Žele li mandžurski nacionalisti nezavisnost?

Žele li mandžurski nacionalisti nezavisnost?



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Mandžurija je postojala od srednjeg vijeka do današnje Kine.

Dinastiju Qing osnovao je klan Jurchen Aisin Gioro u Mandžuriji krajem 16. stoljeća. Wikipedia: Dinastija Qing

Dinastija Qing vladala je Mandžurijom i Kinom, ali je završila 1912. godine i naslijedila Republiku Kinu. Od tada je Mandžurija imala malo moći ili ovlasti nad teritorijom istočne Kine. Potiče li ih to na sticanje nezavisnosti? Jesu li to već probali?


Jesu li to već probali?

Da, nakon osnivanja republike, mandžurska elita njegovala je mandžurski nacionalizam u snovima o imperijalnoj obnovi. Postojanje ovog pokreta bio je jedan od faktora koji je kulminirao stvaranjem Mandžukua u Japanu 1932.

Istaknuti primjer je Asin-Gioro Xi Qia, udaljeni član carske kuće Qing. Dezertirao je kod Japanaca tokom njihove invazije na Mandžuriju i postao jedan od saradnika koji su predložili stvaranje mandžurske države pod posljednjim carem Qingom, Pu Yijem.

Međutim, državom Manchukuo vladalo se kao japanska marioneta. Državljanstvo su dobile sve etničke zajednice unutar njegove jurisdikcije, a ne samo etnički Manchu. Tako je u praksi nacionalistički san o nezavisnoj mandžurskoj nacionalnoj državi potpuno razoren i ispario zajedno sa marionetskom državom 1945. godine.


Mandžukuo je bio marionetska država. Do vremena kada je mandžurska vladavina prestala 1912. godine, mandžurski narod je već prestao postojati.

Mandžurski narod i civilizacija su u osnovi bili potpuno integrirani u kinesku civilizaciju/kulturu kroz međusobne brakove i kulturnu asimilaciju.

Tako da je do kraja dinastije Qing više nije bilo 'čistog' Mandžurijskog naroda (ljudi mandžurske krvi, jezika i tradicije) koji bi mogli prenijeti u Mandžukuo.

Niko u modernoj Kini nije ništa čisto… Kina je zapravo pravi lonac za topljenje. postoji razlog zašto Kinezi nisu izmislili M&M ili Skittles.


Nacionalistički anarhizam: Razumijevanje oslobođenja u korejskom anarhističkom pokretu

Nacionalista Anarhizam? Nije li to jasna suprotnost? Da, na mnogo načina. Tradicionalna anarhistička teorija odlučno odbacuje nacionalizam koliko i nacionalnu državu, tretirajući je kao "praznovjerje umjetno stvoreno i održavano kroz mrežu laži i laži" da se poslužimo riječima Emme Goldman. Nacionalistička retorika smatra se oruđem ugnjetavača, koristi se za stvaranje 'zamišljene zajednice' ili zamišljeno prijateljstvo između ljudi i njihovih elita, koje se zatim može mobilizirati za kolonizaciju, nadmašivanje ili uništavanje drugih zajednica. Od siromašnih nacija se očekuje da se slože s riječima svojih vladara, jer su, prema nacionalističkoj ideologiji, 'svi zajedno u ovome'.

Međutim, u praksi se nacionalizam teško otresti. U svijetu opkoljenom državnošću, birokratijom i nacionalnim identitetom, od kojih sve tri određenim ljudima daju ogromnu historijsku moć, grupe su tražile oslobađanje od ugnjetavanja pokušavajući "okrenuti" oruđa svojih ugnjetača protiv njih. U modernoj istoriji to je dovelo do potlačenih grupa da stvore jake nacije ili sopstvene identitete, bilo da su to Indonežani kada su se oslobodili Holanđana, Vijetnamci kada su bacili okove francuskog imperijalizma, ili Palestinci koji se danas bore za povratak zemlju iz Izraela. Iako ti nacionalni identiteti možda nisu savršeno postojali ranije, i svakako se ne u potpunosti uklapaju u socijalističku percepciju nacionalizma, oni služe kao snažni okupljači za oslobađanje miliona ljudi.

Kao anarhisti, možda ćemo doći u iskušenje da sudimo o ovim revolucijama zbog njihove predanosti državnosti, ali moramo zapamtiti da je to prilično lako učiniti iz udobnosti ekrana računara. Postoje kritike i kritike koje su često opravdane, ali jednostavno reći da oslobodilački pokret mora potpuno odbaciti stvaranje nacionalnog identiteta zanemaruje hitnost tog pokreta i neposrednu i često očajničku potrebu naroda za oslobođenjem od svojih ugnjetavača .

Kao studiju slučaja, dozvolite mi da predstavim situaciju s kojom su se korejski anarhisti suočili početkom 20. stoljeća. Kolonizirani od strane Imperijalnog Japana 1910. godine, korejski aktivisti započeli su vojnu i diplomatsku kampanju s ciljem oslobađanja zemlje iz kandži ove nove imperijalne moći. Nakon što je japanska vojska nasilno ugušila popularan protest pod nazivom 'Pokret prvog marta' (삼일 운동, sam-il undong), vođe pokreta i hiljade drugih aktivista pobjegli su u Kinu. U Kini su aktivisti za nezavisnost, uz podršku kineske vlade, stvorili Privremenu vladu Republike Koreje (KPG) i Oslobodilačku vojsku Koreje, koja će početi voditi napade na Japan.

U međuvremenu su anarhisti, koji su takođe bili uključeni u Pokret Prvog marta, pobjegli u različitim smjerovima. Neki su otišli u Kinu i osnovali Korejsku anarhističku federaciju (KAF), koja je organizirala i objavila radove o neovisnosti Koreje i anarhističkoj teoriji. Mnogi drugi, uz pomoć KAF-a, pobjegli su u Mandžuriju, teritoriju na sjeveru Koreje, i počeli uspostavljati različite anarhističke i anarho-komunističke teritorije, od kojih će jedna postati poznata kao Korejsko narodno udruženje u Mandžuriji (KPAM) , autonomna anarhistička zona u kojoj živi oko dva miliona korejskih migranata. Za razliku od dvije nacije koje graniče s njom, KPAM, inače poznat kao prefektura Shinmin, radio je po sistemu kontroliranom donošenju odluka odozdo prema gore koji je radničkoj klasi omogućio ekonomsku autonomiju. Za razliku od nedavno stvorene i centralno planirane ekonomije SSSR-a, koja je usvojila kapitalističke sisteme upravljanja u svojim tvornicama, prefektura se zalagala za formiranje „dobrovoljnih seoskih zadruga“ kojima bi „seljaštvo samoupravljalo“.

Literatura koju su napisali korejski anarhisti i Korejska anarhistička federacija pokazuje jasnu podršku onome što se uspostavljalo u Mandžuriji. Jedna publikacija, tzv Talhwan (탈환, 'Ponovno zauzimanje'), zauzeo je jasan stav o ugnjetavajućoj prirodi države:

Da bi njihova osuda države bila još jasnija, pisci su Talhwan također kritiziraju licemjernu politiku 'takozvane vlade seljaka i radnika', poznate i kao Sovjetski Savez. Izdvajajući se od državnih socijalista, osudili su 'despotske i diktatorske' postupke Komunističke partije u stvaranju državnog kapitalizma, 'prošireni oblik individualnog kapitalizma koji koncentrira kapital u rukama vlade'. Ovi aktivisti i društvo koje su stvarali u Mačuriji bili su jasno ugrađeni u anarhističku tradiciju u imenu i praksi.

Potičući ove anarhiste, međutim, bio je nacionalizam za koji se moglo smatrati da je u suprotnosti s anarhističkim načelima. Jedan Shin Chaeho (1880-1936), još jedan korejski revolucionar sa sjedištem u Kini, opširno je pisao o potrebi uništenja okupacijske 'strane rase' Japana. Razmotrimo ova dva kratka odlomka iz njegovog djela pod nazivom „Deklaracija Korejske revolucije“:

Bez konteksta, mogli bismo doći u iskušenje da prosudimo njegove anarhističke vjerodajnice, ali to ne znači da je njegovo djelo lišeno anarhističkih osjećaja. U istom djelu on tvrdi da ovu revoluciju koja bi 'uništila vladavinu strane rase' nikada ne bi trebao voditi 'božanska osoba, mudrac ili galantni heroj', niti bi je trebala potaknuti 'žestoka izjava' poput 'mase, probudimo se' ili 'mase, budi se'. Shin Chaeho je vjerovao, na pravi anarhistički način, da revoluciju trebaju voditi ljudi kroz spontani, decentralizirani ustanak.

Kao što s pravom ističu dva povjesničara anarhizma u postkolonijalnom svijetu, Steven Hirsch i Lucien Van de Walt, korejski anarhisti poput Shina Chaeha u jednom su se trenutku "morali suočiti s napetošću između anarhizma kao univerzalne ideje" i "svojih nacionalnih težnji da postignu neposredni cilj vraćanja nezavisnosti od japanskog imperijalizma '. Ovo je općenito bilo pokazatelj 'složenog odnosa u polukolonijalnom kontekstu između nacionalne svijesti i transnacionalnih briga'. Oni citiraju anarhistu Sim Yongcheola kako bi to dodatno ilustrirali:

Upravo je ta vrsta osjećaja dovela historičara Horiuchija Minorua da korejski anarhizam definira kao „nacionalistički anarhizam“. Biti anarhista u ovom kontekstu značilo je baviti se balansiranjem dvije želje, jedne krajnjeg cilja, a jedne neposredne potrebe. Dongyoun Hwang, povjesničar anarhizma u Koreji, odbija to smatrati neuspjehom i vjeruje da bi to nazvao eurocentričnim i pokazao bi nedostatak razumijevanja za historijsko razdoblje u kojem su živjeli. Imperijalizam, tačnije, njihovo podvrgavanje, dovelo je do 'rekonfiguracije' njihovog anarhizma u kontekstu 'nacionalnog cilja i granica'. Slične trendove možemo vidjeti i u drugim anarhističkim pokretima istog razdoblja, gdje je potčinjavanje imperijalne sile s jasnim identitetom dovelo do želje za stvaranjem nacionalnog "protu identiteta", čak i ako taj identitet treba do određene mjere umjetno konstruirati .

Anarhisti ne bi trebali osuđivati ​​ove pokrete, ali ni oni ne bi trebali biti potpuno nekritični. Kao što Maia Ramnath tvrdi u svojoj knjizi Dekolonizacija anarhizma, bilo bi "bezosjećajno zanemariti vrijednost etničkog ponosa" u kontekstu "gdje se etnička pripadnost brutalno a kultura desetkuje", ali bi bilo i naivno zanemariti da se tim etničkim ponosom može manipulirati i koristiti u formiranju hijerarhijskog, državno vezanog društva. Kako navodi:

U slučaju Koreje pod imperijalnim Japanom, možemo razumno kritizirati jesu li korejski anarhisti zauzeli pravi put u potpunoj potpori nacionalnom pokretu, ali ih nikada ne bismo trebali zanemariti kao anarhiste zbog toga što su to učinili. Ako to učinimo, onda globalne pokrete otpora promatramo kroz eurocentrični i ideološki puristički pogled i odbacujemo apsolutnu nužnost oslobađanja od imperijalnih ugnjetača.

Opća pouka ovdje je da ulazimo u težak posao kada pokušavamo tvrditi da jeste ili nije 'anarhistički pokret'. Svaki pokret, anarhistički ili ne, bit će pod velikim utjecajem njegovog specifičnog društvenog, kulturnog i povijesnog konteksta. Zanemariti ih znači zanemariti stvarnost i poteškoće s kojima se ljudi suočavaju pri izgradnji narodnog pokreta protiv ugnjetavanja. U ovom slučaju postoji realnost da nacionalni pokreti daju potlačenim grupama moć nad njihovom sudbinom kakvu do sada možda nisu imali. Možda bismo to mogli kritizirati, ali nikada ne osuditi u potpunosti, kako ne bismo dopustili da naš purizam stane na put oslobođenju.

Preporučena literatura na ovu temu:

  1. Anarhizam i sindikalizam u kolonijalnom i postkolonijalnom svijetu, 1870-1940: Praksa nacionalnog oslobođenja, internacionalizma i socijalne revolucije, ed. autora Stevena Hirscha i Luciena van der Walta [dostupno ovdje].
  2. Anarhizam u Koreji: Nezavisnost, transnacionalizam i pitanje nacionalnog razvoja, 1919-1984, autor Dongyoun Hwang [dostupno ovdje].

Posebno zahvaljujemo našim pokroviteljima, Dominicu Condellu, Johnu Walkeru, BoringAsianu, gospodinu Jakeu P Walkeru, Josephu Sharplesu, Joshu Steadu

Ako nam želite pomoći da dođemo do sredstava potrebnih za održavanje ove web stranice zauvijek, razmislite o tome da postanete pokrovitelj:


Baskijac

Regija najsličnija Kataloniji, u smislu secesionističkih osjećaja i ekonomskih performansi, je Baskija. Baskijska nacionalistička stranka desnog centra (PNV) nadzire vladajuću koaliciju u regiji.

"Vlada PNV -a sa velikim zanimanjem gleda šta se dešava u Kataloniji", rekao je za Al Jazeeru Sebastian Balfour, emeritus profesor savremenih španskih studija na Londonskoj školi ekonomije.

PNV ima pet od 350 mjesta u Španskom kongresu i šest od 266 mjesta u Senatu, ali svako mjesto se računa. Narodna stranka (PP) španskog premijera Mariana Rajoya vodi manjinsku vladu u parlamentu i povremeno joj je potrebna podrška PNV -a.

Baskijski predsjednik Inigo Urkullu rekao je da je član 155 "ekstreman i nesrazmjeran. Raznosi mostove. Generalitat [katalonska regionalna vlada] ima našu podršku u pronalaženju konstruktivne budućnosti. ”

Poštivanje manjinskih prava ključno je za narod Baskije. Njihov jezik, euskara, nije u srodstvu ni s kim drugim, a Baskijci se genetski razlikuju od svih drugih Europljana. Jedna su od najstarijih europskih autohtonih skupina.

Baskijski separatisti predvođeni krajnje ljevicom Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), oružanom grupom čije ime u prijevodu znači "Baskijska domovina i sloboda", vodili su sukob sa španjolskom državom od 1959. godine koji je rezultirao smrću više od 1.000 ljudi i ranjavanje više od 6.000.

ETA se zvanično razoružala 8. aprila, iako je grupa godinama odbijala članstvo.

Iako je ETA dugo bila glavna snaga za promjenu odnosa između Baskije i Madrida, PNV sada ima tu priliku. Ako povuku podršku Rajoyevoj vladi, to će "utjecati na predstojeći budžet za 2018.", rekao je Balfour.

Bez budžeta, Rajoyeve šanse za puni mandat su male, jer se Španija nada da će nastaviti s izlaskom iz secesije.


Kinu nije briga za život ili smrt Mandžura: aktivist za slobodu Mandžurije Bernhardt Silergi

"Od vremena imperijalizma, Kine su vodile politiku osvajanja tuđe teritorije. Ta navika nije nestala ni nakon završetka kolonijalizma. Oni misle da je to način potvrđivanja autoriteta", mandžurski aktivista Bernhardt Silergi.

OpIndia mu se obratila i razgovarala o raznim pitanjima vezanim za Mandžuriju i njen narod. Evo odlomka (sa cijelim video intervjuom na dnu):

OpIndia: Kad govorimo o kineskoj ekspanzionističkoj politici i mjestima pod njenom prisilnom kontrolom, rijetko čujemo za Mandžuriju. Čak je i na internetu dostupna samo ograničena količina literature. Zašto?

Silergi: Vidite, mi imamo istoriju, imali smo kulturu i bili smo miroljubiv narod koji je živio u sjeveroistočnom dijelu sadašnje Kine. Dvadeset godina nakon sloma dinastije Qing, Mandžurija je proglasila nezavisnost 1932. godine uz pomoć Japana. Međutim, 1945. godine Sovjeti su napali našu zemlju, a godinu dana kasnije predali je Kini.

Od tada se borimo da se oslobodimo. Međutim, Kina je učinila sve da potisne naš glas i eliminira naše postojanje. Od Drugoga svjetskog rata čak ni spominjanje Mandžurije ne postoji, pa nitko zapravo ne zna da postoji. Mi nismo Kinezi. Imamo posebnu kulturu, jezik i identitet. To želimo nazad.

OpIndia: Obično, kada govorimo o regionalnoj neovisnosti ili samoupravi, ona lebdi oko dvije stvari: misli o oslobođenju od neke okupacije ili bijegu od tiranije ugnjetača. Zašto se Mandžurija želi osloboditi Kine?

Silergi: Kao što sam već rekao, želimo vratiti svoj identitet. Tibet i Istočni Turkestan nekako su se borili svih ovih decenija i očuvali kulturu, jezik i identitet. Mi to nemamo. Naši ljudi su stvoreni da budu Kinezi, a mi nismo. Pitanje identiteta sebe je u srži.

Zajedno s kulturnim identitetom, Kina je povijesno zanemarivala naš razvoj. Vidite ove velike gradove i jaka svjetla, ali nijedan nije iz Mandžurije. Na našoj zemlji su osnovane industrije, ali ljudi su bili loše tretirani. Uzeli su nam naftu, iskoristili naše resurse i nisu nam dali ništa.

Jednostavno rečeno, Kinu nije briga hoćemo li živjeti ili umrijeti. Sve što žele su naši resursi. Čitava glupost kineskog identiteta je farsa. Kina kao jedna nacija, kineska nacija, je lažna nacija. To je njihova imperijalna istorija otimanja zemlje i eksploatacije tih područja. Moramo se tome usprotiviti.

OpIndia: Kada se vratite svom aktivizmu na nezavisnosti Mačurije i#8217, koliko ste organizovani? Kako se vi ljudi srećete ili organizujete demonstracije … kao što Tibetanci imaju vladu u egzilu …

Silergi: Za sada nismo toliko veliki. Cijeli ovaj pojam slobode i borbe za nezavisnost Mandžurije relativno je nov. Radimo dječje korake, dajemo ljudima do znanja da postojimo i da se moramo okupiti. Trenutno nam je cilj prisustvo na mreži, pokretanje naših kampanja i prikupljanje podrške od istomišljenika.

Tibetanci, Istočni Turkestanci, Tajvanci, Hong Kong naši su saveznici. Oni znaju našu bol. Osećaju našu borbu. Za sada želimo da svijet zna da ne postoji ništa što se zove ‘jedna Kina ’, već je to ilegalno okupirano područje.

OpIndia: Kako vidite kinesku ekspanzionističku politiku, s obzirom na ono što se trenutno događa. Dok je svijet bio fokusiran na sukob Indije i Kine u dolini Galvan, Kina je zauzimala 33 hektara nepalske teritorije.

Silergi: Ovo nije nešto novo. Od svojih dana imperijalizma, Kine su#8217 vodile politiku osvajanja drugih teritorija#8217. Ta navika nije nestala ni nakon kraja kolonijalizma. Oni misle da je to način potvrđivanja autoriteta. Pokušali su ekonomski upasti u Evropu i SAD jer nisu mogli zgrabiti njihovu zemlju.

Ali strategija je bila drugačija. Htjeli su da budu previše ovisni o njima. To se zaista dogodilo, ali sada SAD pokušavaju pobjeći. EU možda ima svoje razloge da ne ide protiv Kine, ali sada vidite da nacije premještaju svoje poslovanje iz Kine. Ide u Vijetnam, Indiju i druge.

Nacije su shvatile koliko je Kina opasna i diktatorska. Formiraju se nove međunarodne grupe za suprotstavljanje kineskom utjecaju. Ovo je potrebno, inače će učiniti sve kako bi proširili svoje zahtjeve i stavili svoje tvrdnje na nešto što nije njihovo.

OpIndia: Kako vidite vodstvo Xi Jinpinga#8230

Silergi: Oh! On je diktator koji nije vidio ratove. Dakle, on ne zna kolika je cijena rata. Pokušava se na njega gledati kao na nekog velikog vođu, ali niko ga na taj način ne voli. Komunistička partija Kine ima svoja pitanja. Dolazi iz druge generacije lidera u Kini koji ne poznaju borbu i stvarnost.

Zato se ponaša kao nasilnik i nije mu stalo do toga da zgrabi zemlju čak ni u Nepalu. Mislim, kakva je korist imati nekoliko hektara zemlje u Nepalu? Ipak, on to radi. On je neuspjeh.

OpIndia: Ima li poruka sugrađanima Manchura?

Silergi: Svi moramo biti prisutni. Moramo se okupiti i predstaviti kombinirano lice. Počnimo s Twitter -om i Facebookom gdje idemo s ručkom @ManchuUnion. Možete mi se obratiti @silergi na Twitteru. Ovo je početak. Stanimo zajedno i radimo na ovom cilju. Učinimo da svijet spozna naše kolektivno stanje. Ovo su bebi koraci, ali moramo početi.

Cijeli video intervju možete pogledati ovdje:


Koliko je nezavisnost popularna u Portoriku?

Nezavisnost nikada nije bila jako popularna opcija u Portoriku. Ona nije dobila čak 6% na bilo kojem statusu, a nijedan nezavisni kandidat nikada nije pobijedio kao guverner.

Nezavisnost je dobila sljedeće postotke glasova na plebiscitima koji su se do sada održali:

  • 23. jula 1967 .: 0,6%
  • 14. novembra 1993: 4,4%
  • 13. decembra 1998: 2,5%
  • 6. novembar 2012 .: 5,54%
  • 11. juna 2017 .: 1,5%

Da biste brojeve stavili u perspektivu, uporedite ih s nekim drugim glasovima za nezavisnost — ili barem anketama — u Sjedinjenim Državama.

U 2016, 26% Teksašana koje je ispitalo ispitivanje javne politike reklo je da su zainteresirani za odcjepljenje od Sjedinjenih Država. To je bio porast sa 15% u 2010. i 18% u 2009. Teksas je bio nezavisna država, Republika Texas, skoro deceniju prije nego što je postao država 1846.

Ukratko, znatno više Teksašana želi nezavisnost nego Portorikanci. Prosječite sve podatke i vidimo da je šest puta više Teksašana izabralo nezavisnost u anketama nego što su Portorikanci glasali za nezavisnost. Pa ipak je još uvijek jasno da većina Teksašana ne želi nezavisnost i ne očekuje se da će se Teksas uskoro otcijepiti.

Anketa koju je sproveo Survey USA među kalifornijskim biračima pokazala je da se 23% zalaže za nezavisnost od Sjedinjenih Država. Anketa Hooverove institucije sprovedena 2017. pokazala je da se 25-27% ispitanika zalaže za nezavisnost. Opet, ovo je mnogo veći postotak od postotka portorikanskih glasača koji se odlučuju za nezavisnost. I opet, to je samo mali postotak svih Kalifornijaca i neće dovesti do Calexita.

Mala grupa američkih doseljenika proglasila se Republikom Kalifornijom oko mjesec dana prije nego što je Kalifornija postala država. Grupa nikada nije priznata kao nacija i zapravo se nikada nije ni organizovala do te mjere da je imala vladu. Poput Teksasa, Kalifornija je bila zainteresirana za napuštanje Meksika, a čelnici su raspravljali o neovisnosti, povezivanju s drugom nacijom (Velika Britanija i Francuska bili su najvjerojatniji kandidati) ili državnosti. Kalifornija je postala država 1850.

Više od 150 godina nakon što su ove dvije države, od kojih su obje imale određeno iskustvo s neovisnošću, postale države, u tim državama još uvijek postoje ostaci pokreta za nezavisnost. Mogu li neki ljudi u Portoriku nastaviti da žele nezavisnost nakon što Portoriko postane država? To bi se moglo dogoditi.

U ovom trenutku, međutim, neovisnost nije popularan izbor u Portoriku, niti čak toliko popularan kao u Kaliforniji i Teksasu.


Nakon Napoleonovih ratova, Britanci su proširili trgovinu s nigerijskom unutrašnjošću i do 1885. godine bilo je dobro poznato na međunarodnoj sceni da su Britanci imali značajan utjecaj na ovu sferu zapadne Afrike.

Do 1900. godine teritorij kompanije & rsquos došao je pod kontrolu britanske vlade, koja je krenula da učvrsti svoju vlast na području moderne Nigerije, a 1. januara 1901. Nigerija je postala britanski protektorat, što znači da je dio Britanskog carstva , tada najveća svjetska sila.

Godine 1914. područje je formalno ujedinjeno kao kolonija i protektorat Nigerije. Administrativno, Nigerija je ostala podijeljena na sjevernu i južnu provinciju i koloniju Lagos.

Nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, kao odgovor na porast nigerijskog nacionalizma i zahtjeve za neovisnošću, uzastopni ustavi koje je donijela britanska vlada doveli su Nigeriju prema samoupravi na reprezentativnoj i sve više saveznoj osnovi. Tako je 1. oktobra 1954. kolonija postala autonomna federacija Nigerije. Sredinom 20. stoljeća veliki val nezavisnosti zahvatio je Afriku, a 27. oktobra 1958. Britanija se složila da Nigerija postane nezavisna država 1. oktobra 1960. godine.

Federacija Nigerije dobila je punu nezavisnost 1. oktobra 1960. godine po ustavu koji je predviđao parlamentarnu vladu i značajnu mjeru samouprave za tri zemlje. Od 1959. do 1960. godine, JajaWachuku je bio prvi nigerijski predsjednik Parlamenta Nigerije koji se također zvao & ldquo Predstavnički dom. & Rdquo JajaWachuku zamijenio je britanskog Sir Fredericka Metcalfea. JajaWachuku je primio Nigerijski instrument nezavisnosti, poznat i kao Povelja slobode, na Dan nezavisnosti. Dobio ga je od princeze Alexandre od Kenta, predstavnice Queen & rsquos na ceremonijama nezavisnosti Nigerije.

Savezna vlada dobila je isključiva ovlaštenja u odbrani, spoljnim odnosima i trgovačkoj i fiskalnoj politici. Međutim, monarh Nigerije je i dalje bio šef države, ali je zakonodavna vlast bila u nadležnosti dvodomnog parlamenta, izvršna vlast u premijeru i kabinetu, a sudska vlast u saveznom Vrhovnom sudu.

Ovdje je an isječak govora tadašnjeg premijera Tafawe Balewe tog dana, & ldquoKada je ovaj dan u oktobru 1960. izabran za našu nezavisnost, činilo se da nam je suđeno da se s tihim dostojanstvom preselimo na svoje mjesto na svjetskoj sceni. Nedavni događaji promijenili su scenu do neprepoznatljivosti, tako da se danas nalazimo na najvećem iskušenju. Odmah smo pozvani da pokažemo da su naše tvrdnje prema odgovornoj vladi osnovane, a pošto smo prihvaćeni kao nezavisna država, moramo odmah odigrati aktivnu ulogu u očuvanju svjetskog mira i očuvanju civilizacije. Obećavam vam, nećemo pasti u odlučnost. I dolazimo do ovog zadatka bolje opremljeni od mnogih. & Rsquo & rsquo

Međutim, uprkos nastojanju da postanu nezavisna nacija, političke stranke u zemlji i dalje su prilično fragmentirane. Na primjer, Kongres nigerijskog naroda i rsquosa (NPC) zastupao je konzervativne, muslimanske, uglavnom hausa i fulanske interese koji su dominirali sjevernim regionom. Sjeverni dio zemlje sastojao se od tri četvrtine kopnene površine i više od polovice stanovništva Nigerije. Tako je sjever dominirao vladom federacije od početka nezavisnosti. Na izborima 1959. godine održanim u pripremi za nezavisnost, NPC je osvojio 134 mjesta u parlamentu sa 312 mjesta.

Osvajanje 89 mjesta u saveznom parlamentu bila je druga po veličini stranka u novoj nezavisnoj zemlji Nacionalno vijeće građana Nigerije (NCNC). NCNC je zastupao interese naroda istočne regije Nigerije u kojem su dominirali Igboi i kršćani, a Akcijska grupa (AG) je bila lijevo orijentirana stranka koja je zastupala interese naroda Yoruba na Zapadu. Na izborima 1959. godine AG je dobio 73 mjesta.

Kao rezultat toga, kada je nastala prva nacionalna vlada nakon sticanja nezavisnosti, nju je formirao konzervativni savez NCNC-a i NPC-a.

Nakon sticanja nezavisnosti, bilo je široko očekivano da će Ahmadu Bello Sardauna iz Sokota, neprikosnoveni snažan čovjek u Nigeriji koji je kontrolirao sjever, postati premijer nove vlade Federacije. Međutim, Bello je odlučio ostati premijer Sjeverne i stranački šef NPC -a, izabrao je Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Hausa, za prvog premijera Nigerije & rsquos.

AG u kojem dominira Yoruba postala je opozicija pod svojim karizmatičnim vođom načelnikom Obafemijem Awolowom. Međutim, 1962. godine unutar AG -a je nastala frakcija pod vodstvom Ladokea Akintole koji je izabran za premijera Zapada. Frakcija Akintola tvrdila je da narodi Jorube gube svoj istaknuti položaj u poslu u Nigeriji od ljudi iz plemena Igbo jer je NCNC u kojem dominiraju Igbo bio dio vladajuće koalicije, a AG nije. Premijer savezne vlade, Balewa, složio se sa frakcijom Akintola i tražio da se AG pridruži vladi. Partijsko vodstvo pod vođstvom Awolowa se nije složilo i zamijenilo je Akintolu kao premijera Zapada jednim od svojih pristalica. Međutim, kada se parlament Zapadnog regiona sastao da odobri ovu promjenu, pristalice Akintole u parlamentu pokrenule su nerede u domovima parlamenta. Izbile su tučnjave među članovima. Stolice su bačene, a jedan član je zgrabio parlamentarni buzdovan i njime upravljao kao oružjem za napad na predsjednika i ostale članove. Na kraju je policija sa suzavcem bila potrebna da uguši nered. U kasnijim pokušajima ponovnog sazivanja zapadnog parlamenta izbili su slični poremećaji. Nemiri su se nastavili na Zapadu i doprinijeli reputaciji Zapadnog regiona zbog nasilja, nasilja, anarhije i namještenih izbora. Premijer savezne vlade Balewa proglasio je vanredno stanje u zapadnoj regiji i uhapsio Awolowa, a drugi članovi njegove frakcije optužili su ih za izdaju. Akintola je imenovan za šefa koalicione vlade u zapadnoj regiji. Tako je AG smanjena na opozicionu ulogu u njihovom vlastitom uporištu.


Besplatni bilteni

Mislim da je svaka vrsta nacionalizma u svom najčišćem obliku religija. To je idolopoklonstvo. To vrijedi i za kršćanski nacionalizam. Ona uzima kršćanske simbole, retoriku i koncepte i utka ih u političku ideologiju koja je u svom idealnom obliku idolopoklonička. Ne kažem da svi u neredima idolopoklonici, jer ne znam da li drže idealan tip kršćanske nacionalističke ideologije. To je rsquos vrlina prepoznavanja klizne ljestvice. Ljudi padaju cijelo vrijeme na ovoj ljestvici, ali u krajnosti je idolopoklonik.

Trebamo li kršćanski nacionalizam smatrati svjetonazorom, poput sekularizma i modernizma? U kojoj mjeri bismo trebali razmišljati o kršćanskom nacionalizmu kao sveobuhvatnom skupu svjetonazora da ćete, ako imate takvo uvjerenje, vjerovatno imati takvo vjerovanje?

Paul D. Miller: Više volim jezik ideologije, da je kršćanski nacionalizam politička ideologija. Ideologija je povezani skup normativnih ideja o društvenom i političkom poretku, posebno o tome kako društvo i politika trebaju biti uređeni.

To su povezane ideje, ali ima umjetnosti. Kaže, "Ovdje je priča o svijetu i o tome kako bi svijet trebao biti." Rdquo To mi daje ulogu da radim na tome da se taj svijet ostvari. To je ideologija. To vrijedi i za socijalizam, marksizam i fašizam. To je istinito za nacionalizam svih crta, uključujući i kršćanski nacionalizam. Koristim takav jezik. Češći je u književnosti i političkoj teoriji.

Koliko mislimo da je kršćanski nacionalizam širok? Koliko su te tvrdnje uticajne? Koliko su rasprostranjeni?

Paul D. Miller: Whitehead i Perry su to izmjerili i kažu da je 52% svih Amerikanaca ono što oni nazivaju ambasadorima. Zatim tu su i prilagoditelji, ljudi koji su u blizini kršćanskog nacionalizma, tolerantni su prema njemu i prihvaćaju dovoljno da im neće stati na put. 78% samooglašenih evangelika su ili ambasadori ili prihvatioci kršćanskog nacionalizma. Usput, važno je prepoznati tu razliku da su ambasadori manja grupa. Oni osvajaju hardcore ideologe koji provode vrijeme razvijajući energiju, razmišljajući o njoj, moleći se o njoj, zalažući se za nju, pišući svoje kongresmene i prisustvujući pobuni.

Moj odgovor na te dvije grupe je drugačiji. Mislim da su ambasadori vukovi, a smještaj, iskreno, ovce kojima je potrebno poučavanje, mudro ispravljanje i savjet koji će im pomoći da jasnije razmisle o ideologiji kojom su se hranili. Mislim da su ambasadori prevaranti i da ih treba protjerati i odbaciti, ali smještaj su oni kojima je potrebna nježna korekcija ako to prihvate.

Reklo bi se da pjevanje patriotskih pjesama, isticanje američkih zastava i izgovaranje Zavjete vjernosti u crkvi potpadaju pod kršćanski nacionalizam?

Paul D. Miller: Uglavnom, rekao bih da jeste. Želim biti jasan: ja sam patriotski Amerikanac: služio sam u vojsci Sjedinjenih Država. Ja sam veteran rata u Afganistanu. Vodim svoju decu na parade 4. jula. Čitao sam im Deklaraciju o nezavisnosti četvrtog.

Nema ništa loše u onome što bih nazvao patriotizmom. In fact, I think we should be patriots because that's the best guardrail against the unhealthy kinds of nationalism. I'm proud to be an American but there is a time and a place for it. There are appropriate boundaries around that and I think the church is not the right place for that. I very much advocate for taking flags out of church buildings. Not because we hate America, but because when we're in church, we are celebrating our citizenship in a different polity in the kingdom of heaven, which is a kingdom that includes all peoples drawn from every people, language, and nation on earth.

That&rsquos a wonderful thing and that&rsquos why the American flag does not belong in a church building. Similarly, I would not advocate singing patriotic songs in church. I'm a little cautious about many churches celebrating, for example, Memorial Day weekend and doing a special shout out or thank you to veterans. That&rsquos a gray area. Some churches go too far and hold big patriotic festivals on the weekend.

Do these churches tend to be more Southern or more rural? A number of us who have grown in the church have been blind to how common some of the God-and-country extremes of Christian nationalism congregations are.

Paul D. Miller: It is unevenly distributed around the country. This is more common in the South with a strong representation in the Midwest. It is stronger in rural areas and smaller towns, less common in bigger cities. There's also a class and education distinction here, more common in the lower middle class and more common amongst the population that does not have a college degree.

In certain parts of the country, you never see anything except this kind of God-and-country co-celebration. I'm from Oregon. I didn't grow up in the South, but I've traveled. In the military, I was based in the South for part of my time, where I saw some of this more up close. The regional distinction is important to keep in mind.

What is the draw of Christian nationalism to the &ldquopoor, uneducated, and easy to command&rdquo Religious Right, as they&rsquove been described? There was the rise of the Religious Right in the 70s and 80s, but it has gotten louder lately.

Paul D. Miller: From the time Europeans stepped foot on North American shores, they thought of the polity. They were building here in religious terms. It&rsquos always been part of the kind of European Christianity that was imported here. It&rsquos a version of Christendom, this blending of sacred and secular identities to makes sense of the universe.

Some Americans during the founding thought that America was the new Israel. They wrote it that way and they felt that the revolution was a step forward in the building of the kingdom of God. It was the case during the Civil War, which was this righteous crusade against an evil slave power. They use that sense of self-righteousness to construct a form of American nationalism that was highly Christian mystic and was unhelpful.

Over the past hundred years, as America has grown less Christian and less white, it has put the white Christian conservative population on the defensive. We feel like the world's against us. We're shrinking, our power is shrinking, our influences are shrinking against all of the other forces in the world.

Non-Christian and foreign influences are now controlling our country and taking it away from us. In the last 40 years, Christian nationalists tend to believe that Christians are under attack and are being persecuted. That leans towards a worldview that increasingly includes a lot of fear: us-versus-them dichotomy, forces beyond our control are steering events against us. I think it is why today's Christian nationalism is different than past generations and why it bleeds over into some of the conspiracy theory stuff as well.

To what degree is Christian nationalism a view of God being extremely active in the world, shaping the nation through sovereignty?

Paul D. Miller: If you ask me, should the United States try to adopt Christian values? I would say yes because as Christians, we are called to work for justice and the common good, and to care for the poor.

Those are Christian values and I think our country should pursue that. That doesn't make me a Christian nationalist. I think we should be involved in the public square. We should advocate for justice drawn from our understanding of justice that comes from the Bible.

That's not Christian nationalism. Christian nationalism is an argument about American identity: We are a Christian nation and we must remain. The distinctive belief of Christian nationalists is that God especially favors the United States. There&rsquos an overlap between that and legitimate Christian engagement in politics. Religious liberty and the unborn are what Christian nationals advocate.

When we criticized and condemned Christian nationalism, that is not a criticism of all Christian political engagement at all. In fact, we need to remain involved in politics to take back the name of Christ and say, &ldquowe don't think that the name of Christ belongs on that agenda.&rdquo

What exactly happened during the 2016 presidential election and subsequent four years, that changed the influence of Christian nationalism?

Paul D. Miller: Commentators will say it was so unlikely that Trump would capitalize on Christian support because of his personal conduct. But if you look at his campaign and his rhetoric, he was explicit about pitching his campaign towards Christians. For example, in June 2016, he said &ldquoWe will respect and defend Christian Americans.&rdquo In January he said, &ldquoChristianity will have power.&rdquo No other candidate ever came close to being that blunt about championing Christian power. That's Christian nationalism in a nutshell, advocating for Christian power rather than Christian principle. Many other candidates advocate for justice, a Christian principle, but Trump said he will champion Christian power. That's why he struck such a deep chord among many white evangelicals. That was their political program for decades, Christian power. It turns out to matter more than Christian principles.

What&rsquos the connection between white nationalism and Christian nationalism?

Paul D. Miller: We need to recognize that the alt-right and white nationalism are straightforwardly racist. They explicitly equate Western civilization with European DNA. They rarely talk about Christianity except to claim it as part of the Western or European heritage, the heritage of Christendom.

Christian nationalism would not claim that whites are inherently superior on the surface level. If you dig a bit deeper, you'll find that Christian nationalists and white nationalists, agree on a range of subjects. For example, if you ask whether racial inequality in America is primarily due to individual merit or due to structural systemic factors, Christian nationalists and white nationalists would agree it's due mostly to individual merit. They would both advocate for strong immigration restrictions. They would reject that systemic racism exists. There is a difference, but there is some overlap in those underlying attitudes.

How should we view the different effects Christian nationalism has on whites and non-whites?

Paul D. Miller: White Too Long by Robert Jones is another book on this. He&rsquos a pollster who found that Black Christians and white non-Christians tend to see the world one way, while white Christians see it another way. This shows that white Christians&rsquo distinctive worldview can't be simply a function of their Christianity. Otherwise, Black Christians would agree with them. It can't be simply a function of whiteness. Otherwise, white non-Christians would also agree with them.

There is some distinctive interaction between whiteness and Christianity, which means that white evangelicalism is now an ethnoreligious historical community with its distinctive worldview and its own way of interpreting reality. That is not Christianity. It is white Christianity or Anglo Protestantism. It's a distinct religious socio-cultural tradition that has emerged in the transatlantic area over the past three centuries in the United Kingdom and the United States.

You can talk about the unique historical contribution of Anglo Protestants, but it's also true that they seem to be uniquely blind to the realities of a racialized society. That's my best answer to what's going on here: white evangelicalism is not anymore a grand tradition of religious reflection and practice. It has become increasingly a narrow, provincial ethnic-religious community that is simply advocating for its own perks, power, and privilege.

How do we begin to address Christian nationalism and white Christianity, and can the two be disentangled?

Paul D. Miller: I don't think you can disentangle those things at all. Any question about race in America is a political question. Part of the answer has to be a reminder that our religion transcends any particular historical community. To the extent that we are finding ourselves becoming too narrow in our Americanness or whiteness, we need to expose ourselves to critiques from people of other traditions and other communities.

On an individual level, if you find yourself in this situation, go find somebody who is from a different tradition and just sit and listen. You don't have to have an awkward conversation about the Capitol riot. You could try to deepen your friendships with those of different cultures, communities, and traditions than you are. That&rsquos an important step.

We can also remind Christians of the long tradition of good stuff in Christianity. Frederick Douglass is an American Christian and he gave good sermons about the nature of the American experiment and its relationship to Christianity. He did that not as somebody who criticized Christianity but rather used his Christianity to criticize the white American church. Let's read Frederick Douglass and learn from him so that we can learn how to distance ourselves from the unsavory parts of the white churches past and cultivate the best of American Christianity.

When people think about this insurrection, they will be thinking about the fake news and dishonesty of the leaders of these people that brought them there. When you think of Christian nationalism, to what extent is this dishonesty embedded?

Paul D. Miller: Tragically, I think more people probably genuinely believe what they're saying than consciously lie about it. At the lay level, it's probably more a problem of hardheartedness and closed ears. It's a problem of pride: a refusal to listen, a refusal to reevaluate their beliefs in the light of reality. It's a refusal to recognize facts as facts. For Christian nationalists, their preconceived beliefs about America and Christianity's relationship with America is now more important than reality to them.

They hold onto their beliefs in the face of conflicting reality. They invent a way to explain these aberrations and that's exactly what gives rise to conspiracies. Conspiracies are a way of explaining reality way and taking refuge in fantastical beliefs.

What would be the catalyst to get people to a place where they begin to doubt those beliefs? What might get people into a self-critical or self-reflective mode?

Paul D. Miller: I used to work for the United States government on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. We talked about de-radicalization efforts to change the terrorists&rsquo minds and convert them to a non-terrorist worldview. That's a helpful framework. We found that these programs work best when they were locally driven when they involve strong institutions of civil society, like mosques, religious institutions.

When they reintegrated these former extremists into strong local communities, these communities would give the former extremists a sense of belonging, purpose, and identity separate from their old affiliations. Predominantly white churches are led by white leaders who recognize the threat of Christian nationalism, and they need to adopt a different or additional understanding of the church's mission. 78% of self-identified evangelicals are supporters or accommodators of this ideology. That's tens of millions of people. The church must always confront false teaching.

It's also the church's job to confront sin. Some people took the name of Christ and they were involved in public sin by engaging in riots and even political violence. It's the church's job to proclaim the name of Jesus and call out false gospel.

The church has to preach the truth and build thick forms of community that give people meaning, purpose, and belonging, separate from our political lives. That is an essential part of treating the loneliness, fear, and anger of the alienation that many Christians feel, and that is leading them into the Christian nationalist movement.

Do you think that the way that we work with those who have been deceived should look the same as the way that we seek to reach out to and confront leadership?

Paul D. Miller: There&rsquos a distinction between the ambassadors and the accommodators. The hardcore ideologues need rebuke for example, Eric Metaxas and how he has gone hard in the direction of pro-Trump advocacy and Christian nationalism. I disagree with him and I think that he's harming himself, the nation, and the gospel.

That is different from the accommodator, the people in the pews. They need love and they need community. The church is not just a place you go to for a good lecture about the Bible. It should be a place where you go to live out the gospel in community with others, where you serve the church and you serve your neighborhood in love. Those roles that give you meaning, purpose, and belonging should draw you away from the unhealthy political expressions that we're seeing out there.

If you were going to start something like reprogramming nationalist beliefs at your church, how might it look?

Paul D. Miller: I would not recommend the pastors stand up and try to deliver a sermon against Trump or the right. It's probably not the best place to start. I do think pastors need to preach correct political theology and eschatology. They need to preach about the kingdom, that Jesus is our King and His kingdom is not of this world.

Pastors need to say from the pulpit that America is not a new Israel. There's a lot of Christians who seem to be confused about this. America is wonderful but it is not a new Israel. The church is the new Israel.

We need to say that loudly. It&rsquos a kind of remedial theological education that we need, but we need it. I recommend books by Jonathan Dodson, a friend of mine who writes about gospel-centered discipleship. He co-authored one called Called Together: A Guide to Forming Missional Communities. It is living the gospel together in discipleship and community, and service to the church and the neighborhood.

It&rsquos also outward facing to the world. It's serving them to make the world better. We are called to do good works and that's what this looks like: when we form these kinds of communities and small groups.

More than just Bible study, it's also living it out in service. That's the kind of thing that gives people belonging in the church of Jesus, to our neighborhoods, and the world in a way that is the opposite of Christian nationalism.

What&rsquos another way in which churches can help to disciple people into being citizens of Christ&rsquos kingdom and out of Christian nationalism when pastors only have one hour a week with folks?

Paul D. Miller: I have a two-pronged answer. One is that pastors, even from the pulpit, can start calling out some of this. I normally wouldn't say that, but I do think the problem is so severe of news consumption and being formed and catechized by secular media.

Pastors in shepherding should warn the sheep against falling off a cliff and falling for lies from the enemy. They should warn people against both the volume of time they spend on this and also particular sources of disinformation and deceit.

Pastors can call out &ldquoHow much time are you spending a day listening to Fox News and talk radio?&rdquo We need to learn the skill of critical analysis of the news sources we get. Pastors can exhort the congregation to do that.

How do pastors pick which battles to fight regarding who and what they call out?

Paul D. Miller: It's partly about courage, but it's also about how no white evangelical pastor is shy about preaching abortion and about the right. They&rsquore not shy preaching a sermon about the imperative of religious liberty.

There are a few issues that belong on our list. Racial justice belongs on that list. Abiding the law and Christian nationalism itself belongs to that list because it has come to deceive. 77% of self-identified evangelicals are in this movement. I want pastors to recognize it has now come to be a serious problem. It's time to start addressing this directly from the pulpit as one of those few political issues that they potreba to address.

The other and probably more influential one, in the long run, is the community. I sense that many churches focus on preaching and let community maybe happen on its own. I think building the community is as important as the preaching because that's where the preaching comes to be lived. It&rsquos where accountability happens. Who's going to warn the guy I sit next to in the pew, a retiree who goes out for coffee once a week, to not watch Fox News five hours a day?

Is it the pastor? No, it's more likely going to be the guy who sits next to him in the pew who invites him over for dinner every other week. That's where the more meaningful measures of accountability are going to happen, but it won't happen if churches aren't purposely building a community that gives people the role of holding one another accountable.

That's that is what churches are for. I'm not sure it's happening at the scale we needed to.

For our non-American listeners, how might you suggest that they pray for the United States right now?

Paul D. Miller: Pray for justice and pray for peace. Pray for clarity and truth. It seems to me that we're in a moment where again, pride is taking precedence over truth. We need humility to hear the truth. Pray for the rebukes that need to be spoken, to be spoken with courage, but also with love. Pray for gentleness in how we reach out to not the leaders, but the followers of this movement. Pray for gentleness and how we reach out to them and lovingly plead with them to steer away from the danger of this movement.


Opinion : Why secessionist nationalists want to stay in the European Union

In several European countries, nationalist secession movements simultaneously seek independence from their countries’ governments, but also want to remain part of the European Union. British political commentator Theodore Dalrymple argues that this combination of attitudes is a “glaring contradiction”:

In reality, there is no great contradiction here. Secessionist nationalists in Europe historically fear their local ethnic rivals far more than the more distant EU, which is sometimes seen as a protector against the former. For Catalan nationalists, the main enemy is not the EU, but the Spanish national government in Madrid. For the Scottish National Party, it is the UK government in London. I tako dalje. There is a long history of local minorities looking to distant power centers as possible protectors against their local adversaries or oppressors. Here in the United States, for example, local minorities have often sought help from the federal government to counter oppression by state and local governments.

European secessionists also want to remain part of the European Union because they know that their very small would-be nations cannot succeed economically without guaranteed access to the EU’s single market. Britain is large enough to take the risk, but Scotland or Catalonia probably cannot afford it.

Finally, although the EU’s power has grown, it still does not regulate or tax nearly as much as national governments do. For example, government spending constitutes some 40% of UK GDP, of which less than 1% goes to the European Union. The central governments of Spain and the UK constrain Scottish and Catalan autonomy far more than the EU does. Even if the EU ultimately does seek the “extinction” of national sovereignty, as Dalrymple fears, it is a long, long way from achieving that goal, and may well never do so. By contrast, existing nation-states have done much more to restrict (even if not completely extinguish) the sovereignty of their regional minorities. For these reasons, it is not surprising that, in the wake of Brexit, Scottish nationalists are likely to seek a new referendum on independence, which will – among other things – enable them to stay in the EU.

None of this implies that the secession of Scotland, Catalonia, and similar regions in other European countries is necessarily a good idea. I am no fan of nationalism of any kind, and believe that secession movements must be evaluated by their likely consequences rather than based on any supposed inherent right of ethnic groups to have states of their own. Whether the world will be a better place with an independent Scotland or an independent Catalonia is, in my opinion, a tough call.

I am also no great admirer of the European Union, though I think it does deserve credit for establishing free trade and freedom of movement over a vast area. But whether we sympathize with their cause or not, whether we like the EU or not, it is entirely understandable that European secession movements should want to stay in the EU even as they simultaneously seek independence from their national governments.


The Namibian struggle for independence – 1966 – 1990 – a historical background

During the 1960s most of Africa’s countries had gained independence except for Namibia. Geographically, Namibia is made up of savannah, dry scrub land, as well as the Kalahari and the Namib Deserts. The country is rich in minerals such as uranium, vanadium, lithium, tungsten, as well as diamonds. It was these mineral resources that encouraged and motivated South Africa to try and hold on to Namibia throughout the many years of revolution, 1966 – 1990. The South African government also believed that by holding onto Namibia, the guerrilla war in Angola would be kept further away from South Africa. South African apartheid laws were extended to Namibia and prevented black Namibians from having any political rights, as well as restricted social and economic freedoms. The aim of South Africa’s rule over Namibia was to exploit the mineral resources by white South Africa.

In 1964, South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was formed. SWAPO was mainly a Black African Nationalist movement led by Sam Nujoma. The agenda of the SWAPO was around the belief that class struggle for independence, political and social freedom was needed to create historical change in Namibia. SWAPO claimed support from all the local tribes. However, the South African government in an attempt to divide and conquer claimed that it was dominated by the Ovambo tribe who make up just over half the population of Namibia. Ovambos are agricultural people who live primarily in the North of Namibia. In 1967, South Africa arrested and tried 37 Namibians for supporting terrorism including Andimba Herman Toivo ja Toivo, one of the founders of SWAPO who was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on Robben Island, off Cape Town’s coast.

In 1966, SWAPO established the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and an armed insurrection started. During the 1960s, Angola was a Portuguese Colony and that meant that any supply lines to friendly black nations were too long for the Namibia armies to get enough weapons and aids to start a serious military campaign. However, the Namibian armies resorted to gathering support and small acts of terrorism and sabotage started.

In 1975, Angola became independent and with better supply lines SWAPO was able to launch a serious guerrilla warfare campaign. In 1978, SWAPO had around 18,000 combatants and could launch 800 raids into Namibia. The South Africans responded by attacking the rebel bases across the border including a retaliatory strike into Zambia which forced the Zambians to be more unwilling to support SWAPO. South Africa’s raid into Angola drove the rebels back 200 miles and did significant damage. The war intensified and South African and Angolan forces fought their first battle in 1981. Two Angolan brigades including their Russian advisors were destroyed. Approximately 10,000 guerrillas were killed with a loss of around 800 South Africans. SWAPO then resorted to guerilla tactics.

By 1988, the number of SWAPO combatants had decreased to around 8700 of which no more than 800 were near the border. SWAPO faced 12,000 South Africans of the South West African Territorial Force 80% of these forces were blacks. In 1987 one black troop refused to fight but the revolt was soon put down. South African counter insurgency tactics were effective. They also used the British idea of fortified villages which cut off the villagers from any contact with the rebels. Without local support, food and intelligence the insurgency was hard pressed to make any impact. However, the fortified villages created 75,000 refugees who fled to Angola.

In 1987, the war in Angola increased rapidly after South Africa gave support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The South Africans sent troops to help in the siege and the battle developed into an arms duel between the South African and Cuban artillery. The Cuban troops got involved directly in the fighting for the first time and rushed reinforcements into the battle. The siege was abandoned in 1988 and the Cubans then sent extra 10,000 troops to support the communist government in Angola, moving large units to the border with Namibia for the first time during their involvement. The Cuba-South Africa war in Angola suddenly increased. This turned the tide of the war for SWAPO as South African forces were unwilling to provoke the Cubans by crossing the border to destroy rebel bases. With safe havens near the border available, SWAPO guerrillas were able to attack South African bases in Namibia and resume their guerrilla warfare operations.

In the 1980s, the political pressure was increasing on the South Africans. For example, the United Nation (UN) formed a “contact group” of influential Western powers which included the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA) to put pressure on South Africa to grant Namibia independence. The USA linked independence for Namibia with the issue of Cuban troops leaving Angola. However, the Angolan government feared it would survive a Cuban withdrawal and the South Africans had little intention of giving Namibia its independence. The Russians who had been supporting the Angolan government decided that it was time to withdraw its support.

Meanwhile South Africa was becoming more isolated internationally and the cost of military intervention was increasing. The South African government realised that if they got out now they could set some terms for Namibia’s independence and protect South African business interests. On 8 August 1988, a cease fire was agreed and announced in Geneva, Switzerland. The UN sent a peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement and to help conduct and manage fair elections. In 1989, elections were held and SWAPO won with 57% of the votes with 41 seats in the National Assembly, the opposition party, Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA) won 29% with 21 seats. Sam Nujoma was elected the president of the country. Namibia had its first multi party system.

On 21 March 1990, Namibia became independent with guests such as the then South African president, F W de Klerk and USA and Russian foreign ministers. During the Namibian struggle for independence, South Africa showed counterinsurgency tactics adopting both the British tactics of fortified villages to cut off the insurgents’ oxygen and striking against rebel bases in safe havens instead of trying to police a huge and isolated border. SWAPO showed the classic collective tactics of being able to shift between full scale guerrilla warfare as the situation changed and in the end its determination proved greater than the South African political will. The conflict in Namibia also illustrated the involvement of super powers in Third World wars to fight the Cold War by alternative and how South Africa attempted to protect business interests through war. It took 24 years of revolt and warfare for Namibia to gain its independence from South Africa. During the years of revolt and warfare, 1966 – 1990, between 20 000 and 25 000 people died. In 1994, the first elections following the country’s independence were held. SWAPO won 53 out of 72 seats in the National Assembly. The opposition party, Democratic Tumhalle Alliance (DTA) of Namibia won 15 seats.


Austria

The Freedom Party (FPÖ) became the only far-right party in power in Western Europe when it joined a coalition as junior partner with conservative Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in 2017. His People's Party, along with the centre-left Social Democrats, have long dominated Austrian politics.

As in Germany, the migrant crisis that unfolded in 2015 was also seen as key to the FPÖ's success, and an issue they long campaigned on.

During its time in power the Freedom Party became caught up in a series of race rows. Then, party leader Heinz-Christian Strache and parliament group head Johann Gudenus were caught up in a scandal over a video "sting" filmed in Ibiza in 2017.

Mr Strache resigned and the fallout led to the far-right party quitting the government and support for the FPÖ fell sharply to 16% in September elections.