Scorpion VI SSN -589 - Historija

Scorpion VI SSN -589 - Historija


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Scorpion VI

(SSN-589: dp. 3.075 (surf.), 3.500 (subm.), 1. 251'9 "
b. 31'7 "; s. 20+ k .; kpl. 99; a. 6 tt .; kl. Skipjack)

Šesti Scorpion (SSN-589) postavljen je 20. avgusta 1958. od strane divizije za električne brodove, General Dynamics Corp., Groton, Conn .; pokrenut 19. decembra 1959., pod pokroviteljstvom gospođe Elizabeth S. Morrison; i pušten u rad 29. jula 1960., Comdr. Norman B. Bessac komanduje.

Dodijeljen u podmorničku eskadrilu 6, divizija 62, Scorpion je 24. avgusta napustio New London, Conn., Na dvomjesečno raspoređivanje u evropskim vodama. U tom periodu učestvovala je u vježbama sa jedinicama 6. flote i drugim mornaricama NATO -a. Nakon povratka u Novu Englesku krajem oktobra, do maja 1961. obučavala se uz istočnu obalu, a zatim je ponovo prešla Atlantik za operacije koje su je odvele na ljeto. 9. avgusta vratila se u New London, a mjesec dana kasnije preselila se u Norfolk, Va.

S Norfolkom kao matičnom lukom do kraja karijere, Scorpion se specijalizirao za razvoj taktike ratovanja nuklearnih podmornica. Mijenjajući svoju ulogu od lovca do lovca, sudjelovala je u vježbama koje su se protezale duž atlantske obale te u operativnim područjima Bermuda i Portorika; zatim je, od juna 1963. do maja 1964., prekinula svoje operacije radi remonta u Charlestonu, S.C. Ponovo preuzimajući dužnost sa istočne obale u kasno proljeće, ponovo je prekinula tu dužnost od 4. avgusta do 8. oktobra kako bi napravila transatlantsku patrolu. U proljeće 1965. vodila je sličnu patrolu.

Tokom kasne zime i ranog proleća 1966. godine, a ponovo u jesen, bila je raspoređena za posebne operacije. Nakon završetka tih zadataka, njen zapovjednik dobio je medalju Pohvalnice mornarice za izvanredno vođstvo, predviđanje i profesionalnu vještinu. Ostali oficiri i ljudi Škorpiona bili su citirani za zaslužna dostignuća.

1. februara 1967. Scorpion je ušao u Mornaričko brodogradilište Norfolk na još jedan produženi remont. Krajem oktobra započela je osvježavajuću obuku i testove prihvatanja sistema naoružanja. Nakon tipične obuke iz Norfolka, krenula je 15. februara 1968. u razmještaj na Mediteranu. Operisala je sa 6. flotom do maja, a zatim se uputila na zapad. 21. maja je naznačila svoj položaj da se nalazi oko 50 milja južno od Azora. Šest dana kasnije, prijavljeno joj je da kasni u Norfolku.

Pokrenuta je potraga, ali su 5. juna Scorpion i njena posada proglašeni "vjerovatno izgubljenim". Njeno ime je 30. juna izbrisano sa spiska mornarice.

Međutim, potraga se nastavila; i krajem oktobra, oceanografski istraživački brod Mornarice, Mizar, locirao je dijelove škorpionovog trupa u više od 10.000 stopa vode oko 400 milja jugozapadno od Azora. Nakon toga, Istražni sud je ponovo sazvan, a druga plovila, uključujući potopljeno Trst, poslana su na mjesto događaja, ali, unatoč bezbroj prikupljenih i proučenih podataka i slika, uzrok gubitka ostaje misterija.


Scorpion VI SSN -589 - Historija

Sećanje na Škorpiona
autor JOSN Michaela Kekedy - sponzor John Donaldson

Norfolk, VA - 27. maja 1968. godine, Theresa Bishop, supruga šefa broda Torpedoman USS Scorpion, Waltera Williama Bishop, i drugi članovi porodice Scorpion okupili su se na pristaništu 22 u mornaričkoj bazi Norfolk po hladnoći i "quottorrential pljusku" dok su njihova djeca još bili u školi. Okupili su se na povratku USS Scorpion koji je bio na moru od 15. februara. Porodice su čekale da se njihova podmornica vrati. Čekali su i čekali.

Nakon što su prošli prvi sati, grupa je pozvana na tender za podmornice na kavu i da se zagrije. Bez znakova podmornice, konačno im je rečeno da se vrate svojim kućama i čekaju vijesti.

STSC (SS) John Bishop iz USS Louisiane imao je 1968. godine samo devet godina. Sjeća se da je 27. maja 1968. došao iz škole i tražio oca.

Prema biskupovim riječima, kada se njegov otac vratio kući sa rasporeda, "sakrio se u kuću gdje smo ga mogli pronaći." Nakon zagrljaja i pozdrava stigli su pokloni. "Ali nismo ga mogli pronaći, a mama je stalno govorila da kasni zbog lošeg vremena", sjetio se Bishop. "Pa smo mislili da ćemo sjediti i čekati."

Ali kako kaže Joan Cowan, "najveće supruge podmornica znaju da ako kasni, nestalo je." Cowan je supruga 18-godišnjeg veterana podmornice MM1 Roberta Jamesa Cowana koji je planirao povući se iz mornarice i vratiti se poljoprivredi. Njen muž bio je među onima koji nisu došli kući.

Načelnik John Bishop, koji planira vlastitu mirovinu u siječnju nakon 20 godina radnog staža, također se prisjetio da je uključio televiziju kako bi gledao informativne emisije u pet i 14 sati, samo da bi saznao da je Škorpion kasnio i da se smatra izgubljenim. & quotOtišao sam reći mami o tome …i prije nego što sam to saznao imali smo kuću punu ljudi. & quot

Mornarica je pokrenula masovnu potragu. Dana 5. juna 1968. godine, načelnik pomorskih operacija, ADM T.H. Moorer, zvanično je objavila da se USS Scorpion (SSN 589) i njenih 99 članova posade smatraju izgubljenim. 30. oktobra 1968. američki pomorski oceanografski istraživački brod Mizar pronašao je Scorpion 400 milja jugozapadno od Azora, mjesto posljednje komunikacije sa podmornicom, u 10.000 stopa vode.

Iako se većina porodica iselila iz područja Norfolka, ostaju u kontaktu, a biskupi i kaunovi su se zbližili kroz tragediju. U početku su spomen obilježja Škorpiona održavana na memorijalnom groblju Woodlawn, a nekoliko posebnih obilježavanja godišnjice održano je na pristaništu 22.

Ovogodišnja svečanost održana je i prošle subote ujutro na pristaništu 22, mjestu gdje je Scorpion posljednji put izašao na more. Uz prisustvo više od 100 ljudi, ceremonija je pozvala ne samo sudbinsku prošlost Škorpiona, već i naslijeđe muškaraca koji su plovili u njoj.

U organizaciji šefa broda Walter Bishop i kćerke#146, CDR -a Mariette Bishop Nolan, pomorske rezervne sestre punih 16 godina, ove godine ceremoniji#146 prisustvovala je mješavina članova porodice, veterana podmornica iz Drugog svjetskog rata i sadašnje podmornice mornari. CDR Nolan je imao osam godina kada je Scorpion izgubljen na moru.

Kapetan Mike Tracy, zapovjednik štaba podmorničkih snaga američke atlantske flote, rekao je za posadu: "Oni (oni koji su izgubljeni na brodu Scorpion) utjelovljuju američki duh i 150 običnih ljudi koji su učinili izvanredne stvari i koji su dali najveću žrtvu u službi svojih drzava. & quot

Komentarišući najvažnije dobro Škorpiona, ljudi iz#146, gost predavač RADM Robert Fountain, USN (Ret), dotaknuo se uspjeha onih koji su služili na brodu Scorpion.

& quotU svojih manje od osam godina angažirane službe, Scorpion je iznjedrila jednog budućeg načelnika pomorskih operacija, pomoćnika sekretara mornarice, zapovjednika podmorničkih snaga, dva druga viceadmirala, šest kontraadmirala i brojne druge časnike i ljude koji su otišli na istaknute karijere u mornarici i civilnom životu ", rekao je Fountain. & quotJedna od velikih tragedija gubitka Škorpiona bilo je gašenje gotovo 100 mladih života jednakog potencijala prije nego što su se oni ostvarili. & quot

Dva puta bivši član posade Scorpion, RADM Fountain je prvo bio dodijeljen Scorpionu, prvoj podmornici na nuklearni pogon koja se pridružila eskadrili Norfolk, kao potpuno novi oficir u ljeto 1961. Vratio se u Scorpion kasnije kao njen izvršni oficir. Fountain je bio posljednji oficir koji je smijenjen prije nego što je Scorpion započela svoju misiju na Mediteranu.

Fountain je elokventno primijetio kako su podmornice promijenile tok istorije tokom svojih 100 godina "tihe službe", dodajući da se "quotScorpion na neki način može smatrati gubitkom Hladnog rata". Iako je uzrok bio slučajan, trčala je naporno, tempom nezamislivim u današnjem okruženju, i vraćala se kući iz napornog raspoređivanja, a operativni intenzitet bio je vrlo velik, graniči s intenzitetom samog rata. & quot

"Dok je naše civilno stanovništvo zabrinuto za Armagedon, posade podmornica na moru učinile su sve što su mogle da ga spriječe, stalno živeći na rubu", rekao je Fountain. "Na strateškom nivou ove epske borbe, niko nije učinio više od naših podmorničkih snaga, podmornica i njihovih posada, za pobjedu u Hladnom ratu."

Tokom Čitanja imena od Rona Gormana, Fountain je sjedio, zatvorenih očiju, potpuno miran. Kao što je Tracy rekla u uvodnim napomenama, "gubitak Škorpiona za njega je zaista lična stvar."

Fountain je rekao da se sjeća posade Scorpiona kao izuzetno bliske i vrijedne. Takođe ostaje blizak porodici Bishop i često govori o "čvrstom, besmislenom" COB-u koji je iznio najbolje u svojim ljudima.

Bishop, njegov brat Michael i njegova sestra slažu se da su trajno naslijeđe Škorpiona njeni članovi posade.

Tokom ovogodišnje službe, najavljeno je da će posebna plaketa za priznanje biti poslana porodici IC3 Vernon Mark Foli koja odaje priznanje kolegi članu Kolumbovih vitezova. Korpus korpusa četvrtog stepena, vojna čast časti vitezova Kolumbovih, ove godine slavi stogodišnjicu#146.

Da biste saznali više o gubitku USS Scorpiona i vidjeli fotografije olupine, posjetite web stranicu Pomorskog povijesnog centra: http://www.search.navy.mil/collections/history. Upišite USS Scorpion i kliknite na & quotseek & quot. Da biste saznali više o Stogodišnjici podmorničkih snaga, posjetite web stranicu: http://www.navy.mil i kliknite na & quotsubenska stogodišnjica & quot. Fotografije - odozgo prema dolje:

  • Podoficir Giles pjeva državnu himnu
  • Porodica Cowan i polaznici iz svih sfera života
  • Prisutne podgrupe iz Drugog svjetskog rata

Foto: John Donaldson. Pogledajte album fotografija Johna Donaldsona sa ovog događaja.


USS Scorpion (SSN 589)

USS SCORPION je bila treća jurišna podmornica klase SKIPJACK klase i šesti brod u mornarici koji je nosio to ime. Osam godina nakon puštanja u rad, SCORPION i njena posada su izgubljeni 22. maja 1968. godine, pod neizvjesnim okolnostima, dok su se vraćali u Sjedinjene Američke Države sa mediteranskog rasporeda. SCORPION je izbrisan sa spiska mornarice 30. juna 1968. godine.

Opšte karakteristike: Dodijeljeno: 31. januara 1957
Keel položen: 20. augusta 1958
Lansirano: 29. decembra 1959. godine
Pušteno u rad: 29. jula 1960
Izgubljeno: 22. maja 1968. godine
Proizvođač: Odjel za električne brodove General Dynamics Corporation, Groton, CT.
Pogonski sistem: jedan nuklearni reaktor S5W
Propeleri: jedan
Dužina: 76,7 metara
Širina: 9,6 metara
Gaz: 27,5 stopa (8,5 metara)
Zapremina: Površina: cca. 2.880 tona Potopljeno: cca. 3.500 tona
Brzina: Površina: cca. 15 čvorova Potopljeno: cca. 30 čvorova
Naoružanje: šest torpednih cijevi 533 mm
Posada: 8 oficira, 85 prijavljenih

Ovaj odjeljak sadrži imena mornara koji su služili na brodu USS SCORPION. To nije službeni popis, ali sadrži imena mornara koji su dostavili svoje podatke.

Nesreće na brodu USS SCORPION:

USS SCORPION je postavljen 20. avgusta 1958. od strane divizije za električne brodove, General Dynamics Corp., Groton, Conn., Lansiran 19. decembra 1959. pod pokroviteljstvom gospođe Elizabeth S. Morrison, a pušten u rad 29. jula 1960., Comdr. Norman B. Bessac komanduje.

Dodijeljen u eskadrilu podmornica 6, divizija 62, SCORPION je 24. avgusta napustio New London, Conn., Na dvomjesečno raspoređivanje u evropskim vodama. U tom periodu učestvovala je u vježbama sa jedinicama 6. flote i drugim mornaricama NATO -a. Nakon što se krajem oktobra vratila u Novu Englesku, do maja 1961. obučavala se uz istočnu obalu, a zatim je ponovo prešla Atlantik za operacije koje su je odvele na ljeto. 9. avgusta vratila se u New London, a mjesec dana kasnije preselila se u Norfolk, Va.

S Norfolkom kao matičnom lukom do kraja karijere, SCORPION se specijalizirao za razvoj taktike ratovanja nuklearnih podmornica. Mijenjajući svoju ulogu od lovca do lovca, sudjelovala je u vježbama koje su se protezale duž atlantske obale te u operativnim područjima Bermuda i Portorika, a zatim je, od lipnja 1963. do svibnja 1964., prekinula operacije radi remonta u Charlestonu, SC. na istočnoj obali u kasno proljeće, ponovo je prekinula tu dužnost od 4. avgusta do 8. oktobra kako bi napravila transatlantsku patrolu. U proljeće 1965. vodila je sličnu patrolu.

Tokom kasne zime i ranog proleća 1966. godine, a ponovo u jesen, bila je raspoređena za posebne operacije. Nakon završetka tih zadataka, njen zapovjednik dobio je medalju Pohvalnice mornarice za izvanredno vođstvo, predviđanje i profesionalnu vještinu. Ostali oficiri i muškarci SCORPION -a bili su citirani za zaslužna dostignuća.

Dana 1. februara 1967., SCORPION je ušao u Mornaričko brodogradilište Norfolk na još jedan produženi remont. Krajem oktobra započela je osvježavajuću obuku i testove prihvatanja sistema naoružanja. Nakon tipične obuke iz Norfolka, krenula je 15. februara 1968. u razmještaj na Mediteranu. Operisala je sa 6. flotom do maja, a zatim se uputila na zapad. 21. maja je naznačila svoj položaj da se nalazi oko 50 milja južno od Azora. Šest dana kasnije, prijavljeno joj je da kasni u Norfolku.

Pokrenuta je potraga, ali su 5. juna SCORPION i njena posada proglašeni "vjerovatno izgubljenim". Njeno ime je 30. juna izbrisano sa spiska mornarice.

Potraga se, međutim, nastavila i krajem listopada oceanografski istraživački brod Mornarice, MIZAR (T-AGOR 11), locirao je dijelove trupa SCORPION-a u više od 10.000 stopa vode oko 400 milja jugozapadno od Azora. Nakon toga, Istražni sud je ponovo pozvan, a druga plovila, uključujući potopljeni TRST, poslana su na mjesto događaja, ali, unatoč bezbroj prikupljenih i proučenih podataka i slika, uzrok gubitka ostaje misterija.


Veza s Bermudskim trokutom

Nekoliko je autora dodalo gubitak podmornice popisu žrtava Bermudskog trokuta, unatoč činjenici da je podmornica potonula izvan tradicionalnih granica Trokuta. Jedan autor (Limbo izgubljenih) čak je "rastegnuo" vrh trokuta tako da pokrije mjesto potonuća, ali i oni koji su podmornicu smjestili u svoje knjige dodali su nivo misterije koju je priča o trokutu zaista zahtijevala, gubitak podmornice i dalje ima objašnjenja sa do danas su još uvijek nepoznati. Ali uključiti Scorpion kao žrtva paranormalnog koji je zaštitni znak priče o Bermudskom trokutu, doživljava se kao medvjeđa usluga porodicama posade, kao i mornarici u cjelini.


USS Scorpion SS (N) -589

Priča o podmornici s nuklearnim napadom prilično je poznata kolekcionarima pomorskih pokrivača. Ona bi bila jedna od dvije nuklearne podmornice koje je izgubila američka mornarica. Scorpion je bila podmornica klase Skipjack, porinuta 29. decembra 1959. i puštena u rad sedam mjeseci kasnije 29. jula 1960. Njena služba bila je u potpunosti u vodama Atlantika, Kariba i Evrope. Na kraju patrole u Atlantiku, na putu za luku u Norfolku, Scorpion je proglašen "pretpostavljenim izgubljenim" 5. juna 1968. Još se sjećam da sam u to vrijeme čitao naslov u novinama.

Koristeći hidroakustiku, lokacija Škorpiona definirana je u okvir za pretraživanje, a izgubljena podmornica locirana je jugozapadno od Azorskih otoka. Vučene saonice za kameru pronašle su olupinu u vodi duboku preko 9 800 stopa nakon 6 mjeseci potrage. Trst II poslan je da istraži olupine. Provedeno je nekoliko istraga kako bi se utvrdio uzrok gubitka Škorpiona. Ova istraživanja dovela su do nekoliko teorija i knjiga o gubitku. Bez obzira na to u koju se teoriju vjeruje, nekontrolirane poplave uzrokovale su podmornicu koja je potonula ispod dubine zgnječenja.


Teorije o gubitku

Slučajno aktiviranje torpeda

Istražni sud američke mornarice naveo je kao jednu mogućnost nenamjerno aktiviranje torpeda Mark 37 na bateriju od nestajućeg napona. Neki vjeruju da je ovo akustično torpedno samonavođenje, u potpuno spremnom stanju i bez štitnika propelera, počelo trčati unutar cijevi. Otpušteno iz cijevi, torpedo se tada nekako potpuno naoružalo i uspješno pogodilo najbližu metu: Scorpion. [19]

Eksplozija torpeda

Kasnija teorija je bila da je torpedo moglo eksplodirati u cijevi, uzrokovano nekontroliranim požarom u torpednoj prostoriji. Knjiga Blind Man's Bluff dokumenti i nalazi doktora Johna Cravena, koji je pretpostavio da je vjerojatni uzrok moglo biti pregrijavanje neispravne baterije. [20] (Dr. Craven je kasnije naveo u knjizi Silent Steel da je pogrešno citiran.) Mark 46 srebrno-cinkova baterija Mark 46 korištena u torpedu Mark 37 imala je tendenciju pregrijavanja, au ekstremnim slučajevima mogla je izazvati požar koji je bio dovoljno jak da izazove detonaciju bojeve glave niskog reda. Da je došlo do takve detonacije, možda je otvorio veliki otvor za utovar torpeda na brodu i izazvao Scorpion poplaviti i potonuti. Međutim, iako je poznato da baterije marke Mark 46 stvaraju toliko topline da su čahure torpeda ožuljene, nije poznato da je jedna oštetila čamac ili izazvala eksploziju. [21]

Dr John Craven spominje da nije radio na pogonskom sistemu torpeda Mark 37 i da je postao svjestan mogućnosti eksplozije baterije tek dvadeset godina nakon gubitka Scorpion. U svojoj knjizi Tihi rat, prepričava kako je radio simulaciju s bivšim Scorpion izvršni oficir, zapovjednik poručnika Robert Fountain, Jr., koji je upravljao simulatorom. Fontani je rečeno da se vraća kući brzinom od 18 čvorova (33   km/h) na dubini po svom izboru, a zatim se oglasio alarm "torpeda s vrućim trčanjem". Fontana je odgovorila sa "desno desno kormilo", brzim zaokretom koji bi aktivirao sigurnosni uređaj i spriječio aktiviranje torpeda. Zatim je u simulaciju uvedena eksplozija u torpednoj prostoriji. Fountain je naredila hitne procedure za izlijetanje broda, rekla je dr. Craven, "ali umjesto toga nastavila je s padom, dostigavši ​​dubinu urušavanja i eksplodirajući za devedeset sekundi   - jednu sekundu manje od akustičnog zapisa stvarnog događaja."

Craven, koji je bio glavni naučnik mornaričkog ureda za posebne projekte, koji je imao odgovornost upravljanja za projektiranje, razvoj, izgradnju, operativna ispitivanja i evaluaciju i održavanje raketnog sistema flote UGM-27 Polaris, dugo je vjerovao Scorpion pogođena njenim vlastitim torpedom, ali je revidirala njegove stavove sredinom 1990-ih, kada su inženjeri testirali baterije marke Mark 46 u Keyportu u Washingtonu, kazali da su baterije procurile elektrolit i ponekad izgorjele dok su bile izvan njihovih kućišta za vrijeme trajanja šokova, topline i hladnoće. Iako je proizvođač baterija optužen za stvaranje loših baterija, kasnije je mogao uspješno dokazati da njegove baterije nisu sklonije kvarovima od onih drugih proizvođača.

Kvar jedinice za odlaganje smeća

Tokom istrage 1968. godine, viceadmiral Arnold F. Shade svjedočio je da vjeruje da je kvar jedinice za odlaganje smeća (TDU) okidač za katastrofu. Shade je teoretizirao da je podmornica poplavljena kada je TDU radio na dubini periskopa i da su drugi naknadni kvarovi materijala ili osoblja tokom suočavanja s poplavama izazvanim TDU-om doveli do smrti podmornice. [22]

Sovjetski napad

Knjiga Sve ruke dolje Kenneth Sewell i Jerome Preisler (Simon i Schuster, 2008) zaključuju da je Scorpion uništen je na putu prikupljanja obavještajnih podataka o sovjetskoj pomorskoj grupi koja je izvodila operacije u Atlantiku. [23] Iako je misija za koju je podmornica preusmjerena s njenog prvobitnog kursa natrag u njezinu matičnu luku rekordna, njeni detalji ostaju povjerljivi.

Knjiga Eda Offleya Scorpion Down promovira hipotezu koja sugerira da Scorpion je potopila sovjetska podmornica tokom sukoba koji je počeo danima prije 22. maja. Offley također navodi da se to dogodilo otprilike u vrijeme misije prikupljanja obavještajnih podataka podmornice, odakle je preusmjerena iz prvobitnog puta prema kući prema Offleyju, flotilu je upravo uznemiravala druga američka podmornica, USS Haddo. [24] W. Craig Reed, koji je služio na Haddo deceniju kasnije kao podoficir i ronilac, a čiji je otac bio oficir američke mornarice odgovoran za značajan napredak ESM -a u podotkrivanju ranih 1960 -ih, prepričao je slične scenarije Offleyju u Crveni novembar, [25] zbog sovjetskog torpediranja Scorpion i opisuje vlastitu uslugu na USS -u Haddo 1977. trčeći unutar sovjetskih voda kod Vladivostoka, kada se činilo da su torpeda ispaljena na Haddo, ali ih je kapetan odmah spustio kao sovjetsku torpednu vježbu.

Oboje Sve ruke dolje i Scorpion Down ukazuju na umiješanost špijunskog prstena KGB-a (tzv. Walker Spy-Ring) predvođenog Johnom Anthonyjem Walkerom, mlađim u središte komunikacije američke mornarice, navodeći da je moglo znati da Scorpion dolazio je istražiti sovjetsku flotilu. Prema ovoj teoriji, obje mornarice su se složile da sakriju istinu o oba incidenta. Nekoliko SSN -ova američke mornarice u tom su se razdoblju sudarili sa sovjetskim podmornicama Echo u ruskim i škotskim vodama. Zapovjednik Roger Lane Nott, zapovjednik Kraljevske mornarice SSN HMS  Sjajno tokom Foklandskog rata 1982. izjavio je da je 1972., tokom svoje službe kao mlađi oficir plovidbe na SSN HMS  Osvajač, sovjetska podmornica ušla je na kanal Scottish Clyde i Osvajač je izdato naređenje da se to "istjera". Shvativši da se za njim traga, "vrlo agresivan sovjetski kapetan okrenuo je svoju podmornicu i odvezao je ravno prema HMS -u Osvajač. Bio je to izuzetno blizak poziv. "[26]

Sovjetske podmornice bile su profesionalne kao Britanci i Amerikanci. Prema prevedenom članku iz Pravda, Moskva nikada nije izdala 'vatrenu' naredbu tokom hladnog rata. [27] Ovo osporavaju oficiri Kraljevske mornarice, "bilo je i drugih prilika kada su uznemireni Rusi ispalili torpeda kako bi zastrašili tragove." [28] Zvanična izjava istražnog suda mornarice bila je da nema drugog broda na 200 milja od nas Scorpion u vrijeme potonuća. [29]

Zaključci američke mornarice

Rezultati različitih istraga američke mornarice o gubitku Scorpion nisu zaključni. Iako istražni sud nikada nije prihvatio teoriju torpeda dr Cravena u vezi s gubitkom Scorpion, njegovi "nalazi činjenica" objavljeni 1993. nosili su Cravenovu teoriju torpeda na čelu popisa mogućih uzroka Scorpion 's loss.

Mornarica nije obavijestila javnost da su se i američke podmorničke snage Atlantic i vrhovni zapovjednik američke atlantske flote usprotivile Cravenovoj teoriji torpeda kao neutemeljene, a također nisu otkrile ni drugu tehničku istragu o gubitku Scorpion dovršen 1970. godine, zapravo su odbačene tvrdnje da je detonacija torpeda igrala ulogu u gubitku Scorpion. Uprkos drugoj tehničkoj istrazi, mornarica i dalje pridaje snažno vjerovanje Cravenovom stavu da ju je eksplozija uništila, o čemu svjedoči ovaj odlomak iz pisma mornaričke podmorničke ratne divizije (N77) iz maja 2003., koji je posebno napisao admiral P.F. Sullivan u ime viceadmirala Johna J. Grossenbachera (zapovjednik Pomorskih podmorničkih snaga), Zapovjedništva pomorskih pomorskih sistema, pomorskih reaktora i drugih u američkoj mornarici u vezi sa svojim viđenjem alternativnih teorija potonuća: Službeni izvještaji američke mornarice i nalazi Komisije u gubitak Scorpion, snažno predlažu da se Scorpion je izgubljen zbog vlastitih torpeda Mk 37. Argument K. Sewella i J Presliera u Sve ruke dolje da se podmornica morala potopiti sovjetskim torpedima može se odbiti. Njihova tvrdnja da je Scorpion imao brzinu od 45 čvorova, [30] cf torpedna brzina Mk 37 od 24 čvora [31] nema vjerodostojnosti. Nije vjerojatno da su sovjetska a/s torpeda imala bolje performanse od MK 37 1968. godine, a nijedna druga američka mornarica/sovjetska podmornica osim ruske Alfe nije zabilježena s potvrđenom brzinom većom od 33 čvora. [32] Ne postoji mogućnost da je Skipjack mogao preći 35 čvorova u dobrom stanju i Scorpion nosio je 10 Mk 37 Mod 1 žičanih a/s torpeda, postavljenih za trčanje pri 26 čvorova za ciljeve do 6 milja, kao i nenaoružanu varijantu za obuku Mk 37 i brza torpeda Mk 14 za površinske ciljeve. [33] Fotografski dokazi ukazuju na to da je Scorpion Mk 37 je skinuo rekvizit, što je upravo način na koji Mk 37 i srodne Mk 46 napadaju podmornice koje smještaju na osovinu podupirača i skidaju ga uz malu eksploziju. [34] Pitanje je kako je Mk 37 pucao. Postoje dokazi da je Scorpion je trčao u Crnom moru u unutrašnjim sovjetskim vodama i sigurno je da je u njegovoj posadi bilo više oficira i činova koji su bili prevodioci za ruski jezik. Had Scorpion otkrili dokaze da su Rusi presreli komunikaciju američke mornarice, malo je vjerojatno da su tu poruku poslali zatvorenim/otvorenim kanalima sve dok nije stigla u Norfolk. Brza klasa Skipjack bila je sposobna 30 do 33 čvora i malo je vjerojatno da ju je presrela podmornica Echo od 22 čvora i nagađanja o Scorpion Njegovo stanje moglo bi biti samo još jedan službeni pokušaj da se pitanje strateškog značaja zbuni 1968. godine na vjerovatno najopasnijoj tački Hladnog rata. [35] Vodeći američki admirali i savjetnici za odbranu možda su također potisnuli pitanja potencijalne špijunaže, upotrebe droga i nereda na površinskim ratnim brodovima i podmornicama američke mornarice u vijetnamskom ratu. Druga je mogućnost da je kapetan Slattery možda izdao naredbu da ispali Mk 37 pod stresom nakon što je čuo lažni odjek čitača sonara nakon što su ga vjerojatno maltretirali, pa čak i ranije angažirali u dugom raspoređivanju sovjetskih podmornica. Razarači američke mornarice i RAN -a nekoliko su puta tokom vijetnamskog rata jurili lažne eho sonarne indikacije, n.b. USS Turner Joy i USS Maddox u incidentu u Tonkinskom zaljevu. [36] Starije fregate RN stalno su čule lažne tragove torpeda tokom Foklandskog rata. Na dan HMS Sheffield bio potopljen, HMS Yarmouth priopćio da je bio napadnut torpedom u devet odvojenih incidenata tokom dana, koristeći pasivni/aktivni puls koji nije Doppler 170/177. [37]

Prvi kataklizmički događaj bio je takve veličine da je jedini mogući zaključak da se dogodio kataklizmični događaj (eksplozija) koji je rezultirao nekontroliranim poplavama (najvjerovatnije prednjim odjeljcima).

Eksplozija vodika

U svojoj knjizi Against the Tide: Rickover -ovi principi liderstva i uspon nuklearne mornarice (2014), a posebno u odjeljku pod naslovom "Opasnost kulture", kontraadmiral u penziji američke mornarice Dave Oliver nudi uvjerljiv tok logike da je vrlo vjerojatno došlo do eksplozije vodika, bilo za vrijeme ili neposredno nakon punjenja baterije, da uništen USS Scorpion i ubio njenu posadu. [38]

Sredinom 1960-ih, operativni stilovi dizelskih čamaca još uvijek su prožimali američke podmorničke snage, a posebno postavljanje "Condition Baker" (zatvaranje svih vodonepropusnih otvora) nakon prelaska na dubinu periskopa. Condition Baker naučio je tešku lekciju tijekom dana s dizelskim čamcima, jer je posada često išla na dubinu periskopa kako bi napunila bateriju dizelskim motorima, a ti su se izleti obično odvijali u blizini pomorskih traka zbog misije podmornica koje su u velikoj mjeri bile protivpovršinske . Postavljanje vodonepropusnih uvjeta prije prelaska na dubinu periskopa, zajedno s promjenama u dizajnu koje su dozvolile poplavu jednog odjeljka bez gubitka broda, bitno je povećalo opstanak dizelskih čamaca tijekom sudara. Značajno je da su dizelski čamci mogli puniti svoje baterije samo dok su na površini ili na dubini periskopa i radili su sa svojim dizel motorima, koji su provjetravali cijeli brod, uključujući i bunar za baterije.

Kako Oliver opisuje iz ličnog incidenta, on je imao centralno mjesto na brodu USS  George Washington Carver  (SSBN-656), postavka Condition Baker i dalje je bila standardna, naslijeđena praksa na podmornicama na nuklearni pogon, iako u usporedbi s dizelskim čamcima nisu provodili gotovo toliko vremena u blizini pomorskih traka, a rijetko su punili i svoje baterije  — obično mjesečno, za razliku od nekoliko puta dnevno.

U toku potopljeni incident na brodu Carver, Condition Baker je jednom nenamjerno postavljen   - u biti zaustavljajući protok zraka u bunar za baterije  — dok je punjenje baterije bilo u toku i gotovo je završeno. Oliver je bio na straži kao inženjerski časnik straže i, iako je jasno živio da bi ispričao priču, bio je svjedok očitavanja vodika u akumulatoru iznad 7 posto, čak iako je zaustavio punjenje baterije nakon postavljanja Condition Baker. Donja granica pri kojoj vodik tvori zapaljivu smjesu sa zrakom je 4 posto.

Dok Carver, zbog gore navedenog incidenta, prestao postavljati Condition Baker tokom priprema za prelazak na dubinu periskopa, to nije bila promjena za cijelu flotu. Dve godine nakon Carver incident, Scorpion je izgubljen. Gore navedeno, nalazi mornarice o gubitku Scorpion nisu bili uvjerljivi, međutim s izvjesnim je povjerenjem utvrđeno da je čamac izgubljen uslijed eksplozije u prednjem odjeljku   - gdje se nalazi bunarski brodski bunar   - i dok je na dubini periskopa ili blizu nje.

U svojoj knjizi kontraadmiral Oliver navodi: "Uvijek sam osjećao da su istražitelji zatvarali oči pred najverovatnijim uzrokom jer nisu htjeli priznati svoju umiješanost u ovu tragediju. Poslao sam svoje pismo o Condition Bakeru putem nekih od isti ljudi odgovorni za Scorpion istraga. "[39]

Odstupanje od gubitka Scorpion, Oliver nastavlja komentirati čitav splet okolnosti u vezi s širokim posljedicama prelaska s dizelskog pogona na nuklearnu energiju:

"Iako je bilo teško i bolno za osobne i profesionalne odnose, uklanjanje Diesel kulture bilo je nužna i dalekovidna taktika u Rickoverovoj općoj strategiji prepravljanja mornarice. Prvo sam služio na moru na podmornici Diesel, a dvadeset godina kasnije zapovijedao posljednja eskadrila podmornica Diesel koja je ostala u mornarici. Nepopularno je reći, ali ipak ostaje istina, da je podmornica Diesel mnogo manje složena platforma za održavanje. Dizelska podmornica zahtijevala je hrabrost, ali mnogo, mnogo manje posla za nastavak rada. Osim toga, manje sposobna podmornica Diesel pruža građanima Sjedinjenih Država znatno manje sigurnosti od nuklearne podmornice.

"Stara garda nije htjela ovo čuti, ali ja sam bio u jedinstvenoj poziciji da to znam. Uvjeren sam da bi unatoč nemilosrdnim ličnim napadima na njega, da Rickover nije inzistirao na dramatičnoj promjeni, mnogo više nas umrlo prilikom izgradnje nuklearno-podmorničkih snaga. Kako je Rickover komentirao svjedočeći o Thresher katastrofa, "Naš problem je u štabovima podmornica gdje su gotovo svi ljudi ljudi koji nisu nuklearni, od kojih neki imaju duboku ogorčenost prema nuklearnoj mornarici jer ih je to ugasilo." [40]


Dajući nam svoju e -poštu, uključujete se u Navy Times Daily News Roundup.

/> Podmornica Scorpion vezana je uz desantni brod tenk Tallahatchie County ispred luke Claywall, Napulj, 10. travnja 1968. Ovaj prikaz prikazuje posadu koja upravlja linijom podmornice na krmi njenog jedra, baš kao što je ubrzana i prebačen Nacionalni zastavnik u položaj porta. (Ljubaznošću poručnik John R. Holland, inženjerski oficir, okrug Tallahatchie, 1969., sada u zbirkama Komande američke pomorske povijesti i naslijeđa)

Assigned to the message center at Submarine Force Atlantic (COMSUBLANT) headquarters in Norfolk, Hannon and a handful of other young sailors were responsible for processing all incoming and outgoing messages for submarines then operating with the Atlantic Fleet.

They worked in a large room full of top-secret encryption machines that took clear-text messages, scrambled them into impenetrable gibberish, and then dispatched the blocks of seemingly random text in Morse code via high-frequency radio to submarines at sea.

The radiomen reversed the process for incoming messages, taking encrypted transmissions from the submarines and “breaking” them back into clear text by using the same encryption gear.

“All messages, incoming or outgoing, were routed through my desk,” Hannon recalled years later. “Nothing came in or went out that didn’t go through that desk.”

During the five-minute walk from his barracks to the COMSUBLANT message center that Thursday, May 23, Hannon was unsure what he would find. As usual, he thought about the abrupt change in atmosphere he and his coworkers encountered each time they went on duty.

Walking up to the unassuming brick building, they would show their ID cards to the armed Marine guards, then step up to the door at the ground-floor entrance to punch in the code to release the cipher lock. Inside, they would take the stairway up to the second-floor message center.

Manned around-the-clock seven days a week, Hannon’s workspace was the solitary link between the three-star admiral commanding the Submarine Force Atlantic and the scores of nuclear- and diesel-electric-powered submarines that, on any given day, were engaged in operations ranging from routine training to top-secret reconnaissance missions at the edge of — and often inside — Soviet territorial waters.

Six to eight junior officers and radiomen typically tended various encryption machines under the supervision of a warrant officer ensconced in an office separated from the main work area by glass windows. On one wall, a large board tracked the current operational status of each of the 104 submarines assigned to Submarine Force Atlantic.

Despite the hushed ambiance, the message center was the nerve center of the U.S. Navy’s submarine operations during the Cold War.

“These regular radiomen were privy to a lot of highly classified information that passed through their hands,” Harold Meeker, who was second in command at the message center, recalled. “They were all cleared for top secret.”

/>The submarine Scorpion photographed on Aug. 22, 1960 off New London, Connecticut. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Yet some messages were so sensitive that not even Hannon or his coworkers were allowed to process them.

In one corner of the room stood a pair of encryption machines with a thick curtain that could be pulled for total privacy. Only three men — Meeker Lieutenant John Rogers, the director of the message center or his boss, Cmdr. Charles H. Garrison Jr. —were authorized to process the orders to, say, an attack submarine shadowing a Soviet missile submarine or conducting surveillance on a Soviet naval exercise.

As he approached the Marine guards, Hannon was still replaying in his head what he had told Ken Larbes the night before.

“She was on a 24-hour Check Report,” Hannon recalled, but both petty officers thought there must be an innocuous reason for the silence.

“It was no big deal because boats were always late for any number of legitimate reasons ranging from equipment malfunctions to ‘the radioman just forgot,’” Hannon said.

Still, the two radiomen were aware of a top-secret situation involving the Scorpion that suggested potential danger. The submarine had originally been scheduled to sail straight home from the Mediterranean to Norfolk, but on Friday, May 17, it had been ordered more than 1,000 miles southwest, down toward the Canary Islands off the coast of Africa. A group of Soviet navy warships, including at least one nuclear submarine, were operating in the area, and the U.S. Navy wanted to check them out.

At the gate that Thursday morning, Hannon flashed his ID to the Marine on duty, punched in the cipher lock code, opened the security door, and bounded up the stairs. Opening the door to the message center, he froze in his tracks. Instead of the normal half-dozen radiomen quietly at work, a large group of senior officers — including several admirals and a Marine Corps general — had taken over the workspace and were talking among themselves in hushed voices. Hannon had never seen any of them before.

Hannon instantly knew that something was seriously wrong. And when he looked past the high-ranking interlopers and saw the expression on his friend’s face, Hannon knew that something terrible had happened to the Scorpion.

/>The submarine Scorpion comes alongside the tank landing ship Tallahatchie County outside Claywall Harbor, Naples, on April 10, 1968. The submarine's Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Francis A. Slattery, is atop her sail, holding a megaphone. (Courtesy Lt. John R. Holland, Engineering Officer, Tallahatchie County, 1969, now in the collections of U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Years later Larbes would describe how his overnight watch in the message center had begun at midnight in relative calm but had steadily become intense as more and more senior officers arrived on the scene.

“I had never seen a captain or an admiral come into that place in the two and one-half years I worked there,” he told me in an interview for this story.

“Now we had captains and admirals running around wanting more information [about the Scorpion]. It was so crazy…they suspended all of the saluting and all that.”

Within minutes of his arrival that morning, Hannon overheard conversations among the high-ranking strangers that made it clear that the Scorpion had disappeared and that its crew of 99 officers and enlisted men were dead.

Hannon, Larbes, and the rest of the radiomen didn’t realize at the time that they were witnessing the beginning of one of the greatest cover-ups in U.S. naval history: the burial of the truth of what had happened to the Scorpion.

The U.S. Navy’s suppression of the facts surrounding the loss of the Scorpion began in earnest five days after it disappeared, when the submarine failed to arrive in port as scheduled.

The official narrative — as told in Navy reports, news releases, and the transcript of a formal Court of Inquiry — is straightforward. A routine homecoming from sea suddenly escalated into a major crisis as the seven-year-old submarine inexplicably failed to appear at 1 p.m. on Monday, May 27.

The story of the missing submarine soon made the front pages of newspapers across the country.

/>Widows of the submarine Scorpion's crew hold hands during a memorial ceremony for the 50th anniversary of the disaster last year. Held at the Scorpion Memorial on Naval Station Norfolk, the ceremony was attended by more than 500 family members, friends and shipmates of the 99 crew members lost in 1968. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Colbey Livingston/Navy)

According to the official account, the incident began unfolding in the morning hours of May 27. Officials at Submarine Squadron 6 in Norfolk were expecting the Scorpion to surface off the Virginia Capes in late morning and establish ship-to-shore radio contact before entering port.

The squadron staff had already arranged for a harbor tug to stand by and had mustered a working party of line handlers to tie the submarine to the pier on its arrival. Despite a fierce nor’easter that was lashing southeastern Virginia that morning, several dozen family members were huddled under umbrellas at the foot of Pier 22 with banners and balloons to welcome their men home from sea.

Officials had announced the arrival time three days earlier. Theresa Bishop, the wife of Torpedoman Chief Walter W. Bishop, the Scorpion’s Chief of the Boat, waited out of the rain with several friends in a car in the parking lot at the foot of the pier. She had left their three children at a friend’s house because of the storm.

Nearby was Barbara Foli, the wife of Interior Communications Electrician 3rd Class Vernon Foli. This had been the first overseas deployment for the young family. Barbara was so eager for a reunion with her husband and their infant daughter, Holli, that she had come out despite the storm.

“It was a very cold, very dreary morning,” she recalled years later. “The wind was sucking the umbrellas away.”

At the Submarine Squadron 6 office aboard the submarine tender Orion, no one yet suspected anything was wrong. Capt. James C. Bellah, commander of the support vessel, was acting squadron commander while its skipper, Capt. Jared E. Clarke III, was out of town on personal leave.

In late morning, Bellah stopped by the squadron office to ask if the Scorpion had broken radio silence.

“We haven’t heard anything from them,” a sailor replied.

Bellah left to return to his own office elsewhere on the Orion. Years later, he would describe how the mood shifted from no concern to stark worry in a matter of several hours.

“Up until 11 a.m., we weren’t that concerned,” he said. “We didn’t know there was a problem we got no indication there was a problem with that submarine at all.”

But when the 1 p.m. arrival time came and went without a sign of the Scorpion, senior officials across the sprawling naval complex started to grow worried.

/>A view of the sunken submarine Scorpion's bow section, on the Atlantic Ocean floor about 10,000 feet deep, some 400 miles southwest of the Azores. Probably taken when Scorpion was located by the deep oceanographic search vessel Mizar in October of 1968. This image shows the top of the bow section, from the vicinity of the sail (which has been torn off) at left to the tip of the bow at top center. The torpedo room hatch is visible about half-way along the length of this hull section, with a lifeline track running aft from it. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Informal alerts began going out to various unit headquarters.

At the Atlantic Fleet’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Command, the telephone rang at 2:15 p.m., and the duty officer received jolting news: Submarine Force Atlantic headquarters was requesting that the aviation command immediately launch long-range patrol aircraft from Norfolk and Bermuda to search for any sign of the Scorpion along its expected course in the western Atlantic.

An hour later Submarine Force Atlantic headquarters formally declared “Event SUBMISS” (submarine missing) and, further, ordered all “units in port [to] prepare to get underway on one hour’s notice.”

By nightfall, most of the waiting families had gone home, still unaware of the emergency. They’d been told only that the submarine had not yet broken radio silence to signal its approach to port and that bad weather was the most likely reason. None of them knew that the Atlantic Fleet was scrambling to sea to hunt for the submarine.

Then, shortly after 6 p.m., WTAR-TV, the CBS affiliate in Norfolk, citing anonymous Navy sources, reported that the Scorpion nedostajao.

While the submarine was nearing the end of its Mediterranean deployment, Sonar Technician 1st Class Bill Elrod, a crewman on the Scorpion since 1964, had received devastating news: His wife, Julianne, had gone into labor on May 16, but the baby had died at birth.

/>Cmdr. Francis A. Slattery, the commanding officer of the nuclear-powered attack submarine Scorpion when it was reported missing in 1968. Cdr. Slattery took command of Scorpion in late 1967. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Cmdr. Francis A. Slattery had diverted Scorpion to the harbor at Rota, Spain, where Elrod and another crewman transferred to a tug and proceeded ashore to fly back to Norfolk.

On Monday, May 27, Elrod had reported aboard the Orion and volunteered to help with his submarine’s pending arrival. In the late afternoon, with no word as to its status, Elrod returned home to their apartment in Norfolk, where Julianne was waiting for him.

At 6 p.m. Elrod turned on the TV to the local news and heard the bulletin about the Scorpion.

“It was over,” he later recalled saying to himself. “They never, nikad announced anything like that. When they announced it on television, I knew the boat was gone.”

Several miles away, Theresa Bishop was preparing dinner for her three children when her eight-year-old son walked into the kitchen and said, “There’s something on TV about the Scorpion missing.”

“I went totally numb,” Theresa later recalled. “Nobody said anything. We just sat around waiting for the telephone to ring.”

Friends and neighbors began arriving at the Bishop home for the first of many long nights of watching and waiting. At one point later in the evening, Theresa Bishop stepped out to listen to the storm that still raged overhead but then heard something else.

From the naval station piers five miles away came a muted chorus of sirens, foghorns, and klaxon alarms as several dozen Atlantic Fleet ships began putting to sea to search for her husband’s missing submarine.

Unlike many of his fellow radiomen at the Atlantic Submarine Force message center, Hannon had actually served on board a submarine, earning his prize Dolphins insignia in the one-of-a-kind nuclear sub Triton before his assignment ashore.

Because of their familiarity with submarine operations and customs, Hannon and his boss, Warrant Officer John Walker, another submariner, were given the responsibility of handling a number of communications activities related to the submarine’s disappearance, particularly the massive search effort.

“I encoded and decoded messages sent to higher command and to several ships and subs in approximate proximity to Scorpion’s last known position,” Hannon later recalled. “However, there were [also] messages sent up the ladder seeking guidance on how to handle the event relative to the press.”

From that vantage point, Hannon watched in growing dismay and anger as the Navy buried the truth of what had happened to the Scorpion.

He was particularly upset to learn that on Friday, May 24, COMSUBLANT officials — knowing full well the Scorpion was already lost with all hands — had announced that it would be arriving at 1 p.m. the following Monday, and worse, had said nothing three days later to dissuade several dozen family members from standing vigil for hours in the raging nor’easter.

/>Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John M. Richardson and his father, retired Capt. William E. Richardson (Ret.), embrace during a memorial ceremony last year for the 50th anniversary of the loss of the Scorpion. The elder Richardson earned his dolphins on board the Scorpion in 1962 and the Richardson family hosted the Scorpion wardroom at their home in Naples, the last port visit before the Scorpion's loss. (Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Colbey Livingston/Navy)

By Tuesday morning, May 28, the story of the missing submarine led the front pages of newspapers all over the country. The previous evening, in an impromptu news conference at the Pentagon, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas H. Moorer had offered a slender reed of hope to the families of the crew.

“The weather is very, very bad out there,” Moorer told reporters. “But the weather may abate. The ship may well have been held back [by the storm], and she could proceed into port.”

This was another lie. Moorer, too, knew that the Scorpion had in fact sunk five days earlier, on May 22 — less than eight hours before the panicked group of senior officers began cramming into the COMSUBLANT message center.

For the next week, dozens of Atlantic Fleet ships and patrol aircraft scoured the open ocean. After several days, the search effort shrank to five destroyers, five submarines, and a fleet oiler proceeding in two groups down the Scorpion’s course track from its last known location southwest of the Azores toward Norfolk.

The two groups, positioned 12 hours apart for maximum surveillance, steamed in a line abreast measuring 48 miles wide as their lookouts peered intently through binoculars and their radar operators stared at their scopes for any sign of the missing submarine.

Hannon’s next shock came two weeks after that late evening when he had told Ken Larbes about the submarine’s missed Check Report.

Picking up the Virginijan-pilot newspaper on the morning of Thursday, June 6, Hannon read that the three-star admiral commanding the Submarine Force Atlantic had, the day before, testified under oath as the leading witness before a formal Court of Inquiry into the Scorpion’s disappearance.

/>A 1943 Conté crayon on paper drawing of then- Lt. Cmdr. Arnold F. Schade by McClelland Barclay. A Naval Academy Class of 1933 graduate, at the time, Schade was the youngest submarine commander in the Navy and a hero in the underwater service. He was credited with sinking eight Japanese vessels during his first two patrols. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

The admiral’s account flatly contradicted what Hannon and his fellow radiomen had seen and heard. Rather than describing the overdue Check Report and the crowd of senior naval officers who had clogged the message center the next morning, Vice Adm. Arnold F. Schade’s sworn statement made no mention of any of the events in the five days before May 27.

As Schade described it, the emergency had not begun until that rain-swept Monday afternoon when the Scorpion failed to arrive back in Norfolk on schedule.

No members of the Court of Inquiry challenged the three-star admiral’s testimony.

Schade, 56, was a revered figure in the Submarine Service — a combat veteran of 11 submarine patrols against the Japanese in World War II and the recipient of a Navy Cross for extraordinary courage in combat.

He was the perfect lead witness before the seven-member panel. It was Schade who had selected the Scorpion for the Mediterranean as a last-minute replacement for the Seawolf, the navy’s second-oldest nuclear submarine, which had suffered serious damage in an underwater grounding off the coast of Maine on January 30, 1968.

His intelligence section provided Cmdr. Slattery with vital information to carry out the Scorpion’s various missions. Schade’s operations staff controlled the submarine’s every movement before and after its three-month deployment with the Sixth Fleet, including the last-minute assignment to spy on Soviet warships off the Canary Islands.

If anyone could unlock the mystery of the Scorpion’s disappearance, it was Arnie Schade.

After offering a lengthy review of the search for the Scorpion and a summary of its Mediterranean deployment, Schade revealed that COMSUBLANT had dispatched unspecified “exercise instructions” to Slattery once the submarine had entered the Atlantic, including a directive to report its position on or about Tuesday, May 21.

The final message received from Scorpion dated 2354Z (7:54 p.m. EDT) on May 21, Schade said, “gave her position at 0001Z [8:01 p.m.]” and “reported that she would arrive in Norfolk [at] 271700Z [1 p.m. on Monday, May 27].”

/>This photograph of the wreck of the submarine Scorpion shows the top of the sunken hull, aft of amidships, resting on the Atlantic Ocean floor, probably taken after the vessel was located in late 1968. The large oval opening is the stowage bay for the messenger buoy. Also visible are circular ballast tank vents, two rectangular access hatches into the superstructure and damaged snorkel exhaust piping. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

After further discussion about the search conducted in the shallow waters off the Virginia coast, Schade took questions from Capt. Nathan Cole Jr., counsel for the court:

Q. Now, I believe you did state that it would be normal, you would not expect to hear from Scorpion after she filed her posit[ion] report and got underway returning home until she got here. Is that correct, sir?

Q. Is this normal, Admiral?

A. It is quite common practice. As you know, our Polaris [missile] submarines go out for 60-day patrols and never broadcast except in most extraordinary circumstances. And frequently our submarines are sent out on exercises which eliminate any requirement for reporting. It is only normal to expect Check Reports and continuous communications both ways when submarines are operating in the local areas when the exercise ground rules so provide.

And so it went for the next four weeks as the Court of Inquiry took testimony from 75 witnesses and examined hundreds of pages of exhibits relating to the Scorpion’s deployment, maintenance history, and other areas.

Not a single witness revealed what the COMSUBLANT message center staff had known all along: that the Scorpion emergency had begun in the late evening of Wednesday, May 22.

On July 26, 1968, the court submitted its classified report and adjourned. But in late October came the stunning news that the wreckage of the submarine had been found.

The Scorpion’s shattered hull had been photographed by a camera mounted on an unmanned “sled” tethered to a three-mile-long cable towed by the research ship Mizar, which for weeks had been searching a 12-square-mile area southwest of the Azores where officials calculated the wreckage lay on the seabed two miles down.

The court’s panel reconvened on Nov. 5 and spent several weeks examining hundreds of images of the wreck. It then went into executive session to write an addendum to its report.

Even so, when the Navy finally released an unclassified summary of the court’s findings on Jan. 31, 1969, the conclusion was disappointingly vague: “The certain cause of the loss of Scorpion cannot be ascertained from any evidence now available.”

/>The deep ocean exploratory vessel Mizar photographed here in the 1980s. (part of the Military Sealift Command Collection at U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

One of the great ironies of the long saga of the Scorpion is that the man most instrumental in revealing the truth about the lost nuclear attack submarine was the official who tried the hardest to keep the full story secret — Vice Adm. Schade.

Fifteen years after the Scorpion went missing, Schade agreed to provide his recollections of the incident in a telephone interview from his home in Florida, a conversation whose revelations would fatally impeach, albeit perhaps unintentionally, the official account of the submarine’s disappearance.

On April 27, 1983, the admiral cleared his throat and began to describe the Scorpion’s departure from the Mediterranean just after midnight on Friday, May 17, 1968.

“When they were coming out [of the Mediterranean], we normally diverted them into the Polaris base at Rota, Spain, for a couple of days for a [torpedo] load-out and [to obtain] a couple of things they might need before leaving the area. And [Scorpion] reported that their condition was so good that they didn’t even need to stop," he said.

Schade then confirmed a finding of the Court of Inquiry that a Soviet naval exercise that included at least one nuclear submarine was underway southwest of the Canary Islands.

“We had general information of a [Soviet] task force operating over in that general area. So we advised [Scorpion] to slow down, take a look, see what they could find out. As far as we know they never made contact, they never reported on that.”

Then Schade unwittingly dropped his first bombshell.

“They were due to report in to us shortly thereafter,” Schade went on, referring to the three-day period cited by the court — May 19 through May 21 — in which the Scorpion’s surveillance of the Soviet warships was to have taken place.

“It was at that time we got a little suspicious, because they did not report,. They did not check in, and then when we got to the time limit of their check-in they were first reported as overdue," he said.

Schade had inadvertently contradicted his own sworn testimony to the Court of Inquiry 15 years earlier. Now, for the first time, Schade was admitting that the Scorpion indeed had been on the Check Report system, and thus was required to transmit the encrypted message — “Check 24. Submarine Scorpion” — each day.

/>View of the sunken submarine Scorpion's sail, probably taken when it was located the deep ocean exploration vessel Mizar in October of 1968. This image shows the starboard side of the sail, with its after end at top left, and the starboard access door in lower left. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Asked to amplify, Schade noted that Slattery had transmitted a position report whose heading read “212354Z May 68,” or 2354 GMT (7:54 p.m. EDT) on May 21.

“As far as we were concerned all was clear, and she should have kept coming. And then, within about 24 hours after that, she should have given us a rather long, windy, résumé of her operations …. And when they did not respond, almost immediately that’s when we first became suspicious, that’s when we followed up with other messages, and really, it was just a matter of hours that we became somewhat concerned," he said.

Schade was explaining that instead of first sounding the alarm on May 27 after the Scorpion failed to arrive as scheduled, his command knew something was wrong with the submarine within hours of its actual sinking — a full four days earlier than officials had ever admitted.

And then he dropped his second bombshell.

Schade recalled that he had been out at sea when word came that the Scorpion had failed to send its Check Report.

“It looked like we needed to do something in the way of a search operation, [and so] I got Adm. Holmes [Ephraim P. Holmes, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet] on the radio and said, ‘Would you place the facilities of CINCLANTFLT [the Atlantic Fleet] at my disposal for the next day or two until we can organize a search operation?’ In fact, he placed them all at our disposal, and this was quite an amazing set of operational circumstances, because we controlled the entire resources of the Atlantic Fleet from a submarine at sea. Working through CINCLANTFLT headquarters and their communications, we organized a search from both ends [of the Scorpion’s presumed course] both by air and surface ships and other submarines.”

Surprised by this totally unexpected disclosure — a secret search for the Scorpion mounted at least four days before the Navy was supposed to have known anything was amiss — I asked Schade once again to clarify, and he did.

“All I know is that long before she was actually due in Norfolk, we had organized a search effort,” Schade said. “We had two squadrons of destroyers, a lot of long-range antisubmarine search planes operating out of the Azores, Norfolk, and other areas, and we had several ships that were in the Atlantic that were in transit between the Med and the U.S. Some [were] diverted and some of them were just told to come over to the track which we presupposed the Scorpion bi bio uključen. They searched up and down that [corridor]. To je trajalo prilično dugo, sve dok nije bilo sasvim očito da je dugo čekala na dolazak u Norfolk. ”

/>Side view of the towed sled used by the Navy research ship Mizar in the search for the nuclear submarine Scorpion in 1968. (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command)

Schade’s disclosures about the Scorpion set in motion a research effort that would occupy me, on and off, for the next 24 years.

During that time the U.S. Navy declassified most — but not all — of the official Scorpion archive.

And after his arrest in 1985, John Walker, who had been the supervisor on duty at the COMSUBLANT message center the night the Scorpion disappeared, pleaded guilty to spying for the Soviets and selling top-secret materials that enabled them to “break” encrypted submarine communications. Nevertheless, to this day U.S. Navy officials insist that Cmdr. Slattery and his 98 crewmen perished as the result of some unknown malfunction, not from any sinister event.

More than four decades after the disappearance of the Scorpion, Mike Hannon and Ken Larbes decided to break their silence.

In 2010, after reading my book on the disappearance of the Scorpion, Hannon contacted me and revealed the final secret of the submarine that he and Ken Larbes had discovered in the tense hours of May 22–23, 1968: The senior officers crowding into the COMSUBLANT message center arrived already knowing that the Scorpion was lost — and why.

Larbes, in an interview in 2018, confirmed Hannon’s account.

“There were officers openly discussing the fact that they believed the Scorpion had been sunk,” Hannon told me.

He also said he overheard that the Scorpion’s sinking had been tracked by the navy’s top-secret Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a network of underwater acoustic sensors used to monitor and track both submarines and surface vessels.

The SOSUS hydrophones in the Atlantic “did hear the explosion,” Hannon said.

And, he added, “a Soviet submarine was tracked leaving the area at a high rate of speed.”

What Hannon, Larbes, and the other radiomen learned that fateful Thursday in May 1968 — and in the weeks that followed — is stark confirmation that the Navy’s expressed shock and surprise over the missing submarine was a sham.

At the heart of the Submarine Force Atlantic, key officials knew practically from the moment of its loss that the Scorpion went down during a confrontation with a Soviet submarine.

Their immediate response was to bury the truth as deep as the remains of the Scorpion samog sebe.

Turning our submarine tragedies into living memorials

Environmentalists and submarine veterans share a common cause.

Ed Offley is the author of Scorpion Down—Sunk by the Soviets, Buried by the Pentagon: The Untold Story of the USS Scorpion (Basic Books, 2007). This article first appeared in the Summer 2018 issue (Vol. 30, No. 4) of MHQ—The Quarterly Journal of Military History, a sister publication of Navy Times.


Scorpion VI SSN-589 - History

USS Scorpion , a 3500-ton Skipjack class nuclear-powered attack submarine built at Groton, Connecticut, was commissioned in July 1960. Assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, she took part in the development of contemporary submarine warfare tactics and made periodic deployments to the Mediterranean Sea and other areas where the presence of a fast and stealthy submarine would be beneficial.

Scorpion began another Mediterranean cruise in February 1968. The following May, while homeward bound from that tour, she was lost with her entire crew some 400 miles southwest of the Azores. In late October 1968, her remains were found on the sea floor over 10,000 feet below the surface by a towed deep-submergence vehicle deployed from USNS Mizar (T-AGOR-11). Photographs taken then and later showed that her hull had suffered fatal damage while she was running submerged and that even more severe damage occurred as she sank. The cause of the initial damage continues to generate controversy more than three decades later.

This page features or provides links to all our views of USS Scorpion .

DatumGdeDogađaji
15. aprila 1968Napulj, Italija
Ako želite reprodukcije veće rezolucije od ovdje prikazanih digitalnih slika, pogledajte: & quotKako nabaviti fotografske reprodukcije. & Quot

Kliknite na malu fotografiju da biste ponudili veći prikaz iste slike.

Photographed on 27 June 1960, off New London, Connecticut, during builder's trials.
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover is standing on her sailplanes with another officer.

Službena fotografija američke mornarice iz zbirki Pomorskog povijesnog centra.

Online Image: 72KB 740 x 595 pixels

Photographed on 22 August 1960, off New London, Connecticut.
A "GUPPY" type submarine is faintly visible in the distance, just beyond the forward tip of Scorpion 's "sail".

Službena fotografija američke mornarice iz zbirki Pomorskog povijesnog centra.

Online Image: 95KB 740 x 605 pixels

Photographed on 22 August 1960, off New London, Connecticut.

Službena fotografija američke mornarice iz zbirki Pomorskog povijesnog centra.

Online Image: 105KB 740 x 595 pixels

Comes alongside USS Tallahatchie County (AVB-2) outside Claywall Harbor, Naples, Italy, 10 April 1968.
Scorpion was lost with all hands in May 1968, while returning to the U.S. from this Mediterranean deployment.

Courtesy Lieutenant John R. Holland, Engineering Officer, USS Tallahatchie County , 1969.

Fotografija američkog pomorskog historijskog centra.

Online Image: 113KB 740 x 615 pixels

Comes alongside USS Tallahatchie County (AVB-2) outside Claywall Harbor, Naples, Italy, 10 April 1968.
The submarine's Commanding Officer, Commander Francis A. Slattery, is atop her sail, holding a megaphone.
Scorpion was lost with all hands in May 1968, while returning to the U.S. from this Mediterranean deployment.

Courtesy Lieutenant John R. Holland, Engineering Officer, USS Tallahatchie County , 1969.

Fotografija američkog pomorskog historijskog centra.

Online Image: 101KB 590 x 765 pixels

Ties up alongside USS Tallahatchie County (AVB-2) outside Claywall Harbor, Naples, Italy, 10 April 1968.
This view shows the submarine's line handling crew aft of her sail, just as she has been made fast and the National Ensign transferred to its "in port" position. Scorpion was lost with all hands in May 1968, while returning to the U.S. from this Mediterranean deployment.

Courtesy Lieutenant John R. Holland, Engineering Officer, USS Tallahatchie County , 1969.

Fotografija američkog pomorskog historijskog centra.

Online Image: 175KB 740 x 615 pixels

Commander Francis A. Slattery, USN

"Commanding Officer of the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589) when it was reported missing in May 1968. Cdr. Slattery took command of USS Scorpion in October 1967."
Quoted from caption released with this photograph.

Službena fotografija američke mornarice iz zbirki Pomorskog povijesnog centra.

Online Image: 74KB 585 x 765 pixels

Lieutenant Commander David B. Lloyd, USN

"Executive Officer of the nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589) when it was reported missing in May 1968."
Quoted from caption released with this photograph.

Službena fotografija američke mornarice iz zbirki Pomorskog povijesnog centra.

Online Image: 57KB 585 x 765 pixels

Insignia of USS Scorpion (SSN-589)

This emblem was adopted in 1960.
Within the shield are four symbols, representing: Scorpion 's streamlined hull design her nuclear powerplant the ancient rock-throwing machine known as a "scorpion" and the stellar constellation Scorpio, the "Scorpion".

Fotografija američkog pomorskog historijskog centra.

Online Image: 90KB 600 x 765 pixels

In addition to the images presented above, the National Archives appears to hold several other views of USS Scorpion (SSN-589), taken in 1960. The following list features these images.

Dolje navedene slike NISU u zbirkama Pomorskog povijesnog centra.
NE pokušavajte ih nabaviti postupcima opisanim na našoj stranici & quotKako nabaviti fotografske reprodukcije & quot.


Reprodukcije ovih slika trebale bi biti dostupne putem fotoreprodukcijskog sistema Nacionalne arhive za slike koje nije u posjedu Pomorskog historijskog centra.


SCORPION SSN 589

U ovom odjeljku navedeni su nazivi i oznake koje je brod imao tokom svog života. Lista je hronološkim redom.

    Skipjack Class Attack Submarine
    Keel Laid 20 August 1958 - Launched 19 December 1959

Naval Covers

U ovom odjeljku navedene su aktivne veze na stranice koje prikazuju naslovnice povezane s brodom. Trebalo bi postojati zaseban skup stranica za svaku inkarnaciju broda (tj. Za svaki unos u odjeljku "Naziv broda i istorija oznaka"). Naslovnice trebaju biti prikazane hronološkim redoslijedom (ili najbolje što se može odrediti).

Budući da brod može imati mnogo naslovnica, one se mogu podijeliti na mnogo stranica tako da se ne može vječno učitati. Svaka veza do stranice trebala bi biti popraćena rasponom datuma za naslovnice na toj stranici.

Poštanske marke

U ovom odjeljku navedeni su primjeri poštanskih žigova koje brod koristi. Trebalo bi postojati zaseban skup poštanskih žigova za svaku inkarnaciju broda (tj. Za svaki unos u odjeljku "Naziv broda i istorija oznaka"). Unutar svakog skupa, poštanske žigove treba navesti prema njihovom tipu klasifikacije. Ako više poštanskih oznaka ima istu klasifikaciju, onda ih treba dalje sortirati prema datumu najranije poznate upotrebe.

Poštanski žig ne bi trebao biti uključen osim ako nije popraćen slikom izbliza i/ili slikom naslovnice koja prikazuje taj poštanski žig. Rasponi se MORAJU zasnivati ​​SAMO na omotima u MUZEJU i očekuje se da će se mijenjati s dodavanjem novih naslovnica.
 
& gt & gt & gt Ako imate bolji primjer za bilo koji poštanski žig, slobodno zamijenite postojeći primjer.


K-152 Nerpa

The Russian K-152 Nerpa suffered an accident when it was conducting an underwater test run in the Pacific Ocean causing the death of 20 men of 208 aboard. The Nerpa is an Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine.

The accidental activation of fire-fighting system released Freon gas into the air in the K-152 Nerpa. The members in the submarine suffered from suffocation and could not activate breathing kits. The rest of the crew were unaware of the situation until the warning sirens sounded after large amounts of gas had been released into the submarine.

Six crew and 14 civilian workers were killed and 21 people were injured. The casualties were transferred to a military hospital in Vladivostok. The submarine was delivered to India in December 2011 on a 10-year lease and is currently operated under the name INS Chakra by the Indian Navy.



Komentari:

  1. Zuran

    Ni ne reč više!

  2. Hosea

    Apsolutno se ne slažem sa prethodnom izjavom

  3. Rowdy

    Potpuno ste u pravu. Radi se o nečem drugačijem i ideji čuvanja.



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