Istorija fudbalske taktike i igračka formacija

Istorija fudbalske taktike i igračka formacija



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Fudbalska taktika su one strategije koje koriste članovi jedne strane kako bi se najefikasnije natjecali sa svojim protivnicima. Ove taktike obično osmišljavaju menadžeri ili treneri. Na primjer, desnom beku se može reći da pokuša natjerati vanjsku lijevu stranu da trči udesno i natjerati ga da koristi slabije stopalo.

Ono što je najvažnije, taktika se odnosi na sistem igre ili formiranje tima koje koristi menadžer ili trener. Prvi fudbalski timovi u 19. vijeku imali su tendenciju da igraju po sistemu osam napadača, sa golmanom, poluzaštitnikom i tri četvrtine kao defanzivcima. U 1870-im uspješni timovi koristili su nešto drugačiju formaciju koja je uključivala sedam napadača, dva polu-beka i jednog beka. Tokom ovog perioda veliki stres je bio stavljen na sposobnosti driblinga pojedinaca.

1880 -ih William Sudell i Tom Mitchell počeli su kupovati igrače iz Škotske, a njihovi timovi, Preston North End i Blackburn Rovers, postali su vrlo uspješni. Ovi igrači su sa sobom donijeli ono što je bilo poznato kao "škotski stil" koji je stavljao veći naglasak na dodavanje nego na dribling.

Prva sezona Fudbalske lige počela je u septembru 1888. William Sudell i njegova ekipa iz Preston North End -a osvojili su prvo prvenstvo bez izgubljenog meča i stekli ime "nepobjedivi". Preston je također pobijedio Wolverhampton Wanderers sa 3: 0 i osvojio finale FA kupa 1889. godine. Te sezone Sudell je koristio formaciju 2-3-5 (dva beka, tri polubrana i pet napadača).

Uspjeh Preston North Enda uvjerio je druge klubove da usvoje formaciju 2-3-5. Ovaj sistem je dominirao fudbalom do 1925. godine kada je FA odlučila promijeniti pravilo ofsajda. Promjenom je smanjen broj protivničkih igrača koji su napadaču bili potrebni između njega i gol-linije sa tri na dva.

Charlie Buchan, koji je igrao za Arsenal, predložio je menadžeru Herbertu Chapmanu da tim iskoristi ovu izmjenu zakona kako bi stvorio novu igračku formaciju. Ideja je bila da centaršul, umjesto dva beka, preuzme odgovornost za ofsajd zamku. Bekovi su igrali neposredno ispred središnjeg poluvremena, dok je jedan od napadača vraćen u sredinu. Formacija je stoga promijenjena sa 2-3-5 na 3-3-4. Ovo je postalo poznato i kao "WM" formacija.

Sistem je razvio ono što je postalo poznato kao igra kontranapada. To se oslanjalo na prolaznu sposobnost Alexa Jamesa i postizanje golova poput Davida Jacka, Cliffa Bastina, Jacka Lamberta i Teda Drakea. Uspjeh nije bio trenutan i Arsenal je tek 1930. osvojio finale FA kupa.

Sljedeće sezone Arsenal je osvojio prvo prvenstvo u prvoj ligi. Alex James je bio povrijeđen veći dio sezone 1931-32. To je bio glavni faktor u tome što je Arsenal izgubio titulu za dva boda od Evertona. James je bio najbolji u sezoni 1932-33. Arsenal je osvojio Prvu ligu sa četiri boda. Oni su te sezone postigli i klupski rekord od 118 golova u ligi. Arsenal je takođe osvojio ligu sledeće sezone pobedivši Huddersfield Town na drugom mestu. Do tada je WM formaciju koristila većina klubova u Fudbalskoj ligi.

Herbert Chapman bio je jedan od rijetkih menadžera koji se uključio u odlučivanje o taktikama prije utakmica. Jimmy Ruffell je igrao za West Ham United između 1920. i 1937. Tim je vodio Syd King, ali je tvrdio da je Charlie Paynter taj koji je odlučio o taktici tima: "Syd King je bio dobar menadžer. Ali ostavio je dosta dana -dnevne stvari našem treneru Charlieju Paynteru. Čarli je većina nas razgovarala o bilo čemu. Syd King je više mislio na sklapanje dogovora kako bi igrači igrali za West Ham. "

Slični komentari dati su i o Joeu Smithu koji je upravljao Blackpoolom između 1935-1956. Stanley Matthews je tvrdio da Smith: "Nikad veliki taktičar, pa čak ni razuman, ipak je bio najbolji menadžer za koga sam imao privilegiju igrati. Joe je u meni iznio ono najbolje jer mi je dozvolio da igram svoju prirodnu igru. Uvijek ću biti zahvalan na njegovoj podršci i uvjerenju, posebno kad se osvrnem na one trenutke u kojima su me situacije izmislile da posumnjam u sebe i svoje sposobnosti ... Joe je bio sjajan psiholog koji je prosječnog igrača mogao zavarati da vjeruje i nastupi kao dobar, i dobar igrač kao jako dobar. Potpisao je neke vrlo dobre igrače, a to je najteži dio menadžerskog posla. Joe je to radio uvijek iznova. Kao što sam već rekao, menadžer nema oni znaju dobrim igračima šta da rade. "

Cyril Robinson je igrao u finalu FA kupa 1953. za Blackpool protiv Bolton Wanderersa. Kasnije je tvrdio da je prije utakmice sve što je Smith rekao bilo "idite tamo i natjerajte ih da ih pobijede". Prema riječima Stanleyja Matthewsa, on je rekao: "Izađite i uživajte. Budite igrači koje znam da jeste i bit ćemo dobro."

Stan Mortensen je takođe igrao pod Joeom Smithom u Blackpoolu. Priznao je i da je Smith provodio malo vremena govoreći o taktikama prepuštajući Harryju Johnsonu, kapetanu: "Joe ima jednu veliku vrlinu koja se ističe među ostalim - a ima ih mnogo. On je gotovo najbolji gubitnik i pobjednik u fudbalu. Ako pobijedimo, on nikad nije u zraku i ne sanja o šampionatu; a ako izgubimo, brzo mu daje utjehu i nikada se ne spušta u usta. Joe je toliko dugo u igri kao igrač i menadžer da zna dobro da jedan poraz ne znači ispadanje, više od jedne pobjede najavljuje osvajanje Kupa ili Lige. "

Dok sam bio u Škotskoj upoznao sam se sa fudbalskim klubom Calthorpe, koji je dolazio i igrao protiv drugog tima Queen's Parka. Bilo je nekoliko vrlo poštenih igrača u Calthorpeu i odlučio sam se, po dolasku u Birmingham, pridružiti im se. Ali jedan od mojih kolega, George Uzzell, spomenuo mi je Aston Villu kao klub koji je brzo došao do izražaja i zamolio me da postanem njegov član. Neko vrijeme sam oklijevao, ali na kraju mi ​​je prijatelj rekao da je "brat Škot", gospodin George Ramsay, kapetan Vile i to je odlučilo za mene. Gospodin Ramsay je bio čovjek iz Glasgowa i uložio je veliki napor kako bi tim Ville doveo u prvi rang. I sam je bio dobar desničarski napadač i dobro ga je podržao W. B. Mason. Otišao sam gospodinu Ramsayju i odmah smo postali dobri prijatelji i takvi smo ostali do danas.

Gospodin Ramsay je praktično bio osnivač fudbalskog kluba Aston Villa. Imao je dobre poduke u igri dok je bio u Škotskoj, a kao član Oxford Cluba stekao je veliko iskustvo i sudjelovao u nekoliko prvoklasnih utakmica. Neposredno prije nego što je otišao, njegov klub se tri puta izjednačio sa Glasgow Rangersima za Kup škota. Čuvao je gol i priča da je zadnji put spasio svoj gol na račun slomljenog nosa.

Gospodin Ramsay je bio sveobuhvatni igrač i mogao je zauzeti bilo koju poziciju i dati dobar račun o sebi. Dolazeći u Birmingham zatekao je fudbal ovdje u vrlo zaostalom stanju. Četiri glavna kluba bila su St. Mary's, Aston Unity, Calthorpe i Birmingham. Jednog dana gospodin Ramsay je ugledao nekoliko momaka kako se igraju zajedno u velikom javnom parku prema Park Roadu, Aston, i promatrao ih je s određenom količinom znatiželje i zabave. Bili su povezani s kapelom Villa Cross Wesleyan i imali su samo najprimitivnije ideje igre. Ramsay opisuje njihovu igru ​​kao "zalet u čovjeka i veliki udarac u loptu;" potpuno su ignorisali dribling i očigledno su bili u najosnovnijoj fazi znanja - prilično "maloljetni", kako je rekao gospodin Ramsay.

Pa, kad je neko vrijeme gledao momke, razgovarao je sa posmatračem i predložio da se njih dvoje pridruže igri. Zatim je pozvao jednog od igrača, Williama Weissa po imenu, i predložio da mu se dozvoli da igra s jedne strane, a njegovom slučajnom poznaniku s druge strane. Kad je nakon mnogo problema shvaćen njegov široki viski, prijedlog je prihvaćen i gospodin Ramsay je počeo svirati. Ubrzo je pokazao da je nauka superiornija od svih njihovih velikih udaraca i lako je prošao loptu pored ljudi koji nikada ranije nisu videli takav prikaz. Bili su zapanjeni kada su vidjeli kako igra i kada je sve bilo gotovo opkolili su igrača koji je izudarao loptu.

Utjecaj Ramsayja, tada Huntera, doveo je Villu do razvoja zamršene igre dodavanja, revolucionarnog poteza za engleski klub kasnih 1870 -ih. Bio je to stil igre zasnovan na onom koji je u to vrijeme bio prevladavajući u Škotskoj, koji je tada bio prevladavajući u Škotskoj i koji je pionirski započeo Queen's Park, sa strane Glasgowa. Ova vrsta sofisticiranog timskog rada rijetko se koristila u Engleskoj. Umjesto toga, pojedinci bi pokušali sami uzeti loptu koliko god su mogli dok ih protivnik ne zaustavi.

Putovali smo od Nottinghama do Birminghama i nabavili potrebnu odjeću za obuku te smo iste noći otišli u Droitwich. Ispred stanice nas je čekala kočnica i u mrkloj mračnoj noći nas je desetak projahalo mirnim seoskim uličicama do malog neviđenog mjesta na rijeci Severn zvanog Holt Fleet.

Ovdje smo stigli u ponoć i umorni od dnevnih napora i pospani tokom vožnje, otisli smo u krevet. Hotelski smještaj u to vrijeme u Holt Fleet bio je ograničenog karaktera i domaćin nije bio naviknut na tako velike zabave koje traže smještaj. Nije bio spreman za nas i prve noći smo morali grubo to shvatiti. Nas šest je spavalo na gornjem tavanu u kojem su bila postavljena tri kreveta. Kažem da smo spavali, ali to nije sasvim točno. Tamo smo bili stavljeni na spavanje, ali kuga koja noću vreba bila nam je suprotna.

Sve je to, naravno, kasnije otklonio ljubazni domaćin, koji je učinio sve da nam bude ugodno. Ali zapitat ćete se zašto smo ovo mjesto odabrali za svoju namjenu. To nije bilo naše otkriće, već nam ga je preporučio W. G. George, šampion u miljama. Bio mu je običaj da hoda, dok trenira, od Bromsgrovea do Droitwicha, a Holt Fleet leži između ova dva mjesta. Okrug je veoma povoljan za sportiste. Postoji lijep dio planine i rijeka koja pruža sve mogućnosti za vožnju čamcem i kupanje. Tada su šetnje svuda unaokolo ugodne, a kupke u salamuri u Droitwichu su, naravno, vrlo zgodne.

Budući da smo bili tamo, drugi fudbalski timovi su iskusili njegove prednosti, posebno Wolverhampton Wanderers. Pa, ovdje smo ostali tjedan dana s našim trenerom, Billyjem Gormanom. Bio je poznati sprinterski trkač i osvojio je poseban hendikep; a kad je sam prestao sudjelovati na javnim natjecanjima, posvetio se treniranju sportaša i bio je glavni čovjek.

Ustajali smo svako jutro u osam sati i doručkovali. Poslije smo se šetali otprilike sat vremena koliko smo htjeli. Zatim smo obukli uniformu i uz dopuštenje, koje je ljubazno odobrio nadzornik lorda Dudleya, bilo nam je dozvoljeno korištenje terena iza hotela za sprintersko trčanje i trčanje na duge staze. Bilo je znatiželjno primijetiti razliku koja se brzo vježba u nekim ili našim fizičkim sposobnostima. Bio je Dennis Hodgetts, na primjer, koji se zvao naš spor čovjek. Do tog trenutka zaista mu je nedostajalo željene kvalitete postojanosti koja je toliko korisna na terenu. No, nakon ovog treninga, divno se razvio u jednog od najbržih u setu, a nadmašio ga je samo Richard Davis (pokojni iz Walsall Swiftsa) koji je imao reputaciju najbržeg igrača na kratkim udaljenostima. Svi ostali su bili vrlo brzi: Albert Brown, Joey Simmonds, Jack Burton, Freddy Dawson, Howard Vaughton, Harry Yates i Albert Allen, ali trčanje u sprintu je značajno poboljšalo njihovu formu.

Što se mene tiče, ja sam trčao na duge staze, sa Warnerom, našim golmanom, koji nije imao posebnu potrebu da ide na ovaj trening, a Coulton, za moje pratioce. Moram ovdje objasniti da je Albert Allen bio naš rezervni čovjek koji je bio spreman preuzeti Dawsonovo mjesto ako je potrebno, jer je Freddy ozbiljno ozlijedio koljeno i bili smo vrlo nesigurni hoće li moći igrati. Međutim, kada je došlo pravo vrijeme, cijelom timu je postavljeno pitanje i odlučili su da je sposoban, pa Alen ipak nije bio potreban.

Pa jutro je prošlo. Ponekad je tim šetao osam ili deset milja po divnim stazama, zadužen za jednog ili dva člana odbora i mene, a onda smo se vraćali na večeru.

Nakon večere, bilo nam je dozvoljeno da se opet izležavamo, a zatim je ekipa sazvana na fudbalske vježbe, gospodin s druge strane rijeke koji nam je stavio na raspolaganje odgovarajuću mrvicu terena. Ovdje smo naporno radili sat i pol, usavršavajući se u nauci o igri i savladavajući svaki trik na koji se moglo pomisliti. Bio je to sport, ali bili smo ozbiljni i iako smo uživali, nismo štedjeli truda da naučimo sve što se treba naučiti.

Kad smo se vratili, trener nas je trljao i pregledao, a zatim smo sjeli na čaj. Nakon što smo pojeli taj obrok, često smo šetali kilometar i pol; a do deset svake večeri tim Vile bio je u krevetu. Takav nam je bio trening iz dana u dan.

Za doručak smo jeli šunku i jaja ili ribu i pili čaj ili kafu. Nismo ručali, osim možda čaše piva ako smo na to navikli. Za večeru smo jeli ribu, uglavnom, lososa ili laminice. Nerijetko nam je domaćin donosio svježe ulovljenog lososa, a u jednom ili dva navrata uživali smo i u ribolovnim ekspedicijama. Ponekad smo jeli malo pečenke ili ovčetine, a povremeno i živinu; ali riba je najčešće predstavljala večeru. Čaj se sastojao od kotleta i odrezaka, a mi smo legli bez večere.

Naravno, svaki dan nije bio isti i imali smo male avanture koje su činile ugodnu varijaciju rutine. Bilo nam je posebno zadovoljstvo naići na našeg dobrog starog trenera koji je sjedio uz rijeku, sa štapom u ruci, strpljivo čekajući ribu koja nikada nije došla, dok noću nije nedostajalo diverzije. Borbe s jastucima bile su sasvim uobičajeno vrijeme i kako je većina nas navikla na prednosti gradskog života, bilo je prirodno da se trudimo pronaći što je moguće više zabave na tom mirnom mjestu izvan svijeta. Neke noći smo nas u hotelu zabavljali okružni berači hmelja bez posla, koji su zaraditi poštenu lipu obučeni u crvene Indijance, zabili im perje u kape, zacrnili im lice i izveli razne divlje igre ludorije, ples i pjevanje.

Prava taktika za koju se slažem da počinje u svlačionici kada će klupski zvaničnici moći dati igračima neku ideju o općim metodama, slabostima i snazi ​​protivnika. Tada se ne pravi niti bi trebao biti napravljen jedan, već nekoliko planova, tako da se opozicija može napasti na najslabijoj tački i istražiti tamo gdje se sumnja na druge slabosti.

Mobilnost je tajna uspjeha bilo kojeg tima, a to znači da bi kapetan u svakom trenutku trebao moći prebaciti svoj plan na neki drugi taktički pokret o kojem je raspravljao i dogovarao se svaki član tima.

Ne mogu se složiti na primjer da jedan unutra, a kamoli dva, uvijek mora biti malo iza svojih kolega u napadu. To nije uvijek moguće. Slažem se da sve dok ostala četvorica napreduju i donose rezultate, metoda se može nastaviti, ali ako rezultati ne dolaze, potrebno je poduzeti korake da se to popravi, a to može rezultirati s pet napada prema naprijed .

Taktičke sheme i planovi tima moraju uvijek biti fluidni, a kapetan i njegov tim uvijek moraju biti spremni da ih usvoje u skladu sa razvojem događaja. Potez odbrane u suprotstavljanju napadu mora se sam suprotstaviti još jednom shemom. Pozitivna akcija cijelo vrijeme najbolja je politika koju svaki tim može usvojiti: energičan i svestran napad put je do pobjede. Negativna politika izbjegavanja poraza koju često usvajaju, posebno od strane kluba u gostima, nije sretno rješenje za nevolje tima.

Za Arsenal se u prošlim sezonama govorilo da je imao svoju metodu, i iskreno, ne vjerujem na trenutak. Koliko ste često čuli da su se dugo koncentrirali na odbranu kako bi protivnike izvukli na teren i, hej presto, lopta je odjednom bila prebačena na njihove dosad besposlene napadače koji tada nisu imali ništa drugo do trčati i staviti loptu u mrežu .

Stara metoda Arsenala imala je više od toga. Neka se shvati da su oni bili tim zvijezda i njihovim napadačima nisu trebali tako široki prostori da naprave pokret koji bi donio rezultate. Mnogi su branioci u prvoj engleskoj ligi koji su se zavrtjeli u glavi pokušavajući spriječiti napadače Arsenala od riječi "kreni".

Neću reći da su metode Arsenala bile fiksne. Uvjeren sam da je kod njih, više nego kod većine timova, važna bila sama fluidnost tima ... potpuno razumijevanje između svih igrača, spoznaja da će svaki čovjek biti u određenom trenutku u određenom trenutku prema način na koji se igra odvijala. U vreme pisanja ovog članka Arsenal je imao lošu čaroliju; oni će ponovo ustati.

Razgovori u svlačionici i razgovori su zaista veoma važni. Igrači upoređuju bilješke iz prethodnog iskustva. Agenti tima vjerovatno su gledali opoziciju na nedavnoj utakmici. Nema štete ako spojite dva i dva i dobijete odgovor u obliku plana koji će vjerovatno nadmudriti opoziciju.

Ali bilo bi pogrešno definitivno reći igračima: "Ovako ćete igrati ovu igru; držite se plana." Moglo bi se reći: "Ovo je vjerojatan način za dobar početak, pokušajte neko vrijeme, a ako su rezultati dobri, nastavite."

Postoji metoda u kojoj sve dok je kapetanu ostavljeno da odluči je li metoda ispravna kada vidi kako djeluje na djelu. Moraju postojati pripravni planovi i očito se uvijek mora uzeti u obzir mišljenje spremno za stavljanje u funkciju.

Syd King je bio dobar menadžer. Syd King više se bavio sklapanjem dogovora kako bi igrači igrali za West Ham. Ali bio je dobar u tome. Odveo nas je do finala Kupa i unaprijedio West Ham 1923. tako da ne možete tražiti mnogo više od toga, zar ne.


Osnove fudbalske taktike: Objašnjena formacija 4-3-3

4-3-3 je postavljen u tri linije na terenu-tipična odbrana dva centralna i dva beka, tri centralna vezna koji mogu formirati trokut i tri napadača, jedan centralni i dva koja igraju na bokovi.

Slika sa soccer-training-guide.com

Ključ za ovu formaciju su široki napadači, koji bočno drže usamljenog centralnog napadača. Ovi igrači su svestrano napadajući igrači s brzinom i sposobnošću šuta, koji koriste svoju brzinu na krilima prije nego što zabiju prema golu. Cristiano Ronaldo je izvanredan primjer. Usamljeni napadač sam može biti moćna meta ili neko ko duboko padne kako bi odvukao odbrambene igrače i ostavio prostor širokim napadačima, u čuvenom stilu "Lažne 9" Lionela Messija.

Tim napadačima pomažu najmanje dva centralna vezna. Ti središnji vezni formiraju uski trokut na sredini terena i često ulaze u uloge 'kreatora-razarača-dodavača', da napadaju, brane i održavaju posjed. Neki vezni igrači kombiniraju sve te elemente, ali dobro izbalansiran vezni red ključan je za formiranje.

Sa kompaktnim središnjim veznim redom, napadači se mogu pridružiti napadu i koristiti ogromnu količinu prostora zbog visokog pozicioniranja širokih napadača.

4-3-3 je vjerojatno potencijalno najveća od svih modernih formacija. Postoji razlog zašto ga koriste mnoge od najdominantnijih strana evropskog fudbala - Chelsea, Real Madrid, Barcelona. Ovo su strane koje očekuju pobjedu svake sedmice, sa dovoljno napadačke snage da savladaju strane odlučne da odu sa neriješenim rezultatom.

U posjedu, 4-3-3 omogućava najmanje 7 igrača da napadnu, dok široki napadači stisnu odbranu, bekovi im dolaze iza leđa, a dvojica centralnih veznih guraju prema naprijed.

Međutim, posebna kvaliteta dobrog 4-3-3 je kvalitet davljenja koji on donosi. To dolazi kombinacijom dva elementa, centralnog sredine sa tri čovjeka koji može dominirati posjedom preko trokuta dodavanja i tri napadača koji mogu pritisnuti visoko na terenu. Protivnicima je teško doći do lopte, a teško je i zadržati je. Vezni igrači ne mogu uhvatiti loptu i brzo ih pritiskaju. Branitelji se suočavaju s trojicom muškaraca koji ih pritiskaju i nema lakih lopti u krila kada se bekovi guraju.

Potpuno funkcionalna ofenziva 4-3-3 je poput plime protiv pješčanog dvorca-moglo bi potrajati, ali će na kraju probiti odbranu. I nikada nije bilo 4-3-3 koji je bolje funkcionirao od Barcelone 2008-09 pod vodstvom Pepa Guardiole u svojoj prvoj sezoni, trostrukih pobjednika koji su dominirali Manchester Unitedom u finalu Lige prvaka i Real Madridom u ligi.

Obrnuta strana je da je 4-3-3 koji ne može držati loptu dok napada u napadu potencijalno vrlo ranjiv. Jedini igrači koji su ostali u odbrani su centralni bekovi i defanzivni vezni. To stvara vrlo opasnu situaciju u kontri jer protivnički široki igrači imaju dovoljno prostora za proboj. Sve što je manje od vrhunskog defanzivnog veznog igrača, koji je fizički jak, ima odlično pozicioniranje, puno tempa i precizno dodavanje, može ostaviti centralne bekove vrlo izloženim. Jedno pogrešno dodavanje i protivnička ekipa imaju opasnu kontru.

4-3-3 također zahtijeva veliku količinu discipline od svojih širokih igrača. Potencijal da budete izloženi ako imate široke napadače koji ne uspeju da se vrate, ogroman je. Puni bekovi koji jurišaju u znak podrške napadu moraju imati energije za trku i odbranu 90 minuta. U protivnom, protivnički široki igrači pobuniće bokove.

Iako je ime Paul Lambert danas u blatu oko Villa Parka, bilo je vremena kada su Villans bili optimistični u pogledu budućnosti ove strane. Taj osjećaj je bio najjači na kraju sezone 2012-13, kada je sveobuhvatni napad Abgonlahora, Bentekea i Weimanna u kombinaciji izbacio Vilu iz zone ispadanja. Vrhunac je bila pobjeda 6: 1 nad Sunderlandom.

Nažalost, osim prve tri, zaista nije bilo materijala za stvaranje stabilnog tima sa sniženim defanzivnim veznim igračima u Yacouba Sylli i Karimu El-Ahmadiju i stalnim nedostatkom kvalitetnih bekova. Taj problem se nastavio i ove sezone, gdje su dva poraza protiv Arsenala i izloženost Carlosa Sáncheza pokazali ranjivost 4-3-3 uz nedostatak presinga i vrhunskog defanzivnog veznog.

4-3-3 i Villa trenutno

Tim Sherwood nije pokazao veliku sklonost da koristi 4-3-3, naizgled preferirajući Bentekea kao usamljenog napadača ili u paru sa Abgonlahorom, a Andi Weimann je uglavnom ograničen na klupu. Korišten je samo u prvoj utakmici FA kupa protiv West Broma kada su Scott Sinclair i Charles N'Zogbia pretvoreni u improvizirane napadače sa obje strane Gabby Abgonlahor, i skoro se probili.

Ključne pozicije beka i defanzivnog veznog igrača još se rade na ovoj strani Vile, pa je malo vjerojatno da ćemo ovu formaciju vidjeti u Claret-u i Blue-u u skorije vrijeme.

Više članaka iz serije Osnove fudbalske taktike 7500toHolte možete pronaći ovdje:


Povijesna upotreba vanjskih leđa

Prvih 90 godina taktike slijedilo je zajedničku taktičku strukturu: visoki ciljevi preko prednje linije, a preostali igrači odvođenje sredine. Kao što Wilson primjećuje, fudbal je u ranim danima bio visoko individualiziran. Sposobnost driblinga bila je odlika velikog igrača, a fizički pristup izjednačen je s čvrstinom. Rani gubici od Engleza doveli su Škotsku do razvoja prolazne strane igre, ali oba pristupa se uklapaju u piramidalnu formaciju 2-3-5.

Kao što možete vidjeti na donjoj slici, osnovna struktura piramide omogućila je veću širinu u napadu uz zaštitu od središnjih protunapada. Vješte napadače pokrivali su vezni ili centaršuti. Kako je posjed izgubljen, a timovi prešli u svoju odbrambenu trećinu, centaršut se pridružio bekovima kako bi brojčano obračunali napadače protivnika.

1920-ih, legendarni trener Herbert Chapman predstavio je W-M formaciju. Varijacija 2-3-5, W-M je naslagao prednju liniju, dodajući element centralne dominacije i triangulacije. Ovih 2-3-3-2 osiguralo je gubitak posjeda, što je dovelo do toga da je protivnik morao očistiti drugu liniju odbrane. Chapman je poznat po stavljanju rezultata iznad stila, pa iako je ova evolucija taktike bila pragmatičnija i odbrambenije zvučna, ona inicira defanzivniji, pragmatičniji pristup sportu zasnovan na rezultatima, trend koji će se nastaviti još nekoliko desetljeća jedan. Napredak je uključivao jednog, pa drugog, centarfota koji je ubačen između bekova radi dodatne odbrambene čvrstoće.

U stvari, nakon M-M-a, mnogi timovi su krenuli prema 4-2-4. Istorijski gledano, ovo je bila sljedeća velika evolucija taktike. Centralna polovica je sada preuzela uloge koje su ranije bile dodijeljene bekovima, čineći da se središnje polovine potpuno vrate. Bez obzira na to da li su bekovi bili ravni ili u položaju pometača/stopera, puni bekovi iz prošlosti viđeni su više kao odbrambeni pokrivač.

U potrazi za modernim vanjskim bekom, analizirao sam brojne historijske utakmice. Istraživanje vanjskih bekova koji su napravili najbolje liste svih vremena dovelo me do sljedećih igara.

  • Inter Milano - Celtic (25. maj 1967.)
  • Brazil protiv Italije (21. juna 1970.)
  • Ajax protiv Juventusa (30. maj 1973.)
  • Italija - Brazil (5. jula 1982.)
  • AC Milan - Real Madrid (19. april 1989.)
  • AC Milan - Barcelona (18. maj 1994)

S izuzetkom Cruyffovog Ajaxa, ta prva tri meča imala su nekoliko rotacija, odlučujući se za taktički rigidniji pristup. Dok su timovi Brazila i Ajaxa 1970 -ih bili daleko ispred svog vremena, bilo je jasno da su to bili rani dani revolucije. Prelazi za prekidanje linija, poziciona triangulacija i intenzivno pritiskanje bili su temelj njihovog pristupa. Osim toga, brazilska upotreba Carlosa Alberta i Everalda dovela je do toga da vanjski bekovi preuzimaju napadačke odgovornosti visoko na terenu.

Uspeh napada spoljnih bekova doveo je do promene paradigme. Umjesto da tjeraju kreativce u zakrčena vezna polja, timovi su koristili vanjske bekove gotovo kao dodatnog veznog. Kako se igra razvijala, vanjski bekovi su se sve više uključivali u napad, dajući nam igrače poput Roberta Carlosa, Javiera Zanettija, Philipa Lahma, Danija Alvesa i Marcela. Svjedoci smo još jednog napretka, koji je zaista povratak našim nogometnim korijenima.

Inspirisani totalnim vokalnim sastavom Michelsa i Cruyffa, Barcelonin Juego de Posición i obnova Ajaxa ukazuju na evolucijski napredak u napadu na fudbal. Prateći Cruyffove petrijeve posude, Ajax i Barcelonu, vidimo njegove učenike i njihove direktne rivale kako prilagođavaju osnovne taktičke principe piramide 2-3-5 modernoj igri. Uz osnovno razumijevanje istorije piramide i razvoja modernih vanjskih leđa, vrijeme je da pažljivo pogledamo manifestacije i varijacije 2-3-5 u današnjoj igri. Umjesto da dajemo pregled svakog tima, istražit ćemo taktičku teoriju koja pokreće ovu novu primjenu piramide, pokazujući neke od vodećih svjetskih timova i primjećujući neke taktičke nijanse koje razlikuju klubove.


Brazil, 1970. i najljepši fudbal u istoriji

Nogomet ne želi fenomene. Bilo je fenomenalnih igrača, fenomenalnih trikova, golova, dodavanja, igranja i sve smo to vidjeli. Fenomenalni timovi su puni stadioni kroz istoriju, ostavljajući mase koje se broje u hiljadama (i milioni se prilagođavaju) u strahu od svojih sposobnosti. Bilo da se radi o lutki, elastiku ili golu iz središnjeg kruga, ova herojska heroja iz mašte rijetko uspijevaju zapanjiti.

No, dok obožavatelji nastavljaju drapati svoje idole u superlative koji inače odgovaraju kraljevskim licima, ako ne i sami bogovi, postoji presedan koji ponižava svakog takvog fudbalskog mogula: legendarna brazilska strana 1970.

Osam godina ranije, na nacionalnom stadionu u Santiagu u Čileu, Brazil je slavio drugo uzastopno Svjetsko prvenstvo nakon što je u finalu pobijedio Čehoslovačku sa 3: 1. Proslava se nije povlačila danima, a zvijezde Garrincha i Pelé, unatoč tome što su posljednji propustili veći dio turnira zbog povrede, sada su proglašeni nacionalnim ikonama. Ekstazi je sjajno izgoreo. Festivali na ulicama predali su se mračnijoj stvarnosti tog vremena.

Godine 1961., usred velike zabune, João Goulart preuzeo je funkciju predsjednika u Brazilu. On je ranije bio potpredsjednik, ali kada je dosadašnji lider Jânio Quadros podnio ostavku na mjesto predsjednika, Goulart je unaprijeđen da vodi državu. Njegove kasnije reforme uvelike su polarizirale javnost.

Goulart je želio nacionalizirati određene industrije kako bi izgradio jaču domaću ekonomiju i umanjio ekonomski jaz između Brazila i SAD -a. U strahu da su reforme prvi koraci za pridruživanje komunističkom bloku, mnogi Brazilci i parlament povukli su svoju podršku. Uticaji su ga prozvali komunistom i započeli poziv na državni udar.

1. aprila 1964., s pobunjeničkim trupama koje su već bile u Rio de Janeiru, Goulart je pomislio da poštedi nevolje građanskog rata i pobjegao je u Urugvaj. Nakon deset dana, načelnik štaba brazilske vojske, maršal Castelo Branco, izabran je od strane Kongresa za predsjednika.

Puč je izbacio Goularta i njegove sporne reforme u većinu korist Brazila, ali ih je uvalio u još dublja politička previranja. Castelo Branco uvelike je proširio moć predsjedništva. Svaki aktuelni predsjednik sada bi mogao promijeniti ustav po svom nahođenju i smijeniti bilo koju političku ličnost. Brankov nasljednik, general Artur da Costa e Silva, potpisao je novi akt koji je efikasno raspustio Kongres, uveo cenzuru i dodatno povećao predsjednikove ovlasti da se izjednači s ovlastima diktatora. Zbog zdravstvenog stanja nije mogao odslužiti ostatak mandata, Costa e Silva zamijenio je general Emílio Garrastazú Médici.

Preuzimajući dužnost 1969., Médici je svim srcem prihvatio slogan brazilskog vojnog režima, “Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o ”(Brazil: volite ili ostavite to). Nakon godina rastuće inflacije, sporog ekonomskog rasta i društvenih nemira, Médici je pokušao promijeniti klimu kako je smatrao prikladnom. Pod njegovim mandatom represija i mučenje su bili sve jači. Novinari su bili pod teškom cenzurom, a disidenti, lažno optuženi ili ne, zatvoreni bez suda. Reći da je postojala društvena nelagoda pod Medicijevom diktaturom bio bi najljubazniji način da se to izrazi. To quell the masses, Médici found his alternative bread and circuses: football.

No political regime is wholly supported by its populace. Brazilians, however, revere the national team. To some locals, football means life. To many others, it means much, much more. Médici wanted his government to be seen in tandem with the national team – footballing success would mean political success. It was a means of controlling the discontent mob, but his heavy involvement in football was rather forced nor welcome.

He sanctioned the building of numerous new stadiums throughout the nation. High on personal pride, Médici continued to interfere directly with the sport, commandeering team selection at Flamengo before attempting to do the same with the Seleção. Although the propaganda effectively screened his regime’s atrocities, there was a tad bit more resistance than Médici had grown used to.

With the 1970 World Cup mere months away, Brazil were looking promising. They had won all their games in the qualifying rounds despite the manager, João Saldanha, failing to accommodate all the star names in his line-up. Most controversially and to much of Brazil’s dismay, Saldanha saw no logic in starting both of Brazil’s deadliest attackers, Pelé and Tostão (humorously nicknamed the ‘White Pelé’). He also neglected Rivellino and Médici’s personal favourite striker, Dario. Médici voiced his desire to see Dario involved in the team, to which Saldanha allegedly replied, “I do not mess with his cabinet, he will not mess with my team.”

Unsurprisingly, Médici fired Saldanha. He was replaced by a member of Brazil’s 1958 and 1962 World Cup winning squads, Mário Zagallo . Médici subsequently took a step back from the inner dealings of the Seleção, opting to propagate from afar in lieu of man management. Brazil, living pessimistically enough, had now lost all hope for their national team as well, while Zagallo quietly went about his ways.

Zagallo had one main initiative: to field Brazil’s best under one tactic. Brazil had a plethora of number 10s – Rivellino, a slick dribbler with an atomic left foot, Jairzinho, a fast dribbler with the strength and incision to pass any man, Gérson, a midfield maestro with the passing range to hit any tree, and the aforementioned Pelé and Tostão. Zagallo used the 4-2-4 formation Brazil played at the 1962 World Cup as the blueprint tactic for this team.

In goal stood Félix, Carlos Alberto – the captain of the side – Piazza, Brito and Everaldo made up the back four, Clodoaldo and Gérson operated as the midfield pivot, Jairzinho and Rivellino occupied the right and left flanks respectively, and Pelé and Tostão were the striking partnership. There were, however, a number of tactical tweaks.

Pelé played slightly deeper than Tostão. He was the pivotal playmaker, the closest to a classic number 10. Tostão, wearing the famous number 9, resembled more of a false 9. He roamed across the front line, often dropping deep to contribute to the build-up play and destabilise the opponent’s defence. With the centre-backs following Tostão’s runs, space would be created for Pelé or Jairzinho, the latter cutting inside from the right.

Rivelino was a more unorthodox winger. He would drift into the centre, consequently creating a three-man midfield with Clodoaldo and Gérson, or taking up more attacking positions near Pelé. Carlos Alberto was instructed to bomb down the right flank when Brazil were in possession, leaving Piazza, Brito and Everaldo to cover for the whole team. Piazza was actually a midfielder Zagallo insisted on him playing in defence to help with Brazil’s build-up play.

It is easy to forget that such tactical tweaks were radical innovations at the time. In terms of tactics and team identity, not much existed beyond the Catenaccio of the Italians – a rather new tactic within itself. Tostão’s false 9 runs were first introduced just a bit more than a decade prior, when the Hungarians humbled the English 6-3 in 1953. But Brazil did not adopt an identity from Zagallo’s tactics – those were mere instructions. The Seleção played with Brazil’s ever-present joga bonito mentality. The zest to ‘play beautifully’ is far more accredited to Saldanha. “Brazilian football,” Saldanha believed, “is a thing played to music.”

This samba rhythm did not stem from any vast technical or athletic superiority, rather the expressive art of capoeira. Cruelly exploited under the governing regime, Brazilian slaves developed this dance-martial arts hybrid. Capoeira focused on free bodily movement, which the slaves were otherwise denied. It was the perfect antithesis. Each practitioner, finally able to freely express, felt euphoric.

Capoeira became a tool of resistance – a dance, a movement that liberated one from the ails of the oppressing society. And in the 1930s, when black Brazilian players no longer had to powder their faces just to play football, this resistance-through-expression mentality truly became joga bonito.

Thus, with mere weeks to go until the World Cup in Mexico, a sudden managerial change, and a nation suffering under oppression once more, meant the capoeira mentality held more prevalence than ever. Brazil looked to their 23 travelling players for some sort of escape. Few fans, albeit reluctantly, rooted against the Seleção, hoping their shortcomings would embarrass Médici enough to leave office. But to the nation as a whole, Zagallo’s men were to be an indicator of the future – if Pelé and co could succeed in such times, then Brazil could too. Luckily, they were enchanting.

Drawn in a group against the world champions, England, the European champions, Czechoslovakia, and Europe’s newest sensation, Romania, Brazil’s chances were rated slim. Just four years prior, Portugal knocked Brazil out of the 1966 World Cup, evidently showing that Brazil could not cope with the European physicality.

It was on 3 June in Guadalajara, Mexico that Brazil faced Czechoslovakia in their opener of the World Cup. Televised to the entire world in colour for the very first time, everyone tensely watched on. Pelé, absent from this same fixture in the final of the 1962 World Cup, kicked the game off. I tako, Seleção dazzled as the world marvelled.

Brazil moved fast. They did not focus on hogging the ball nor defending deep. When in possession, they would swiftly play out the back and look for vertical passes to their attacking quartet. In truth, the team could play a myriad of styles but focused on quick combination play and instinctive movement. Pelé would often dummy the ball, leaving the pass for Tostão and continuing his own run into the box. Rivellino would fool opponents with his trickery, whilst Jairzinho posed a direct threat on the right. The world, seeing such sharp movements and trickery for the first time, could not help but watch.

Czechoslovakia scored first, but Rivellino soon equalised with a thunderous free-kick. Before half-time, Pelé audaciously attempted a shot from the centre circle. He missed by centimetres, but the crowd cheered as loud as ever. Brazil looked to be even stronger after the break, with Pelé nonchalantly finishing a team move. Gérson soon found Jairzinho with an over-the-top pass, and the number 7 thumped the ball into the net. The Brazilian joga bonito was on display from the very start but, despite winning 4-1, there was cause for concern. Gérson had gotten injured.

Gérson tied all strings together. His orchestration helped the team gel. Brazil felt confident to play the quick and simple passes around and through Gérson. But he was out until the remainder of the group stage, and a difficult game against England beckoned. The game was decisive. The winner would likely top the group and play in Guadalajara until the final, in lieu of Mexico’s more demanding altitudes.

Gérson’s absence was strongly felt. Brazil struggled to pass the ball around as effortlessly as before. The attacking quartet now faced the challenge of breaking down Bobby Moore’s solid defence. Carlos Alberto in his later years admitted that it was the hardest game of the whole tournament – but a game Brazil nonetheless won.

They managed to bypass England’s defence a number of times but met great resistance in Gordon Banks. In what looked a sure goal, Brazil went from their own third to the six-yard box in two passes and four touches, but Banks’s stretching arm miraculously kept out Pelé’s header in what many refer to as the save of the century. Eventually, when outnumbered six to three in England’s own penalty box, Tostão found Pelé with a cross, who laid it off to Jairzinho for the winger’s second goal in as many games. It was a physical, demanding game but Brazil had passed their hardest test without their most crucial cog. Qualification was now guaranteed.

In their final group stage game against Romania, joga bonito was a different animal. Still without Gérson and with Rivellino rested, Brazil wanted to ensure their victory early on. They carved holes in the Romanian defence. Pelé and Jairzinho put Brazil 2-0 in a blitz before even half an hour was played. The Romanian goalkeeper, Stere Adamache, was even subbed off for someone fresher and more confident. But Brazil’s lax defensive structure and insistence on playing out the back was proving problematic, as Romania soon capitalised on a misplaced pass.

After half-time, Pelé restored the two-goal lead with a predatory finish from inside the box. The ball had gotten there after an inventive flick from Tostão. Brazil was expressing itself and coasting, the world riveted by their football. Hope was trickling its way back into Brazilian life.

In the quarter-finals, Brazil faced their first South American opponents, Peru. Gérson and Rivellino had returned to the side. With Guadalajara watching, Brazil proved that in football, greatness and flexibility are synonymous. For 90 minutes, they did everything. They could create chances in all forms, be it a short corner, a pass over the defence, overlapping runs from the full-backs – Brazil terrorised Peru with undefendable flicks and tricks.

Rivellino scored the first with a deft, powerful finish to the bottom corner from the edge of the box. Tostão scored the second after a short one-two from the corner with Rivellino and a near-post finish. With a simple tap into an open net after Pelé had chipped the ball over the onrushing keeper, Tostão scored another. To cap off the spectacle, Jairzinho rounded the Peruvian goalkeeper and slotted the fourth into an empty net. The game finished 4-2 but the two Peruvian goals were more flukish than anything.

Such was the gusto that the Seleção felt for football, they simply wanted to play, to entertain, and to do so together. From their carefree attitude stemmed their tactical flexibility. Where the Europeans would position their players with meticulous instruction, Zagallo would license them to freely roam. No player in Brazil’s attacking quartet, bar Jairzinho, had a defined position.

Tostão, in lieu of leading the line, could either drop deep to join the midfield or pick up the ball on the left wing. When one player would leave his position, another would compensate. In the absence of a leading man, Pelé would push forward becoming the sole focal point of the attack. In such times, Rivellino would adopt the mantle of having dictatorial freedom in the centre. He could accompany Gérson in the midfield pivot, link up with Jairzinho on the right, or play right underneath the striker – be it Tostão or Pelé.

Such free movement greatly destabilised Brazil’s opponents. What was the right-back to do if Rivelino is casually strolling on the other flank? How were the centre-backs to react of Tostão was playing in midfield? Follow him out of position and you leave free space for Pelé to exploit. In a game of little options and no leeway, Brazil’s opponents could just watch. As these 11 spectators trembled in fear, millions of others gasped at the canary shirts wreaking havoc on their televisions. Hitherto the semi-finals, it seemed little could object Brazil’s free-flowing, attacking football.

South American rivalries are a fiery bunch. Each nation takes great pride in its footballing achievements. The fans, holding little direct influence on any result, succumb to two chief vices: pessimism and hyperbole.

Brazil were to face Uruguay in the semi-finals. Such a fixture had been played out once before at the World Cup, in the final of the 1950 edition. Uruguay had won that game, and at Brazil’s iconic Maracaña. Naturally, Brazilian fans were expecting a repeat. There was little cause to feel hopeful or optimistic about Brazil’s future in any regard given the ongoing political crisis. Many thought that nothing would go their nation’s way. Their fears were soon realised.

Uruguay had started the semi-final on the front foot. In a tactical tweak of their own, Uruguay assigned players to shadow Pelé and Gérson’s every movement. Pelé could shake his marker off easily, but with Gérson rarely in free space, Brazil suffered. A free-roaming tactic could only be applied on the basis of a vital, anchoring cog.

The same players that tormented defences all summer could no longer find one another with a pass. Uruguay, as aggressive as ever, seized their chance. They took an early 1-0 lead as the ball rolled slowly past the planted feet of the non-reacting Félix – a man embodying a nation. With time, however, Brazil grew into the game.

Their moves were penetrative, but Uruguay still looked unlikely to concede. But Gérson’s influence on a football match came in many forms. With half-time looming, he told Everaldo to start making attacking runs from deep. It only took the left-back one try. He ran into the penalty box and volleyed in Tostão’s cross. It was Brazil’s most crucial goal of the tournament. Now tied at 1-1, they knew that in the second half Uruguay would have to eventually open up to score. It was no longer a game of catch up.

The second half saw a different Brazil, a hungrier Brazil. Pelé was the first to come tantalisingly close. A dangerous diagonal pass on the edge of the penalty box called for two takers, Pelé and the onrushing Uruguay goalkeeper. With the latter at full stretch, Pelé let the ball roll, escaping him and Mazurkiewicz. Now alone in the penalty box with only one Uruguayan defender on the goal line, Pelé ran onto the loose ball but unfortunately shot it wide in the most iconic goal that never was. It was a taste of what was to come from Brazil.

Jairzinho turned the game. Tostão, from deep, played him a wonderful pass that left the Brazilian with one defender and the goalkeeper in his sight. He outpaced his man and slotted the ball into the bottom corner. Rivelino then secured the 3-1 victory with yet another strike from the edge of the box. The Seleção had laid Brazil’s fears to rest. The past was to hold no bearing on the present. A country at its lowest point and facing an opponent to whom it felt inferior to most, was now en route to the World Cup final. Life in Brazil no longer felt so dire.

June 21 saw a mouthwatering clash at the Estadio Azteca as Brazil’s joga bonito took on Italy’s catenaccio. Free, attacking football took on defensively astute, ruthless counter-attacking football. Zagallo expected the Italians to man-mark his players as the Uruguayans did before. To counter their measure, he instructed his men to keep possession and constantly pass the ball around to exhaust the Italians. It worked to perfection.

Throughout the game, Rivellino continuously moved central, with his marker following suit. Brazil focused on keeping the ball in areas where their players were in the numerical superiority. Clodoaldo, Gérson, Rivellino, Pelé and Tostão kept it circulating in the centre, essentially playing cat and mouse with the blue shirts. The aim was to draw out as many Italian markers from their defensive shape as possible, and then exploit the open spaces. But Brazil were rarely one dimensional.

Their first goal came from a throw-in. Taken short to Rivellino, he lofted it into the air towards Pelé. Brazil’s star man out-jumped his defender and headed the ball into the net, aptly scoring Brazil’s 100th goal in World Cup competitions. Brazil’s insistence on keeping possession and playing out the back once more cost them dear. The Italians capitalised on a misplaced pass within Brazil’s own defensive third and equalised before half-time.

After the break, Brazil didn’t change their approach instead, they upped a gear. Their passing now swifter and more purposeful, clear-cut chances were still hard to come by, but the Italians were growing shaky. Brazil had penned them into their own penalty box and two Italians markers would step out of line to greet any approaching Brazilian.

Jairzinho tried dribbling his way through. Losing out in a tackle, the ball landed to Gérson. He shuffled it slightly to the left, fired through the minuscule gap in Italy’s defence and into the net. Brazil had retaken the lead and Italy were forced to start pushing higher up the pitch.

Brazil had altered their tactics accordingly. Still circulating possession, they now searched for direct passes to its attacking quartet through the Italian lines of press. Such a ball was lofted from the middle third towards Pelé in the penalty box. He cushioned it down into Jairzinho’s path and the powerful winger scored his seventh goal of the World Cup.

The final was Brazil’s spectacle. Winning 3-1 and radiating confidence, Brazil kept the ball circulating as the Italians laboured behind. It came to Rivellino’s feet at the left corner of the penalty box. One Italian defender stood right ahead with another immediately behind. Rivellino stood his man up, and with the ball at his left foot, performed the elastico in one swift motion. The ball had went through Bertini’s legs and out again so cleanly it had to be magic. The world, seeing the trick for the very first time, could but marvel. The stadium now roaring, “Brazil! Brazil! Brazil!”. One more act of artistry was on its way.

The play started in Brazil’s own third. Tostão had chased the ball all the way back from attack. The final whistle now minutes away, Brazil pinged a few short passes together. The ball came to Clodoaldo’s feet and a screen of four blue shirts stood ahead. With a myriad of step-overs, his long legs tipped and toed their way through each oncoming challenge before passing the ball to Rivellino deep on the left flank.

Still in his own half, Rivelino played a long vertical pass to Jairzinho. The Italians were now heavily concentrated on the left, trying to dispossess the powerful winger. He passed the ball across the pitch to Pelé, who stood at the crown of the penalty box. The Italians, dazed and yet to catch up, could only watch. Pelé rolled the ball into the path of Carlos Alberto. The right flank of the pitch was entirely free. The right-back had galloped from defence into the Italian box and struck a first-time rocket to seal off a 4-1 win. The move encapsulated Brazil’s legendary football of 1970.

It was a team that made grown adults gawk. One that could do it all and make it look so effortless. But when a team that played a mere six games nearly half a century ago is considered the greatest of them all, any rational cynic would disregard the notion as romanticism. Brazil won all its plaudits on merit. It was the first nation to win all its games at the World Cup the first to have a player, Jairzinho, score in each game and the first nation to become a three-time world champion. Brazil did it in first-class style.

When Zagallo was appointed manager, he later admitted, he did not have to do much. The players had a perfect understanding and each was capable of winning matches single-handedly. Zagallo merely fixed the tactics and physically prepared them for Mexico’s high altitudes. Their brilliance was innate. None of the Brazilian players were playing in Europe and were largely unknown. As a result, when the world tuned in to see the famous yellow shirt and short blue shorts donned by 11 strangers, it fell in love for many a reason.

It was their story: an oppressive dictator presiding over a country in peril and a team gunning for glory to salvage some form of happiness for its despairing countrymen. It was their players: strong, fast, skilled, each capable of inventing a priorly unseen moment of magic. It was their football: quick, imaginative, and full of flair, Brazil set the precedent for a fluid and potent offence. Bilo je joga bonito – the zest to play beautifully.


Total Football: A graphic history of the world's most iconic soccer tactics

The striking evolution of the world's most iconic football tactics: How they work, why they win - and the people that made them iconic. In the early days of football, it was simple: a goalkeeper, two defenders and the rest attacked. Now the game is all about strategy.

Innovative graphics and expert analyses guide you through the managers' decisions that led to new formations, the pure talent of footballers that defined each playing style, and the matches that propelled the winning tactics to legendary status. Sanjeev Shetty explores how each tactic works and the ways in which it guaranteed victory time and time again. From catenaccio to tiki taka, Pele to Messi and Cruyff to Guardiola, Total Football gives you a new understanding of how the beautiful game is played.

Sanjeev Shetty is a sports journalist with nearly twenty years' experience. He works for the BBC as a producer and reporter on their international services covering their sports news channels. On je autor knjige No Middle Ground i Messigraphica. Sanj lives in Cheshire, UK with his family.


Football Tactics basics: The 4-4-2 formation explained

As 7500 to Holte's resident tactics obsessive, a guide to some of the formations and tactical concepts that I talk about each week may help. So this is the first of a series of tactical guides I'll be writing to explain some of those fundamentals.

This week we're starting with a guide to a formation, that English classic, the 4-4-2. It's characterised by four defenders (two centre-backs in the middle, full-backs on the left and right sides), four midfielders (two central midfielders, two wingers on the left and right sides) and two strikers. This is the ‘open' or ‘flat' 4-4-2 in which the midfielders are not placed in a narrow diamond shape but spread out in a line.

Image from soccer-training-guide.com

The chief benefit of the 4-4-2 is its simplicity. It provides a solid basic structure with defensive depth and attacking numbers, with clearly marked roles. Many English players have grown up playing this formation their entire lives and define their position as a defender, midfielder or striker due to its influence.

Without the ball, the four defenders and four midfielders can put eight men in front of the opposition, covering the entire width of the field. If the defence pushes up high with the midfield, the opposition can be strangled in their own half by a wall of players. With the ball, there are always options out wide and a strong presence up front to provide attacking options via long balls or crosses.

The real danger of the 4-4-2 is a pair of strikers who understand each other's game. The common example is a ‘big man-little man' combo, where a big striker is the target man for long balls and crosses, ready to knock the ball behind the defence or down into the box for his partner to latch onto. Christian Benteke and Gabby Abgonlahor have played this way for Aston Villa this season. But such combinations can exist between many different types of strikers. The best example in recent years was under Alex Ferguson at Manchester United in Andy Cole and the former Villa man Dwight Yorke - two good strikers who became terrifying when put together and drove United to their 1998-99 Treble.

The downside of the 4-4-2 is that its rigid positions can lead to a side being swamped by more flexible opponents. The obvious potential weakness is that by playing with two strikers you can be outnumbered in midfield. While one striker may be tasked with dropping back to help out, many strikers are not disciplined enough to do so effectively. If the wingers also prefer playing out by the sidelines of the pitch, the central midfielders can quickly be isolated against teams playing three or even four central midfielders.

That rigidity is caused by the 4-4-2's three lines of players which can allow opposition players to find pockets of space ‘between the lines', especially defence and midfield. A well-disciplined team will compress the space between defence and midfield so as to avoid this, but a poorly organized 4-4-2 can leave huge amounts of space in front of the defence and if the midfield cannot close down the passing lanes, teams can be ripped apart by opposition players lurking in those spaces.

Martin O'Neill´s Aston Villa

The example that most Villa fans will remember is under Martin O'Neill from 2007-2010. The key components of his 4-4-2 were the strikers and the wingers. Up front, Gabby Abgonlahor was paired with a big target man in the form of either John Carew or Emile Heskey. Width was provided by the team's standout performer Ashley Young and James Milner or Stewart Downing .

O'Neill also used powerful aerial centre-backs, either the outstanding Martin Laursen and Olof Mellberg or James Collins and Richard Dunne. The key central midfielders of his tenure were Gareth Barry and Stiliyan Petrov , with Milner also sometimes playing in the middle.

This video of a 5-1 win against Bolton shows the shape of the Villa attack, balls flying in from the wings towards John Carew, supported by Gabby Abgonlahor. The reason this team was elevated beyond a typical 4-4-2 was the quality and versatility of Ashley Young and James Milner. Starting on the left wing, Ashley Young could cross with either foot, or cut in and score and was given complete freedom to switch wings as he wished -a winger on both sides of the pitch and a third striker at the same time. Milner was even more flexible, a winger, a third striker and a fine central midfielder as well.

Young and Milner's versatility led an overwhelming Villa counter-attack which overrode the possible defensive weaknesses of the formation itself and O'Neill's lack of a really good defensive midfielder or top full-backs - except occasionally such as the 7-1 loss to Chelsea.

The 4-4-2 and Villa right now

The 4-4-2 is very relevant at Villa right now due to Tim Sherwood taking over. Paul Lambert rarely used it, but it became strongly linked with Sherwood during his time at Tottenham when he brought Emmanuel Adebayor back into the team as a target man striker and got him scoring goals via this formation - though he insisted that "I don't know what you are saying about 4-4-2" when it was blamed for an FA Cup loss to Arsenal.

During his time at Villa we've seen this type of open 4-4-2 a few times - first in the glorious 4-0 win over Sunderland (which I analysed here if you want to relive it) but also in the losses against Swansea and Manchester United (analysis here and here for the more morbid). Sherwood has looked to use Benteke and Abgonlahor as a big man-little man pair and the pace of N'Zogbia and Sinclair on the wings, with the full-backs also given freedom to come up the field, especially Bacuna.

Against Sunderland it was hugely successful, their defenders unable to cope with the pace of the attack. However Swansea and Manchester United both used their superior numbers in midfield to dominate the game. Since then Sherwood has experimented instead with the ‘diamond' in midfield. We're unlikely to see the flat 4-4-2 again until Abgonlahor is fully fit, to reform the crucial striking partnership, but while good strikers and wingers are available, the 4-4-2 will always be an option when the side needs goals fast.

More articles in the 7500toHolte Football Tactics Basics series can be found here:


The Long Ball Game

This is a tactic which is often sneered at. Not particularly pleasing on the eye and requiring less of the more respected technical skills required, defensive-minded teams are often the ones who adopt a long ball strategy.

In essence, the idea of playing the long ball game is to send the ball forward from deep positions in the air towards a striker who takes the ball down and begins an attack.

To play this tactic successfully, the forward players need to be strong, capable of holding up the ball and good in the air. The long ball can also be used to play the ball into space for a fast attacking player to latch on to. You'll also need a couple of outstanding attacking midfielders who have the ability to join the attack and ensure the striker doesn't become isolated.

Long ball teams are often defensively minded in their approach. Their intention is get the ball as far away from their goal as possible, using physical players up top to dominate the opposition in the air.

Long ball football is often criticised as being ugly but it can produce moments of brilliance. Dennis Bergkamp’s goal for Holland against Argentina is replayed time and time again, as being one of the best in the 1998 World Cup. he goal was started by a long ball, sent by defender Frank de Boer over seven Argentine players, who were instantly cut out of the game. Bergkamp's technical ability was rightly praised - but it still needed a good old-fashioned hoof upfield to get the move going.

Sam Allardyce is perhaps English football's most well-known fan of a long-ball strategy. Using arguably the game's most physical front man, Kevin Davies, and a midfielder who knew where the back of the net was in Kevin Nolan, Allardyce oversaw a successful Bolton Wanderers team from 1999-2207.


4-4-2 Narrow

A stranger, more archaic version of the 4-4-2 is to bring the wingers inside and use a platform of four horizontal central midfielders.

I don't know of any clubs or international sides that use this formation to date (if you know any, please comment), but the shape is synonymous with the England side of 1992.

David Platt, Paul Ince, David Batty and Paul Gascoigne all needed to be in the same team, so then-manager Graham Taylor used this formation to incorporate all of the talent.

We haven't seen a libero in a long, long time, but I'm not ruling out its return.

Pep Guardiola has been applauded for tactical innovation, yet most of his brilliance came from working backward through the footballing timeline and bringing things back into fashion.

Franz Beckenbauer was a notable libero, of course, but my focus is on the 1973 Ajax team.

It was Barry Hulshoff who played the sweeping playmaker role for this team, though many don't know that, as they can't see past Johan Cruyff, Johan Neeskens and Ruud Krol.

This 1-3-3-3 was free-flowing, attack-minded and beautiful to watch. The way football is headed right now, it's not inexcusable to believe the libero could return.


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Good information and idea thanks

oh this is great work, thank you so much

We have played in this 3-5-2 formation for the last two games (Temple and Fordham) and I think it is the best formation to maximize our teams potential in the middle and offensively. I think we have been very disciplined defensively in this formation (both games have resulted in a shut out) and we are really starting to get used to the pressure cover relationships that exist across the field. This position allows us to get numbers forward (having that back post runner to follow up) and have better pressure on their backline with two forwards instead of one to force turnovers and cut the field in half. Obviously finishing is a key piece of this puzzle that we need to figure out and as coach Bill said “being mature enough to score.” Once we step up and get the first goal in the formation I think we will be successful in preserving the lead and then capitalizing again to score. In this formation, we should have Annika in the middle, Keefe (Bridget in this position when she is healthy) and Ally on the left side. All of these players are solid defensively and have good composure on the field. Across the midfield, Mary (or Maggie/ Becca) on the right, Lisa in the holding position (Libby as a sub) Abby and Kayla in the midfield (Mattie to sub in) and Myself on the left (sid subbing in). The starting lineup that we have had the last two games is just starting to get the flow and work well with each other/ understand each other’s strengths. Up top, I would start Ryelle and Courtney (Maggie first sub in, Grace next sub) because they have very different styles for playing the same position and I think they compliment each other well. Bottom line, getting a goal is our teams priority and this formation will help.


Variations of the 4-3-3 Formation:

As mentioned above, the 4-3-3 formation is very flexible depending on the personnel available to the coach.

While the defence largely lines up in the same way with only the instructions to the fullbacks varying depending on how comfortable they are attacking, it is the players in front of them that provide the most variation to the formation.

If facing an offensive team, the coach may include two defensive-minded players in the line up.

If up against a weak opponent, more attacking-minded midfielders can be used.

This is the beauty of the formation as the players themselves influence and drastically change its strong points depending on their capabilities.

With all the possible midfield line ups, the players still need to know how to work together and coordinate their play. This will always be the key.

Up front, the forwards again offer a number of different playing options depending on the players available…

If there is a target man up front, then the team will aim to play more into their feet for them to hold it up and will play higher crosses into the box to take advantage of their aerial prowess.

A speedier but smaller striker will instead make more runs in behind the defence and prefer to be on the end of lower crosses.

A creative false 9 will aim to influence the play with their dribbling ability and play-making skills by creating goalscoring opportunities out of seemingly nothing.

While a formation provides a team with structure, it is the players themselves who impact the result of the game through their individual playing styles and how they fit in and work with the rest of their team mates.

Teams must change their approach within the formation to get the best out of the players.

It would make no sense, for example, to keep playing balls in behind the defence if the striker was slow and not very mobile.

The great thing about 4-3-3 formation is that you can quickly change the attacking and defending outlook of the team with just one quick substitution.

For instance, a target man subbed for a speedy striker suddenly changes the whole game plan and forces the opposition to rethink their defensive strategy.

Zaključak:

Attacking at heart, the 4-3-3 formation is a great choice depending on your personnel.

Reliant on hardworking players and athletic fullbacks, the formation also requires tricky wide forwards who can create a lot of goal scoring opportunities.

The team’s movement will create a lot of space in which to play while the energy and pressing of the team can impede the opposition from getting their passing game going and limit the space available to them.

In this formation, attack is the best form of defence and you need high energy players to make the best of it.

What is certain, though, is that you will have a lot of fun playing this formation

Less reliant on tactically astute players than the 3-4-3 formation, the 4-3-3 gives players the flexibility and structure needed for them to express themselves and play to the best of their abilities.


Pogledajte video: Complete soccer warm up