaragvu. Američki zvaničnici također su izrazili zabrinutost za sigurnost približno 1.000 Amerikanaca, uglavnom studenata medicine, koji žive u Grenadi. Dan nakon što je Bishop ubijen, radna grupa američke mornarice s marincima dobila je naređenje za Grenadu.

Američka vojna intervencija u Grenadi 1983. godine, pod šifrom ‐imenovana “Urgent Fury, ” užurbano je planirana, ali ogromna. Invazijske snage uključivale su Nezavisnost Carrier Battle Group nosač helikoptera Guam i Amfibijska eskadrila Četiri 1.700 marinaca 22. pomorske amfibijske jedinice dva bataljona armijskih rendžera spremna brigada 82. vazdušno -desantne divizije raznih jedinica za specijalne operacije i simboličkih snaga OECS -a. Ispostavilo se da je ostrvo branilo samo oko 500 do 600 grenadskih vojnika od 2.000 do 2.500 milicajaca i 750 do 800 Kubanaca, uglavnom vojnih građevinskih radnika.

William C. Gilmore, Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation, 1984.
Paul Seabury i Walter A. McDougall, ur., The Grenada Papers, 1984.


Američka invazija na Grenadu, 1983. - Howard Zinn

Izvještaj povjesničara Howarda Zinna o američkoj invaziji na malo karipsko ostrvo Grenada, navodno radi 'zaštite' američkih građana, ali zapravo radi ponovne potvrde američke vojne i finansijske dominacije u regiji.

U jesen 1982. predsjednik Reagan poslao je američke marince u opasnu situaciju u Libanonu, gdje je bjesnio građanski rat, ponovo ignorirajući zahtjeve Zakona o ratnim ovlastima, kao što je to učinila vlada s Kambodžom u aferi Mayaguez. Sljedeće godine, više od dvije stotine tih marinaca ubijeno je kada su teroristi eksplodirali bombu u njihovoj vojarni.

Ubrzo nakon toga, u oktobru 1983. (s nekim analitičarima koji su zaključili da je to kloniranje kako bi se skrenula pažnja s libanonske katastrofe), Reagan je poslao američke snage da napadnu maleno karipsko ostrvo Grenada. Ponovo je Kongres bio obaviješten, ali nije konsultovan. Razlozi koji su američkom narodu dati za ovu invaziju (zvanično nazvana Operacija Hitna bijes) bili su u tome što je nedavni puč koji se dogodio u Grenadi doveo američke građane (studente medicinske škole na ostrvu) u opasnost i što su Sjedinjene Američke Države primile hitan zahtjev Organizacije država istočnih Kariba za intervenciju.

Neobično naglašen članak dopisnika Bernarda Gwertzmana u New York Timesu 29. oktobra 1983. rušio je te razloge:

Formalni zahtjev da SAD i druge prijateljske zemlje pruže vojnu pomoć uputila je Organizacija istočnih karipskih država prošle nedjelje na zahtjev Sjedinjenih Država, koje su željele pokazati dokaz da je od njih zatraženo da djeluju u skladu s ugovorom o ovoj grupi & rsquos . Formulacija formalnog zahtjeva, međutim, sastavljena je u Washingtonu, a posebni američki emisari su je prenijeli karipskim liderima.

I Kuba i Grenada, kada su vidjele da američki brodovi kreću prema Grenadi, poslale su hitne poruke u kojima su obećavale da su američki studenti na sigurnom i pozivale da se invazija ne dogodi & hellip priznao da nema sklonosti pokušaju pregovora s grnadskim vlastima & hellip & ldquoTamo smo stigli na vrijeme, & rdquo rekao je predsjednik. Glavna tačka u sporu je da li su u stvari Amerikanci na ostrvu bili u takvoj opasnosti da opravdavaju invaziju. Nijedan zvaničnik nije iznio čvrste dokaze da su Amerikanci bili maltretirani ili da ne bi mogli otići ako bi htjeli.

Pravi razlog invazije, rekao je jedan visoki američki dužnosnik Gwertzmanu, bio je da bi Sjedinjene Države trebale pokazati (odlučne u namjeri da prevladaju osjećaj poraza u Vijetnamu) da su zaista moćna nacija: & ldquoŠta su dobri manevri i pokazivanje sile, ako nikad ga ne koristite? & rdquo

Veza između američke vojne intervencije i promocije kapitalističkog poduhvata uvijek je bila posebno loša na Karibima. Što se tiče Grenade, članak u Wall Street Journalu osam godina nakon vojne invazije (29. oktobra 1991.) govori o & ldquoan invaziji banaka & rdquo i napominje da je St. George & rsquos, glavni grad Grenade, sa 7.500 ljudi, imao 118 banaka na moru, jedan na svakih 64 stanovnika. & ldquoSt. George & rsquos postao je Casablanca na Karibima, brzo rastuće utočište za pranje novca, utaju poreza i razne finansijske prijevare & hellip & quot

Nakon proučavanja različitih američkih vojnih intervencija, politikolog Stephen Shalom (carski Alibis) zaključio je da su ljudi u napadnutim zemljama umrli & ldquonot kako bi spasili američke državljane, koji bi bili daleko sigurniji bez američke intervencije, ali kako bi Washington mogao jasno reći da vladao Karibima i da je bio spreman upasti u paroksizam nasilja kako bi izvršio svoju volju. & rdquo On je nastavio:

Bilo je nekih slučajeva u kojima su američki građani bili uistinu u opasnosti: na primjer, četiri crkvenjakinje koje su ubili eskadrile smrti sponzorirane od vlade u El Salvadoru 1980. Ali tamo nije bilo američke intervencije, nema iskrcavanja marinaca, niti zaštitnih bombardovanja. . Umjesto toga, Washington je podržao režim odreda smrti vojnom i ekonomskom pomoći, vojnom obukom, razmjenom obavještajnih podataka i diplomatskom podrškom. Priča u Panami, Nikaragvi, Gvatemali i jugoistočnoj Aziji bila je tragično slična.


Ovaj članak je preuzet iz Howard Zinn & rsquos izvrsne Narodne istorije Sjedinjenih Država. Od srca vam preporučujemo da odmah kupite A People's History of United States. OCR odredila Linda Towlson i lagano uredila libcom - Pravopis SAD -a u UK, dodani su dodatni detalji, pojašnjenja i veze .


Invazija i posledice

Scoon i Organizacija istočnih karipskih država (OECS) su bili ti koji su dali pokriće Sjedinjenim Državama da napadnu, a oba su zatražila invaziju tajnim diplomatskim kanalima. Kada su snage iskrcale 25. oktobra u operaciji Urgent Fury, Sjedinjene Države su izjavile da je to učinjeno na zahtjev Toma Adamsa i Eugenije Charles, premijera Barbadosa, odnosno Dominike. Tokom nekoliko dana, oko 7.000 američkih vojnika i 300 drugih iz Organizacije američkih država (OAS) borilo se s oko 1.500 grenadskih vojnika i oko 700 naoružanih kubanskih državljana koji su zauzeli odbrambene položaje. Neke od američkih snaga krenule su u "spašavanje" američkih studenata u medicinskom kampusu Sveučilišta St. George na otoku, što je postalo ključna komponenta američke domaće propagande koja je opravdala imperijalistički napad.

Kad su borbe završile, nadmoć američke vojske je prevladala — sa samo 19 ubijenih američkih snaga. Kubanske i grenadanske snage pretrpjele su veće žrtve, kao i civili, uključujući 18 koji su poginuli u "slučajnom" bombardovanju mentalne bolnice.

Američka vlada branila je invaziju: bila je to akcija poduzeta radi zaštite američkih građana koji žive na otoku, posebno onih studenata medicine. Povelja OAS -a, tvrdi američki State Department, odnosi se na situacije "koje bi mogle ugroziti mir", a povelje OAS -a i Ujedinjenih naroda "priznaju nadležnost regionalnih sigurnosnih tijela u osiguravanju regionalnog mira i stabilnosti". Odobrenje OCES -a za invaziju je, smatrao je američki imperijalizam, očistilo Sjedinjene Države od bilo kakvih nedjela.

Naravno, sve je to bila laž. Povelja UN-a zabranjuje upotrebu sile od strane država članica, osim u slučajevima samoodbrane ili kada to izričito odobri Vijeće sigurnosti UN-a, od kojih se nijedna nije primijenila. Generalna skupština UN -a osudila je invaziju kao "flagrantno kršenje međunarodnog prava", a Vijeće sigurnosti je velikom većinom donijelo sličnu rezoluciju na koju su Sjedinjene Države zatim stavile veto.

Cinično opravdanje da je invazija štitila studente medicine uveliko je djelovalo u Sjedinjenim Državama. Njihova škola nalazila se u blizini piste izgrađene na Kubanskom jeziku##8212 za koju su Sjedinjene Države tvrdile da je u vojne svrhe, a ne za međunarodni aerodrom. kao što su to bile četiri godine ranije američke diplomate u Iranu. Većina demokrata stala je u red iza predsjednika Reaganove uprave, savjet O'Neill, na primjer, promijenio je svoj položaj u položaj podrške. Nekoliko izuzetaka bili su Kongresni crni kokus i mala grupa od sedam demokratskih članova Kongresa koji su podnijeli neuspješnu rezoluciju o opozivu Reagana.

Američki napad na Grenadu imao je za cilj obnovu buržoasko-nacionalističke vlade koja bi izvršila naloge imperijalizma. Vlada SAD -a i Kariba učinile su upravo to i brzo su ponovo postavile Scoona kao jedinog predstavnika kraljice Elizabete u Grenadi, sa punim zakonskim ovlaštenjima. Organizirao je pažljivo orkestrirane nove izbore koji su u decembru 1984. doveli na vlast novog proimperijalističkog premijera Herberta Blaizea.


  • 1974: Grenada stekla nezavisnost od Velike Britanije i postala članica Commonwealtha
  • 1979: Maurice Bishop preuzima vlast državnim udarom i formira Narodnu revolucionarnu vladu
  • Ožujak 1983: Predsjednik Reagan upozorava da bi se aerodrom na Grenadi, koji je trenutno u izgradnji, mogao koristiti kao sovjetsko-kubanska zračna baza i predstavlja jasnu prijetnju SAD-u

Grenada je u nestabilnom stanju sa (političkim) nasiljem i orijentisanim ka socijalizmu.


13. mart 1979: Grenadska revolucija

13. marta 1979., premijer Grenade Eric Gairy zbačen je s vlasti pučem koji je organizirao Pokret novih dragulja, a predvodio ga je Maurice Bishop. Biskup je postavljen za premijera novoosnovane Narodne revolucionarne vlade. Bill Bigelow opisuje u Grenadi: 'Ljupki mali rat':

1979. socijalistički pokret New Jewel srušio je korumpiranog i nepopularnog diktatora Erica Gairyja gotovo beskrvnim pučem. Godinama je Gairy vladao kroz strah. Njegovu tajnu policiju, "Mongoose Gang", snabdijevala je Pinochetova diktatura u Čileu koju podržavaju SAD. Revolucija koju je pokrenuo pokret novih dragulja - "Revo", kako su je od milja zvali - bila je izuzetno popularna.

Do 1982. godine, kada sam prvi put posjetio otok, započela je kampanja opismenjavanja, izgrađene su nove škole, a nezaposlena omladina na selu imala je koristi od novih poljoprivrednih zadruga. Grenada je pozdravila kubansku pomoć: učitelje, zdravstvene radnike i građevinske radnike na novom međunarodnom aerodromu koji su namjeravali zamijeniti zastarjelo i opasno uzletište u planinama.

U samo četiri godine nezaposlenost je smanjena sa 49 posto na 14 posto. Umjesto oglašavanja cigareta i pića, šareni panoi po cijelom otoku promovirali su obrazovanje: „Svaki nauči jednog“, „Ako znaš, nauči ako ne znaš, uči“ i „Obrazovanje je i proizvodnja“.

U nastavku se nalaze izvori za poučavanje o revoluciji u Grenadi, uključujući video isječak Biskupa koji govori na Hunter Collegeu u New Yorku o tome kako je i zašto State Department prikazao Grenadu kao prijetnju. Nakon isječka slijedi dokumentarac o napretku revolucije u Grenadi.


/> KUBANSKA I SAD INVAZIJA GRENADE. (Video zapisi/fotografije)

Invazija na Grenadu, pod kodnim nazivom Operacija ‘Urgent Fury ’, bila je 1983. američka invazija na Grenadu, ostrvsku državu na Karibima sa populacijom od nešto više od 100.000 stanovnika koja se nalazi 100 kilometara (160 km) sjeverno od Venezuele. Pokrenuo ga je vojni udar koji je zbacio kratku revolucionarnu vladu.

Uspješna invazija dovela je do promjene vlade, ali je bila kontroverzna zbog optužbi za američki imperijalizam, politike Hladnog rata, uključenosti Kube, nestabilnog stanja grenadanske vlade i statusa Grenade kao regiona Commonwealtha s Elizabetom II kao monarh. Grenada je stekla neovisnost od Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva 1974. godine, a ljevičarski pobunjenici preuzeli su vlast pučem 1979. Nakon što se unutrašnja borba za vlast 1983. završila svrgavanjem i ubistvom revolucionarnog premijera Mauricea Bishop, invazija je započela 25. oktobra 1983. godine. snage od oko 7.600 vojnika iz Sjedinjenih Država, Jamajke i pripadnika Regionalnog sigurnosnog sistema (RSS) porazile su otpor Grenada i vojna vlada Hudsona Austina je svrgnuta. Smrt civila uključuje sve stanovnike ostrva i samo mentalnu bolnicu#8217.

Biskupova vlada započela je izgradnju uz pomoć Britanije, Kube, Libije, Alžira i drugih nacija. Aerodrom je prvi put predložila britanska vlada 1954. godine, kada je Grenada još bila britanska kolonija. Dizajnirali su ga Kanađani, potpisala britanska vlada, a djelomično izgradila londonska firma. Američka vlada optužila je Grenadu za izgradnju objekata za pomoć izgradnji sovjetsko-kubanske vojske na Karibima i za pomoć sovjetskom i kubanskom transportu oružja pobunjenicima iz Centralne Amerike. Biskupova vlada je tvrdila da je aerodrom izgrađen za smještaj komercijalnih aviona koji prevoze turiste, ističući da takvi avioni ne mogu slijetati na postojeći aerodrom na sjeveru ostrva. Ni sam postojeći aerodrom nije se mogao proširiti jer se njegova pista uklapala u planinu.

U ožujku 1983., Ronald Reagan počeo je izdavati upozorenja o prijetnji koju Sjedinjenim Državama i Karibima predstavlja “sovjetsko-kubanska militarizacija ”, o čemu svjedoči pretjerano duga avionska pista koja se gradi, kao i obavještajni izvori. Rekao je da su pista od 2700 metara (2700 metara) i rezervoari za skladištenje nafte nepotrebni za komercijalne svrhe, te da su dokazi ukazivali da će aerodrom postati kubansko-sovjetska vojna vazdušna baza. Znali smo/obavještavali o tajnoj intervenciji u Grenadi specijalnih snaga predvođenih kubanskim generalom Ochoom (još nekoliko mjeseci prije nego što je vatrogasni odred odveden kao izdajica) i čvrsto jezgro dokazanih prvoklasnih kadrova Castroa#8217s &# 8220međunarodni borci ”. To je tajno uzeto i sa ostrva za koje je kubanska vlada znala da će američka intervencija biti blizu.

Američka intervencija ..

Invazija, koja je započela u 05:00 sati 25. oktobra 1983., bila je prva velika operacija koju je američka vojska izvela od rata u Vijetnamu. [Potreban citat] Viceadmiral Joseph Metcalf, III, komandant Druge flote, bio je generalni komandant SAD -a snage, imenovane Zajednička operativna grupa 120, koja je uključivala elemente svake vojne službe i više jedinica za posebne operacije. Borbe su se nastavile nekoliko dana, a ukupan broj američkih vojnika dosegao je oko 7.000 zajedno s 300 vojnika iz OECS -a. Okupatorske snage naišle su na oko 1.500 grenadskih vojnika i oko 700 Kubanaca. Također je bilo prisutno 60 savjetnika iz Sovjetskog Saveza, Sjeverne Koreje, Istočne Njemačke, Bugarske i Libije. Prema novinaru Bobu Woodwardu u njegovoj knjizi Veil, navodni zarobljeni "vojni savjetnici"#8221 iz gore navedenih zemalja bili su zapravo akreditovane diplomate i bili su uključeni njihove izdržavane osobe. Niko nije učestvovao u borbama. Neki od građevinskih radnika “ bili su zapravo odred kubanskih vojnih specijalnih snaga i borbenih inženjera.

Službeni američki izvori navode da su branitelji bili dobro pripremljeni, dobro pozicionirani i pružili tvrdoglavi otpor, do te mjere da su SAD pozvale dva bataljona pojačanja navečer 26. oktobra. Potpuna pomorska i zračna nadmoć koalicijskih snaga - uključujući helikopterske topovnjače i podršku pomorskoj vatri - nadjačala je lokalne snage. Skoro osam hiljada vojnika, mornara, vazduhoplovaca i marinaca učestvovalo je u HITNOJ FURIJI zajedno sa 353 karipska saveznika CPF -a. U.S. forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded Cuban forces sustained 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 combatants captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358 wounded at least 24 civilians.

The Cuban government sent these troops there to support the leftist government of the country. In 2008 the government of Grenada announced a move to build a monument to honor the Cubans killed during the invasion. At the time of the announcement the Cuban and Grenadian government are still seeking to locate a suitable site for the monument.

While the invasion enjoyed broad public support in the United States,and received support from some sectors in Grenada from local groups who viewed the post-coup regime as illegitimate, it was criticized by the United Kingdom, Canada and the United Nations General Assembly, which condemned it as “a flagrant violation of international law”.25 October is a national holiday in Grenada, called Thanksgiving Day, to commemorate the invasion, and on 29 May 2009 the was officially renamed in honor of the slain pre-coup leader Maurice Bishop by the Government of Grenada.


/>Cuban and US Invasion of Grenada

The called or code named Operation ‘Urgent Fury’, was a 1983 US-led, a Caribbean island nation with a population of just over 100,000 located 100 miles (160 km) north of Venezuela. It was triggered by a military coup which ousted a brief revolutionary government. The successful invasion led to a change of government but was controversial due to charges of American imperialism, Cold War politics, the involvement of Cuba, the unstable state of the Grenadian government, and Grenada’s status as a Commonwealth realm with Elizabeth II as the monarch.

Grenada gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1974, and Leftist rebels seized power in a coup in 1979. After a 1983 internal power struggle ended with the deposition and murder of revolutionary Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the invasion began on 25 October 1983. A combined force of about 7,600 troops from the United States, Jamaica, and members of the Regional Security System (RSS) defeated Grenadian resistance and the military government of Hudson Austin was deposed. Civilian deaths include all the residents of the island’s only Mental Hospital.

The Bishop government began constructing the Point Salines International Airport with the help of Britain, Cuba, Libya, Algeria, and other nations. The airport had been first proposed by the British government in 1954, when Grenada was still a British colony. It had been designed by Canadians, underwritten by the British government, and partly built by a London firm. The U.S. government accused Grenada of constructing facilities to aid a Soviet-Cuban military build-up in the Caribbean, and to assist the Soviet and Cuban transportation of weapons to Central American insurgents. Bishop’s government claimed that the airport was built to accommodate commercial aircraft carrying tourists, pointing out that such jets could not land at the existing airport on the island’s north. Neither could the existing airport, itself, be expanded as its runway abutted a mountain.

In March 1983, Ronald Reagan began issuing warnings about the threat posed to the United States and the Caribbean by the “Soviet-Cuban militarization” as evidenced by the excessively long airplane runway being built as well as intelligence sources. He said that the 9,000-foot (2,700 m) runway and the oil storage tanks were unnecessary for commercial , and that evidence pointed that the airport was to become a Cuban-Soviet military airbase.

CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES

The invasion, which commenced at 05:00 on 25 October 1983, was the first major operation conducted by the U.S. military since the Vietnam War.[citation needed] Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, Commander Second Fleet, was the overall commander of U.S. forces, designated Joint Task Force 120, which included elements of each military service and multiple special operations units. Fighting continued for several days and the total number of U.S. troops reached some 7,000 along with 300 troops from the OECS. The invading forces encountered about 1,500 Grenadian soldiers and about 700 Cubans. Also present were 60 advisors from the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Libya.According to journalist Bob Woodward in his book Veil, the supposed captured “military advisers” from the aforementioned countries were actually accredited diplomats and included their dependents. None took any actual part in the fighting. Some of the “construction workers” were actually a detachment of Cuban Military Special Forces and combat engineers.

Official U.S. sources state that the defenders were well-prepared, well-positioned and put up stubborn resistance, to the extent that the U.S. called in two battalions of reinforcements on the evening of 26 October. The total naval and air superiority of the coalition forces – including helicopter gunships and naval gunfire support – overwhelmed the local forces. Nearly eight thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines had participated in URGENT FURY along with 353 Caribbean allies of the CPF. U.S. forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded Cuban forces sustained 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 combatants captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358 wounded at least 24 civilians.

The Cuban government sent these troops there to support the leftist government of the country. In 2008 the government of Grenada announced a move to build a monument to honor the Cubans killed during the invasion. At the time of the announcement the Cuban and Grenadian government are still seeking to locate a suitable site for the monument.

While the invasion enjoyed broad public support in the United States,and received support from some sectors in Grenada from local groups who viewed the post-coup regime as illegitimate, it was criticized by the United Kingdom, Canada and the United Nations General Assembly, which condemned it as “a flagrant violation of international law”.25 October is a national holiday in Grenada, called Thanksgiving Day, to commemorate the invasion, and on 29 May 2009 the Point Salines International Airport was officially renamed in honor of the slain pre-coup leader Maurice Bishop by the Government of Grenada.

Sources: Wiki/CubanWars/InternetPhotos/TheCubanHistory.com
Invasion of Grenada/ The Cuban History/ Arnoldo Varona, Editor

LA INVASION DE GRENADA

La operación llamada o nombre en clave,’Furia Urgente’ fue un 1983 liderada por Estados Unidos a una nación insular del Caribe con una población de poco más de 100.000 situado a 100 millas (160 km) al norte de Venezuela, Grenada.

Provocada por un golpe militar que derrocó a un gobierno revolucionario breve. El éxito de la invasión condujo a un cambio de gobierno, pero fue polémico debido a las acusaciones de imperialismo estadounidense, la política de la Guerra Fría, la participación de Cuba, el estado inestable del gobierno de Granada, y el estado de Granada como un reino de la Commonwealth, con Isabel II como el monarca. Granada, obtuvo su independencia del Reino Unido en 1974, y los rebeldes de izquierda tomó el poder en un golpe de estado en 1979. Después de una lucha de poder interna de 1983 terminó con la deposición y el asesinato del revolucionario Primer Ministro Maurice Bishop, la invasión comenzó el 25 de octubre de 1983. Una fuerza combinada de cerca de 7.600 tropas de los Estados Unidos, Jamaica, y los miembros del Sistema de Seguridad Regional (RSS) derrotó a la resistencia granadina y el gobierno militar de Hudson Austin fue depuesto. Las muertes de civiles son todos los residentes de el único Hospital Mental de la isla.

El gobierno de Bishop empezaron a construir el aeropuerto internacional de Point Salines, con la ayuda de Gran Bretaña, Cuba, Libia, Argelia y otros países. El aeropuerto había sido propuesto por primera vez por el gobierno británico en 1954, cuando Granada era todavía una colonia británica. Había sido diseñado por los canadienses, suscrito por el gobierno británico, y en parte construida por una firma de Londres. El gobierno de EE.UU. acusó a Granada de la construcción de instalaciones para ayudar a un cubano-soviética fortalecimiento militar en el Caribe, y para ayudar al transporte soviético y cubano de armas a los insurgentes de América central. El gobierno del obispo afirmó que el aeropuerto fue construido para alojar a los turistas de aviones comerciales que transportan, señalando que estos chorros no pudo aterrizar en el aeropuerto existente en el norte de la isla. Tampoco pudo el aeropuerto existente, en sí, se amplió su pista de aterrizaje como tope de una montaña.

En marzo de 1983, Ronald Reagan comenzó a emitir advertencias sobre la amenaza que plantea a los Estados Unidos y el Caribe por la “militarización soviético-cubana”, como lo demuestra la pista de aterrizaje excesivamente largo se está construyendo, así como las fuentes de inteligencia. Dijo que la pista de 9.000 pies (2.700 m) y los tanques de almacenamiento de petróleo eran innecesarios para fines comerciales, y que la evidencia señala que el aeropuerto se convertiría en un militar cubano-soviética base aérea.

CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES

Intervención de EE.UU. ..

La invasión, que comenzó a las 05:00 el 25 de octubre de 1983, fue la primera gran operación llevada a cabo por los militares de EE.UU. desde la Guerra de Vietnam. [Cita requerida] El vicealmirante Joseph Metcalf III, comandante de la Flota En segundo lugar, era el comandante general de los EE.UU. fuerzas, de la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta designado 120, que incluía elementos de cada servicio militar y varias unidades de operaciones especiales. La lucha continuó durante varios días y el número total de tropas de Estados Unidos llegó a unos 7.000, junto con 300 tropas de la OECS. Las fuerzas invasoras encontraron unos 1.500 soldados granadinos y cubanos alrededor de 700. También estuvieron presentes los 60 consejeros de la Unión Soviética, Corea del Norte, Alemania Oriental, Bulgaria y Libya.

According al periodista Bob Woodward en su libro Veil, los supuestos “asesores militares capturados” de los países antes mencionados fueron en realidad los diplomáticos acreditados e incluyó a su cargo . Ninguno tuvo una parte real en la lucha. Algunos de los “trabajadores de la construcción” eran en realidad un destacamento de fuerzas militares cubanas especiales e ingenieros de combate.

Oficial de Estado de EE.UU. de fuentes que los defensores estaban bien preparados, bien posicionada y ofrecieron una resistencia tenaz, en la medida en que los EE.UU. llamó a dos batallones de refuerzos en la noche del 26 de octubre. La superioridad naval total y el aire de las fuerzas de la coalición, incluyendo helicópteros de combate y apoyo de fuego naval – abrumado a las fuerzas locales. Casi ocho mil soldados, marineros, aviadores e infantes de marina habían participado en FURIA URGENTE junto con 353 aliados del Caribe de la ACB. Las fuerzas estadounidenses habían sufrido 19 muertos y los heridos 116 fuerzas cubanas sufrió 25 muertos, 59 combatientes heridos y 638 capturados. Bajas fuerzas de Granada fueron 45 muertos y heridos 358, por lo menos 24 civiles.

El gobierno cubano ha enviado estas tropas allí para apoyar al gobierno de izquierda del país. En 2008 el gobierno de Granada anunció un movimiento para construir un monumento para honrar a los cubanos muertos durante la invasión. En el momento del anuncio del gobierno de Cuba y Granada se sigue tratando de localizar un lugar adecuado para el monumento.

Mientras que la invasión contó con el apoyo del público en general en los Estados Unidos, y recibió el apoyo de algunos sectores en Granada de los grupos locales que vieron el régimen post-golpe de estado ilegítimo, que fue criticado por el Reino Unido, Canadá y las Naciones Unidas la Asamblea General, que lo condenó como “una violación flagrante del derecho internacional” 25 de octubre es un día de fiesta nacional en Granada, llamada Día de Acción de Gracias, para conmemorar la invasión, y el 29 de mayo de 2009, el aeropuerto internacional de Point Salines fue rebautizado oficialmente en honor de los muertos antes de la líder del golpe, Maurice Bishop por el Gobierno de Grenada.


By Naval Institute Archives

It is the anniversary of the invasion of Grenada which took place 30 years ago. The following article, The Guard in Grenada by Dale L. Thompson was first published in Naval Institute Zbornik radova in November, 1984.

Grenadian children from the town of Gouyave greet the crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Cape Fox. Quartermaster Chief Nicholas H. Lobkowicz looks on.

In late October 1983, Grenada was torn by internal revolution. Its Marxist government had come apart, and conditions of anarchy and bloody repression were reported. Concerns for the lives of the U. S. citizens on the island and for stability in that portion of the Caribbean led to the 25 October rescue mission. The invasion force contained personnel from all the U. S. services and six other Caribbean Island states, which made up the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). The U. S. Coast Guard participated on the invasion day with two search and rescue platforms, a C-130 aircraft, and the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718). Later, in December, the Coast Guard returned in force to the island.

By November 1983, organized resistance to the combined U. S. and Caribbean Peacekeeping Force rescue mission had collapsed. But an ongoing security presence was needed to give the country time to reestablish order and decide its future without outside interference. Psychologically, the population was still shaken by the events of the previous weeks and cowed by two successive autocratic governments – one right wing, one Marxist.

An interim government had been formed. Led by the former British Crown Colony adviser, Sir Paul Scoon, it was a volunteer advisory council primarily composed of businessmen with little political experience. Their challenges were many. They needed to restart the democratic process, pay a crushing inherited national debt, revive a stalled economy, and reinstitute normal governmental services and organizations. The unemployment rate was more than 30%. Every former member of the Marxist civil law enforcement agencies was either discredited or in jail. Grenadian police, coast guard, even prison guard organizations had to be rebuilt from scratch. Thus, the CPF, supported and equipped by the United States, maintained law and order, acting as agents of the government of Grenada. Ashore, the CPF and U. S. Army commands worked together and dispersed combined squads and patrols throughout Grenada. At sea, a small CPF coast guard contingent was based in the main harbor, St. Georges, while a U. S. Navy task unit patrolled offshore.

The Navy had two primary missions. The first was to prevent the escape of wanted Marxist fugitives or the infiltration of subversives, weapons, or any other military contraband. The second was to demonstrate a continuing U. S. commitment by a naval presence. Reassuring Grenadians of their continued security was vital to creating a stable government and a functioning economy.

The U. S. Coast Guard was the logical service to fulfill these missions. As an armed service, it could deploy quickly and integrate fully into the joint command structure. As the nation’s seagoing police, it had developed great expertise in coastal surveillance and interdiction in the fight against illegal drug traffic. And its image as a humanitarian organization with a history of protecting lives and property at sea made its arrival less politically sensitive to both sender and recipient.

A squadron of four cutters, three 95-foot patrol craft (WPBs) and one support unit, was chosen. These were manned by a little more than 100 men and women. All four vessels were chosen from the Seventh Coast Guard District in Florida because of their proximity to the operating area and their familiarity with Caribbean waters, vessel types, and traffic patterns. The squadron commander was assigned from the Atlantic Area staff.

WPBs are seaworthy, fast, well armed, and small enough to steam along the coast, yet large enough to self-deploy across the Caribbean. Since their routine patrols include drug interdiction, law enforcement, and search and rescue missions, their 15-member crews are well versed in interception, boarding, searching, and seizing procedures. The WPBs chosen were the USCGC Cape Fox (WPB-95316), USCGC Cape Gull (WPB-95304), and USCGC Cape Shoalwater (WPB-95324).

Planning for the worst case, no support from ashore, a support cutter was included, in this case the USCGC Sagebrush (WLB-399). The 180-foot seagoing buoy tender (WLB) was an excellent choice. Designed and built more than 40 years ago to resupply offshore lighthouses, WLBs can carry a large amount of fuel, water, and provisions. Capabilities integral to a WLB not found in a WPB are a heavy lift cargo boom, a large forward cargo deck, a machine shop, welding facilities, and electronics repair.

Additional WPB support was included by embarking a special support team of senior enlisteds in supply, electronics, and engineering rates and WPB spare parts on the Sagebrush. This team was drawn on short notice from a WPB shoreside support group, an experimental concept at Coast Guard Base, Miami Beach. The group was part of a multi-crew, multi-hull program. Designed to exact the maximum underway time from hulls without exhausting crews, the program used three crews to man two hulls. The support group provided additional maintenance during the hull’s short in-port periods.

It later proved logistically useful when the WPBs in Grenada were relieved. A crew could be flown to the island to relieve on scene without having to sail the hull home. The routine evolution took less than 24 hours.

For operational security, the crews of the chosen cutters were told only to make ready for a long deployment. Only the cutters’ commanding officers (COs) knew the actual plans. Similar procedures were routine to conceal patrol intentions from drug smugglers. Once underway, the cutters maintained strict electronic emission control. En route, the WPBs refueled from a Coast Guard high-endurance cutter on patrol in the Windward Passage. All the cutters rendezvoused at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, for final provisioning.

On my way to Roosevelt Roads, I called on both the operational and support commanders. The operational guidance I received was succinct. Essentially, it was to continue the ongoing work, coordinate with and support the CPF in developing a Grenadian coast guard, and promote good will.

Just before sailing from Roosevelt Roads, I briefed the cutters’ crews on their destination and mission. My verbal orders from Commander, Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, were simple: ”Go there and do good things!”

The squadron arrived off Grenada the afternoon of 7 December, relieving the Navy units, which turned north for a well-earned rest. Arrival meetings, resupply of the WPBs from the WLB, situation and intelligence briefings by the Army, and an orientation flight for COs followed rapidly. (The helicopter flight was particularly useful and became a standard arrival event for new COs and executive officers.) Available charts were old and poorly scaled. But from above, the shoals, channels, and reefs stood out clearly in the tropical waters. After the flight, the first cutters began patrolling.

Throughout the first month, we maintained two cutters on patrol. Our employment objectives were twofold. First, we wanted to intimidate potential contraband smugglers by displaying a high profile and intensive boarding tactics. Grenada is the southernmost island of the Leeward Island chain-a natural stepping stone from South America to the north. Smuggling is a generations-old way of life for many. We were neither legally empowered nor charged with stopping this traditional smuggling of whiskey, cigarettes, etc. (much to the relief of more than one smuggler stopped by a cutter).

We did, however, check every boat we could for military contraband or fugitives. We pointedly announced what type of contraband we sought. Apparently, this word spread quickly through the grapevine. Until then, intelligence reports of military contraband smuggling were routine. After we started these tactics, the reports dried up. We never did uncover any contraband, which was a disappointment to several crew members. They had hoped to add to the rows of marijuana leaves painted on their stack a Cuban cigar, signifying a Grenada contraband bust.

Our second objective was to gather intelligence and demonstrate presence by frequent visits to small coastal towns. Since the smuggling peaked at night, as did the patrol intensity, the afternoons were used for these visits. Routinely, one of the two cutters would anchor off a town around noon. The small boat would take a party of three or four crew members to meet with the mayor, the fishermen, and the local CPF and military police squad, if any. The receptions were uniformly and enthusiastically pro-United States, bolstering our morale as much as theirs.

Our crews, new to the country, were often incredulous when they first heard of the warm welcome extended by the average Grenadian. For example, a landing party on its first visit to a small coastal town was spontaneously mobbed at the beach by a good portion of the village. They would not let the crew members inland until they had heard five choruses of “Happy Birthday, Papa Reagan” – it was the week of the President’s birthday. In another incident, a sailor returned from his trip to a bakery shaking his head in disbelief. The woman behind the counter had thanked him for personally saving her life.

Every couple weeks, the Coast Guard conducted search and rescue operations for boats overdue into port. These operations sometimes involved coordinated air-sea search with an Army helicopter. Operations with the military police were conducted as deemed appropriate by intelligence information. Usually, our role would be to help insert a force (which prevented warning by helicopter noise) and then stand by off the surf to prevent any escape to sea.

As the holidays approached, morale remained high. The busy pace helped. Some of the crews played Santa, distributing donated toys from the United States to some of the outer islands. A Coast Guard cutter full of “Berts” and “Ernies” was uniquely a Grenadian experience.

All our operations soon dovetailed so that joint operations with the Army and U. S. Embassy could be conducted. Daily meetings were held at the embassy and the Army compound to report the current operations, plans, intelligence, and political and economic evaluations. Courses of action were discussed and agreed upon. For example, during mid-December, there were significant Army force reductions. This generated a surprising amount of unrest and public concern among the Grenadians. Rumors were rife of a U. S. withdrawal and a return to power of the Marxists. Thus, we altered our helicopter flight and cutter patrol routines to put them in sight of as many Grenadians as possible.

The single biggest factor in the success of the U. S. efforts in Grenada was the rapport and mutual respect among the Coastguardsmen, the Army personnel, and the embassy staff. This link was key not only in operations but in day-to-day support activities. The embassy had the only hard-copy message traffic facilities therefore, it served all the U. S. organizations on the island. In turn, cutters ferried State Department staff to outer islands, and State Department supplies were often carried on the Coast Guard’s logistic flight. The Army provided many support services to the Coast Guard: Autovon telephones, mail, medical, exchange, movies, truck loans, and barbershop facilities. It was soon apparent that we were better served by putting the members of the WPB support team ashore. They were able to get at these facilities and services, work the logistics, and be available all day, every day. This had the added benefit of reduced crowding on the Sagebrush and freed her to patrol without taking the WPB support with her. Thus, the WLB entered the patrol rotation, proving another facet of this class’s use.

The single biggest headache of routine business was logistics. Limited communications and inexperience with unsupported deployments outside the continental United States were the major problems. Also, the small cutters were accustomed to independent resupply at their home ports, thus the class-compatibility of parts was poor. Initially, the documentation of what parts had been ordered by our support command and at what priority was lacking. The logistics flights’ cargo manifests were incomplete and the cargo poorly marked. Local sources for baked goods, fresh produce, and fruit eased the provisioning needs. The extra frozen and dry stores previously loaded on the WLB would last for weeks. Fuel was available from the local Texaco distributor.

Communications were limited and awkward. The embassy’s communication center was a temporary installation. A small staff operated old equipment. The alternatives were secure voice satellite to the operational commander and two Autovon lines at the Army compound. VHF-FM was used extensively ashore and afloat since the island telephone system was down 98% of the time. Predictably, the Army and Coast Guard FM systems were incompatible. We installed one of our transceivers in their communications center and borrowed their backpack FMs so the cutters could talk to the military police across the surf line. FM and high frequency were used to communicate to the cutters on patrol from the shore station.

To reduce report volume, we developed standard report formats and codes. These codes and a communications plan, which included preset frequency shifts, increased operational security over the uncovered circuits. Portable FMs became part of the uniform ashore. The Army compound, the embassy, our shore station, and the cutter moorings were located on separate parts of the island and thus required us to drive from one to the other. Consequently, the seemingly trivial matter of who had what car and was going where could get out of hand quickly if everybody was not in touch by portable radio.

The United States was acting in support of the CPF which, in turn, was acting as an agent of the government of Grenada. Thus, our legal authority to act as if the waters and vessels of the area were under U. S. control, and not Grenadian, was delegated to us from the CPF. The CPF was equipped and trained under the U. S. Security Assistance Program administered on Grenada by an ad hoc Security Assistance Control Team (SACT). Emphasis had been on the CPF shore units, which were the bulk of the force and had the more pressing needs. In addition, rapid turnover in the CPF coast guard contingents between Jamaican and Barbados personnel hindered the force in getting SACT assistance and using it effectively.

The patrol craft available to the CPF were five British-built former Grenadian Coast Guard boats ranging from 30- to 55-feet long and from two to ten years old. Their material conditions varied from poor to completely unsalvageable. No preventative maintenance had been done for years. They literally ran on baling wire and bubble gum fixes because of a history of underfunding and ”make do” maintenance. There were no spare parts, tools, safety, firefighting, or emergency equipment. The one functional radio was moved around to whichever boat was running. That the CPF managed occasional patrols near the harbor was remarkable.

As operations permitted, we supported the CPF with assistance in training and maintenance. CPF personnel embarked on day trips in the WPBs to obtain practical experience. They proved good sailors who learned rapidly, and the program was expanded to include longer trips as bunk space permitted. The amount of this training varied as the CPF contingents changed and their needs changed.

Maintenance of the CPF boats began. The WLB brought each of the former Grenadian boats alongside one at a time. What could be done with low-cost consumables was done. What could not was put on a work list. This list was used also to make up orders of parts needed. Managing this effort, arranging funding through SACT, and pushing to recruit and train a truly Grenadian Coast Guard was a full-time endeavor. We recommended a “sailor” element be assigned to SACT, with our support team continuing to assist as needed. This occurred in mid-January 1984 with the assignment of a Coast Guard lieutenant commander from the security assistance office of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Under his focused effort, much greater progress occurred.

With time, coastal trade increased. This was a good sign for the economy, but the WLB found it difficult to get a berth at the only pier in St. George’s. The WPBs did not have this problem, mooring at the yacht club. As we became increasingly accustomed to the traffic and the waters, gathered more intelligence through our visits, and the country continued to stabilize, we reduced the patrolling force to one cutter. This allowed us to send one WPB home. At about this time, I was relieved by Commander J. Morris, also of the Atlantic Area staff, so that I could attend a long-planned-for school. The second WPB relieved crews in country (as part of the experimental multicrew concept discussed earlier). Then, the third WPB was relieved by a new cutter, the USCGC Cape York (WPB-95332). Also, a relief WLB, the USCGC Gentian (WLB-290), arrived with a fresh load of provisions and supplies.

About then, I returned to duty in Grenada. At the harbor master’s request, the WLB overhauled and reset St. George’s buoys and serviced the range dayshapes. With the revival of the economy, limited civilian machine shop services became available. Thus, the remaining link keeping the WLB in country became the stored provisions on board. After a little judicious trading with the Army, we arranged dry storage in their compound and space for a portable freezer box that was deck-loaded on board the WLB. The stores were transferred ashore and the WLB headed north. With this final and significant force reduction, we were down to two WPBs and about 25 people in country. The C-130 logistics flights could then be decreased to once every three weeks.

Once again, it was Commander Morris’s turn in country, and I left Grenada for the last time. Soon thereafter, a project we had both promoted came to fruition. Two standard 20-foot shipping containers, one fitted as an engineering workshop/storeroom, were delivered and set up near the WPB moorings. They proved ideal as support team work spaces. Continuing the reduction in force, Commander Morris departed in May 1984, with the small remaining contingent folding into a reorganized joint U. S. command on the island.

For the first time in years, the Coast Guard deployed a squadron of cutters in a joint military operation outside the United States and unsupported by immediately available Navy logistics. The Coast Guard may have to do so again, probably on short notice, possibly further away. If so, we should remember:


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Komentari:

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